THE EU’S INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY: LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ITS PAST

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ABSTRACT

The adoption of an Internal Security Strategy in the European Union in the early months of 2010 raised not only expectations but also a number of questions from Brussels observers. Where did it come from? Who was behind the strategy? Does it represent the interests of the many actors involved in internal security cooperation? What will be its effect on actual cooperation and policy outcomes? This paper takes a historical perspective in helping to answer these questions. We examine the history of the ISS from three perspectives – its origin, its formulation, and its eventual content – and examine the extent to which those perspectives offer clues as to the likely impact of the ISS. Using some “ideal-type” benefits attributed to strategies generally – including political-symbolic benefits, cohering effects, and improved operational guidance – we assess whether the history of the ISS is likely to enable or constrain success. While further research is needed, our analysis of developments in the months after adoption of the ISS suggests that its history served to undermine its impact on cooperation generally and policymaking specifically.
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INTRODUCTION

The adoption of an Internal Security Strategy (ISS) for the European Union (EU) caught many Brussels watchers off-guard. Appearing rather quickly from the hands of the Spanish Presidency in 2010, the ISS was adopted without widespread debate in the early months of that year. Since then, commentators have taken aim at the ISS, what it means for the EU, and what it may (or may not) represent for the future of internal security policymaking in the EU. Most analyses, however, fail to take into account the historical, institutional and political context from which the ISS emerged. This working paper shows that the ISS has a much longer lineage than typically assumed, and argues that the background of the ISS must be accounted for if we are to gauge its potential to shape the future direction of EU internal security cooperation.

We examine the history of the ISS from three perspectives – its origin, its formulation, and its eventual content – and examine the extent to which those perspectives offer clues as to the future impact of the ISS. As a set of evaluation metrics, we outline the standard goals of strategy and study the ISS and its evolution against that backdrop. Those goals include political symbolism (to signal renewed intent), administrative cohesion (to create a common narrative), and operational guidance (to illuminate means with ends). Those metrics allow us to assess whether the historical trajectory and eventual outcome of the ISS is likely to achieve what strategies are intended to achieve: to change behavior and shape cooperation in more coherent ways.

The paper conducts a process tracing of the creation of the ISS, drawing on multiple sources of data to illuminate links between various stages of its evolution and eventual outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). The data gathered include EU official documents, drawn from electronic archives and from sources within each of the EU’s institutions. We also conducted interviews with key policy officials, some at high-levels of the Commission’s administration. Press clippings from newspapers documenting Brussels policy events were used as verifying data, while secondary sources including academic articles and think-tank papers rounded out the analysis. In addition to uncovering historical details that might inform current practice, the data collection effort here serves another purpose with an eye to posterity: we wish to document the untold story of a key piece of European Union policy.

The paper begins by discussing some “ideal-type” benefits of strategy before looking at the history of the ISS in three sections. First, we examine the origin of the idea to create a strategy for internal security, showing that the idea was vaguer and took a more circuitous route to fruition than typically assumed. Second, we look at the process through which the ISS was written, revealing that the process was controlled by a relatively small group in the Council through the entrepreneurship of the then-Spanish Presidency of the EU. Third, we study the eventual content of the ISS and discuss its skewed set of objectives and tools and its intergovernmental (rather than Union) character. We conclude the analysis by taking stock of developments after the ISS as an indication of its effect on outcomes and behavior. The conclusion recounts the findings and questions the next steps in strategic thinking on EU internal security.
ASSESSING STRATEGY

The notion of a “strategy” for internal security raises expectations for what it might do; that is, what effect it could potentially have on organization and outcomes. The literature on strategy, although scattered across the fields of business management and international relations, offers a series of indications about what benefits of strategy (e.g. developing a strategic plan) might have in principle. We outline those benefits here, as a backdrop for our history of the ISS and as a set of measures for assessing whether the ISS can be interpreted as a strategic success.

