The EU's Internal Security Strategy: less than meets the eye

It comes as no surprise, then, that the launch of an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) in 2010 has attracted a great deal of attention - from policymakers and researchers, too. The eventual strategy, however, generates more questions than answers. Where did it come from? Who was behind the strategy? What will be its effect on actual cooperation and policy outcomes? 

In a recently published UI Occasional Paper, Mark Rhinard and Anna Horgby look at the origins of the ISS. The study is the first of its kind to trace the origins of the ISS, how it came to be formulated, and its eventual content. Formulating the benefits typically offered by a strategy, the study examines how the history of the ISS is likely to affect these potential benefits. The analysis suggests that the way the writing process was handled - insular, unguided and hastily - is likely undermine the impact of the ISS on both cooperation and policy.

For example, the ISS had more banal origins than policy strategies normally have. Instead of signaling newfound intent at the highest levels, or marking a break with the past and the pathway to a new future, the inception of the ISS can be traced to a committee on the operational aspects of EU internal security cooperation (COSI - Comité permanent de sécurité intérieure). The committee, proposed in 2002 in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks, was searching for a guiding concept. It was not until the Madrid train bombings in March 2003 and the London transport attacks in July 2005 that the concept of internal security moved to the top of EU agendas in both the Council and Commission. It was then that first references were made to an "Internal Security Strategy." 

Even with the idea firmly planted, there was no real progress in the development of the strategy for several years. Discussions took place only in an informal group of national ministers, the "Future Group," before reappearing in the official debate in 2008. With a new multi-year internal security program in the making - the Stockholm Programme - and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty containing provisions to COSI, a window of opportunity opened for the idea of formulating a strategy.

Once the need for an ISS was firmly established, attention turned to process: formulating the actual strategy. The Stockholm Programme, somewhat awkwardly, called on both the Council and the Commission to further define an ISS, which caused confusion and raised questions of which institution was responsible and whom would take the leadership. Only a handful of governments, led by Spain, started to develop the ISS, although in a closed process including only a small circle of officials. Little room was left for consultation and input by other governments, the European Parliament or the Commission. While the Commission kept its distance, national parliaments and the European Parliament expressed their concerns about the situation. Considering the process in which the ISS was formulated, the strategy lost the possibility to create "buy-in" and generate direction within fragmented institutional landscapes.

In terms of content, the ISS reads in a fairly rambling and winding way, with a wide array of risks and threats included as a kind of "Christmas Tree? model of policymaking. The ISS introduces the concept of a "European Security Model." Yet, this concept is unspecified and does not follow through with coherent principles and objectives. The content of the ISS seems narrow and inconsistent with the current legal framework for EU-decision making in internal security cooperation. In fact, it focuses mainly on intergovernmental issues without addressing the Union's competences adequately. The strategy thus contains very little information helpful for guiding daily activities.

This brief summary of the paper suggests that rather banal origins of the ISS, its unclear ownership, the formulation of the strategy in a fairly exclusive group, and the fragmented content lacking availability to guide policymaking, together undermine the potential benefits of the ISS. It also explains why the ISS may not prove to be as influential as some might hope. 

Read the paper The EU's internal security strategy in full.

Text by: Anna Horgby, former UI researcher and Mark Rhinard, Senior Research Fellow and head of the Europe Research Program at UI.