A strategy is typically defined as a plan for mobilizing resources towards the attainment of an objective or a set of objectives. McKeown puts it more elegantly when he argues that “strategy is about shaping the future” – it is an attempt to achieve “desirable ends with available means” (2011). This definition of strategy is about planning and plotting a future deemed by its formulators to be better than the present. Strategy is viewed as important since the present (in addition to not featuring the characteristics of a future we would like to get to) is constrained by limited resources, unruly bureaucracies, and uncertainty about how broader contexts will impinge on the direction of an organization. These constraints, coupled with a desire to slip from their grasp by setting longer-term objectives, point to the value of strategy. In short, strategy provides three potential benefits (Rumelt 2011):

1. Signaling renewed intent, or a break from the past, is part of the political-symbolic role played by strategy. Strategy often follows a shift in a polity or organization’s circumstances (e.g. the election of a new President) or crisis-induced change (e.g. an attack). It represents a highly evocative statement about a desire to reach new or revised goals and sometimes comes with a symbolic, descriptive concept that can be easily understood by outsiders (Biscop 2004, 2009). In short, the political-symbolic function of a strategy is to signal intent to a wide audience.

2. Generating a sense of common purpose is part of the cohering role that strategy might play. Strategy is invariably oriented towards internal actors in particular, since one goal of strategy is to improve cohesion of purpose within complex, fragmented organizations. They attempt to gain “buy-in” from complex organizations accustomed to doing things in different ways and sometimes for different purposes (Rumelt 2011). National security strategies are often a case in point: they are intended to encourage the various parts of sprawling government apparatuses to mobilize their respective resources towards a common goal.

3. Providing indicators and measures for day-to-day policymaking is another potential benefit of strategy. Strategy by definition is normally not particularly detailed, but it can provide a reminder of how existing means for pursuing newly stated aims. Operational actors can see how their activities fit the broader picture, and what kinds of signposts indicate progress toward success (McKeown 2011). To that point, the literature on strategy often recommends “translating” broad strategy into sectoral or other micro-level activities as a way for strategy to influence action on the ground (Rumelt 2011).

These functions of typical strategies are highly stylized, of course; few real-life strategies match this ideal-type picture. But they do offer a useful set of metrics against which to examine not just the ISS itself, but also how its history may have contributed – and continue to shape – its potential for changing behavior within the EU.
THE ORIGIN OF THE ISS

While some strategies are intended to signal newfound intent at the highest levels, or to mark a break with the past and the pathway to a new future, the ISS had more pedestrian origins. The ISS can be traced to the proposal for a committee of high-level internal security officials from national levels, a committee that eventually became known as COSI, its French acronym (Comité permanent de sécurité intérieure). The idea for COSI was born almost a decade before it went into operation. In 2002, the then-Spanish Presidency of the EU proposed such a committee, in recognition that the attacks of 11 September 2001 illuminated the cross-border nature of crime and security threats. Just as the Political and Security Committee (PSC) coordinates the operational issues associated with external security missions in the EU, so was the perception that internal security required better coordination. The proposal was rejected (Arteaga 2010: 5) but resurfaced when the European Convention was convened later in 2002 to consider a major treaty change for the EU (See Table 1 for a table of key documents in the life of the ISS).

The European Convention’s Working Group X on internal security was busy laying the groundwork for the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ) provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty when it took up the issue of coherence and efficiency in EU internal security cooperation. It proposed an internal security committee with a more operational (as compared to policymaking) role, and in their final report, argued for “a more efficient structure for the coordination of operational cooperation at high technical level to be created within the Council” (CONV 426/02). This was the official inception of COSI, and as the Tampere Programme of multi-year planning for internal security cooperation was nearing its end, and a new successor program was being formulated, the proposal was incorporated into what became known as the Hague Programme in 2004.

The Hague Programme formally invited the Council to set up a “Committee on Internal Security” (Council 2005/C 53/1: 26), following by a flurry of Council documents discussing what precisely the role of such a committee would be (Statewatch 2005).

As Luxembourg took over the rotating presidency of the EU in January 2005, the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty still seemed to be on track. The Presidency took on the challenge of establishing COSI and, in issuing guidance to an upcoming Council of (Justice) Ministers meeting, offered the first glimpse of a strategy. Their guidance invited ministers to reflect “on the basis of an integral concept covering police and judicial aspects of operational coordination” (Luxembourg Presidency 2005). That action, which most likely reflected early internal discussions, helps to explain the origin of a strategy – to guide the work of a committee on internal security operational coordination. The Constitutional Treaty was rejected via two referenda only a few months later, but the Madrid train bombings in March 2003 and the subsequent London transport attacks in July 2005 ensured that the question of internal security policy coherence remained high on the agenda.

Indeed, the effects of the London bombings were felt strongly as the EU moved to review its internal security cooperation in 2006. The Council’s contribution to a review of the Hague Programme prioritized advancement of an “Architecture of Internal Security” and encouraged “a process for the establishment of a reference framework for EU internal security” (Council 7039/2/06 and 9596/1/06, p. 2). This oblique reference nevertheless referred to growing discussions about the possibility of moving from a “concept” to a “strategy”. Indeed, only a few months later both the Council and the Commission made reference to a strategy. The Council’s “Report on the Review of The Hague Programme called for “an agreed Internal Security Strategy, which should build upon the ongoing inter-institutional work in the area of counter-terrorism and protection of critical infrastructures” (Council 15844/06: 9). A Communication by the Commission on “Implementing the Hague Programme: The Way Forward” stated that “it is time to develop an agreed Internal Security Strategy” (COM(2006) 331).

With the notion of a strategy on internal security firmly planted (but not moving particularly fast), the torch was passed to the “Future Group”. This informal group of ministers was formed in January 2007 following the joint initiative of the then-German Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble and Franco Frattini, then-European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs. According to their own terms of reference, the Future Group offered a platform for open and informal reflection on new ideas and
proposals for the development of the AFSJ (Future Group 2008a; see also Future Group 2007: 1). It had a fairly wide membership but only a subset of member states. Ministers of Internal from Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, France, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Spain, Belgium and Hungary were joined by the President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), a representative of the Secretariat General of the Council, and of course Franco Frattini representing the Commission. Deliberations revealed a proposal by the Luxembourg Minister for a wide-ranging “EU Internal Security Policy” to guide JHA ministers “by defining the operational priorities of its action every two years, through an Action Plan which will identify the level of necessary action (EU, national or local), including the external dimension of the measure to be taken” (Future Group 2007: 5). The Future Group’s final report instead opted to recommend an “Internal Security Strategy” (Future Group 2008a: 22), a finding noted by the Council in its conclusions (Council 11657/08). Perhaps more importantly, several governments holding upcoming Presidencies of the EU took part in the discussions and “signed up” to the idea of strategy – including France and Spain (Future Group 2008b).

The 2008 French Presidency reintroduced the idea of an ISS into official debate. Council texts on the future of JHA cooperation noted the 2006 Council mention of an ISS, and introduced a discussion in the Article 36 Article 3 Committee (“CATS”, Comité de l’article trente-six, which had a coordinating role regarding police and judicial cooperation in the EU) on what an ISS might look like. The French may have had a strategic interpretation of the role ISS might play, reflected in their question of whether an ISS formulation process, if undertaken, might require an “improved strategic analysis system” (Council 12390/08: 8).

By 2008, the review of the Hague Programme was well underway and a successor programme was in the making. That programme would eventually become the “Stockholm Programme”, as it was adopted under the Swedish Presidency of the EU in late 2009, and gave advocates an opportunity to link the ISS with the launch of a new multiyear internal security programme (Arteaga 2010: 2). At the same time, the final ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which contained the COSI provisions carried over from the Constitutional Treaty, was taking place through a referendum in October 2009 in Ireland. The convergence of the formal authorization of COSI, the birth of the Stockholm Programme, and the continuing attention paid to the idea of an ISS together opened a window of opportunity for the ISS to come into being.

The origin of the ISS from the Commission’s perspective is difficult to gauge. Following their 2006 intervention, the ISS featured prominently in Commission texts again only in 2009. One might surmise that the Commission had cause to consider carefully the possible benefits of an ISS. Not only was the potential “ownership” of such a strategy unclear, but its “jurisdiction” might even prove complicated: would a strategy cover Commission competences, Council political direction, EU agencies, or all of the above? The Commission no doubt treaded carefully in such questions, but may have warmed to the idea. In June 2009, the Commission adopted a Communication in which the ISS was one of four ideas for developing an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the Citizen”. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Commission’s approach was wide-ranging, including a broader variety of goals and objectives and focusing on its own competences (COM(2009) 262).

At the start of the Swedish Presidency in July 2009, the ISS was for the first time placed as an individual item on the agenda of the JHA Council at an informal Council meeting (Swedish Presidency 2009). Later that year, drafts of the Stockholm Programme were circulated which contained an explicit call to define a “comprehensive Union internal security strategy” (Council 5731/10)22, first calling on the Council to do so, and in later drafts, calling on both the Council and the Commission. That dual call sowed the seeds of confusion (House of Lords 2011: 8) and raised questions of which institution was responsible and which would take leadership. Furthermore, the conception of what the ISS was intended to do seems to have expanded over time: originally conceived as an “integral concept” to guide the COSI committee, articulations in the Stockholm Programme used terminology such as the importance of developing a “comprehensive...strategy” to “further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of citizens of the Union and to tackle organised crime, terrorism and other threats” (European Council 2010: 5). As the Stockholm Programme was being finalized in the end of 2009, and as the final JHA Council meeting of the Swedish Presidency took place, this expansive – and somewhat confusing – language was adopted by the European Council (Council 16883/09).
## TABLE 1. KEY DOCUMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE ISS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DOCUMENT NO.</th>
<th>DOCUMENT TITLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>2 December 2002</td>
<td>CONV 426/02 WG X 14</td>
<td>Final report of Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice”</td>
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<td>27 January 2005</td>
<td>Informal Meeting of the JHA Ministers</td>
<td>Strengthening Security – Structuring operational police and judicial cooperation at European Union level</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 April 2006</td>
<td>7039/2/06 REV 2, 9596/1/06 REV 1 JAI 270 CATS 104</td>
<td>Architecture of Internal Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 November 2006</td>
<td>15844/06 JAI 650</td>
<td>Report on the review of The Hague Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September 2008</td>
<td>12390/08 JAI 416 CATS 65</td>
<td>Structuring and internal cooperation in internal security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 2009</td>
<td>COM (2009) 262 final</td>
<td>An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 – 17 July 2009</td>
<td>Working doc. 1, meeting 421</td>
<td>Informal meeting of Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs - Preparing the Stockholm Programme - Developing a Europe that Protects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 2009</td>
<td>14449/09 JAI 679</td>
<td>Draft Multi-annual programme for an area of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the citizen (The Stockholm Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 November – 1 December</td>
<td>16883/09</td>
<td>2979th Council meeting – Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December 2009</td>
<td>17024/09 CO EUR-PREP 3 JAI 896 POLGEN 229</td>
<td>The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens (draft)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 December 2009</td>
<td>17696/09 POLGEN 240</td>
<td>18 month programme of the Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 January 2010</td>
<td>5008/10 JAI 1 COMIX 1</td>
<td>JHA Trio Presidency programme (January 2010 – June 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January 2010</td>
<td>5462/10</td>
<td>Results of the EU-US Informal Justice and Home Affairs Senior Officials meeting, Madrid, 11-12 January 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 February 2010</td>
<td>6048/10</td>
<td>Summary of the meeting of the European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), held in Brussels on 26-27 January 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February 2010</td>
<td>6870/10 (Presse 44)</td>
<td>EU Internal Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 2010</td>
<td>5731/10 CO EUR-PREP 2 JAI 81 POLGEN 8</td>
<td>The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March 2010</td>
<td>EUCO 7/10 CO EUR 4 CONCL 1</td>
<td>European Council 25/26 March 2010 Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May 2010</td>
<td>2010/C 115/01</td>
<td>The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 2010</td>
<td>9359/10 LIMITE JAI 390 COSI 29</td>
<td>The Joint Report by EUROPOL, EUROJUST and FRONTEX on the State of Internal Security in the EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 October 2010</td>
<td>15358/10</td>
<td>Draft Council Conclusions on the creation and implementation of a EU policy cycle for organised and serious international crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November 2010</td>
<td>COM(2010) 673 final</td>
<td>The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February 2011</td>
<td>3071st JHA Council Meeting</td>
<td>Council conclusions on the Commission communication on the European Union internal security strategy in action</td>
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In short, the origin of the ISS is linked to the drive to create a guiding concept for the work of a coordinating committee for internal security in the Council: COSI. It was not conceived as a method for fomenting a change in policy direction or for signaling grand intentions. The story of its origin, which we traced along a meandering path, shows how a modest initial proposal survived a series of obstacles to be taken up officially more than a decade later (Bunyan 2010: 6). Yet the origin of an ISS was still associated with controversy, in that the role of the Commission and the Council in instigating the ISS was never made entirely clear. This ambiguity, along with its rather banal origins (from a strategic perspective), meant that one possible benefit from strategy – to signal political-symbolic intent – was undermined from the start.

THE PROCESS OF CREATING THE ISS

With the need to develop an ISS firmly planted, the Spanish Presidency (first half of 2010) took it upon itself to start the formulation process. We see the ISS as part of the Presidency’s AFSJ agenda priorities as early as March 2009, when the government presented ideas at a meeting of European ministers at the G6 meeting in Berlin (Hillebrand 2010b: 39). Through 2009 the drafting process got underway but with very little publicity. The Spanish Ministry of the Interior formed a small working group to produce an initial text and the group consulted very little with “outsiders” such as the Commission. If a form of “policy entrepreneur” can be identified, it was Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, the then-Spanish Interior Minister. Rubalcaba was on the record arguing that “[T]here is no common strategy for internal security. The Spanish Presidency will work at filling this gap’. Rubalcaba wants this internal security strategy framework to be as clear and concrete as possible so that European citizens realise that the EU works hard to protect them” (Acker 2010: 44).

While this may have been the case, Rubalcaba engaged in only a modicum of “shuttle diplomacy” on the issue. Some member state governments only received notice of the draft towards the end of 2009. A full draft strategy was circulated on 3 December 2009 amongst EU interior ministries (Hillebrand 2010b: 39-40) while a meeting of senior national officials from interior ministries in Madrid on 17-18 December 2009 were asked to comment on the draft, which was titled “Towards a European Security Model” (Gruszczak 2010: 3). All of this was aimed at gaining consensus in advance for the 20-22 January 2010 informal ministerial meeting planned in Toledo, Spain.

The tight timeline left little room for consultation, even with other governments. This may not have been true for other holders of the “trio” presidency – including Belgium and Hungary – which featured the ISS as part of the joint agenda, although that agenda was published after the Madrid meeting (Council 17696/09 and 5008/10). Copies of the draft were sent in January 2010 to delegations (Council 5842/10) and to the JHA Council (5462/10). It was at that time, too, that the European Parliament’s LIBE Committee was formally notified and shown copies of the draft (Council 6048/10). This left many Parliamentarians angry at the closed nature of the process, with few opportunities for meaningful consultation and input prior to the Toledo meeting in January 2010. National parliaments were also largely cut out from discussions if they were not informed by interior ministries in their own respective governments (Busuioc & Curtin 2011: 15). The Commission, too, felt largely cut out of the process – or, at a minimum – that the process was being driven firmly by the Council and the Spanish Presidency (House of Lords 2011). The Council did, however, consult with some of the EU’s agencies – namely Europol, Eurojust and Frontex – for assistance in the listing of threats contained in the draft strategy (Council 9359/10). While the Spanish Presidency asked for a combined threat assessment from three agencies, the result was rather haphazard and lacked coherence (Brady 2011: 77-78; see also Bigo 2010).

Following some last minute adjustments to include “road traffic accidents” as one of the listed internal security threats, the ISS was adopted on 25 February 2010 (Council 6870/10) and approved by the European Council one month later (European Council EUCO 7/10). Even with the ISS adopted, the Parliament continued its criticism – having been cut out not only of the ISS drafting process but also of
the original discussions on COSI (Hillebrand 2010b: 40) at a time when the Lisbon Treaty made the Parliament an equal legislator on many JHA matters. The Commission, too, had a hard time interpreting the content and meaning of the ISS. What was the relationship of the ISS to the Commission-driven Stockholm Programme? Was the ISS to shape policy beyond the operational considerations covered by COSI, as originally intended? As one Commission cabinet member put it, “It is hard to know what to do with [the ISS]. We need to give it focus and match it with available instruments” (Interview 2010).

To summarize, the process of formulating the ISS was kept within a fairly small circle, and an intergovernmental circle at that. The Commission kept its distance, while the Parliament and national parliaments expressed deep concern over the lack of consultation. While some EU agencies were asked for input, very little attention from the press or general public can be discerned. If one goal of strategy is to create “buy-in” and generate direction within fragmented institutional landscapes, the process by which the ISS was formulated may have undermined that aim.

THE CONTENT OF THE ISS

An advantage of strategy is the ability to link means with ends, which, along with a statement of priority and indicators of success, can provide day-to-day guidance for policymaking. This turns our attention to content. The sub-title of the ISS suggestively suggests the EU should move “Towards a European Security Model”, a concept subsequently defined as a “set of common tools” and a commitment to a long list of normative “principles” including solidarity, inclusion of relevant actors, a commitment to civil liberties, and prevention work in addition to addressing “sources of insecurity”. The text begins with a list of threats and challenges, listed as terrorism, serious and organized crime, cyber-crime, cross-border crime, violent itself, natural and man-made disasters as well as phenomena such as road traffic accidents. It then shows the responses that are taking place – and which ostensibly should take place – such as prevention work, improving response capacities, coordinating EU agencies and roles, such as the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, more effectively, improved information sharing based on mutual recognition, and improved evaluation and follow-up activities.

After going through the normative principles that constitute a European Security Model (principles largely corresponding the European Charter of Fundamental Rights), the document concludes with a set of “strategic guidelines for action”. A list of ten objectives, which expand upon but overlap with the “responses” section described earlier, could be described as a “Christmas Tree” of wishes in a number of disparate working areas and at different operational levels: more intelligence-led policing, better focus on democratic freedoms, more integrated border control, and improved information exchange, to name some examples (see Council 6870/10). The wide ranging and normative nature of some of these tasks raises questions about the original intent of the ISS: to give direction to COSI, and operational committee intended to coordinate actions rather than draft policy and monitor civil liberties, for instance.

Considering the process by which it was created, it might not be a surprise that the ISS is a Council document in more than just name. It focuses mainly on issues of an intergovernmental nature rather than on Union competences. Going further, the ISS presents a model of intergovernmental cooperation in only some areas of internal security; thus Arteaga suggests the ISS presents a “sub-model” at best (2010: 4) while Guild and Carrera (2011: 3) go further in saying the ISS can be seen as an attempt to reintroduce third pillar decision-making in a post-Lisbon environment. In any case, the ISS seems narrow and inconsistent with the current legal framework for EU decision-making in internal security cooperation – a framework in which the Community Method now applies to most issue areas. This inconsistency limits the potential for the ISS to guide day-to-day decision-making in the policy field – one of the key benefits that strategy might have.

Further, the power of the European Security Model to guide decision-making is undermined by the fact that the “action objectives” in the ISS do not correspond very well to the “principles” of the model. Much is left undefined and imprecise, including the specific nature of threats, the actors responsible for different
tasks, and measures of success. Imprecision is not totally uncharacteristic of strategies in general, but for the ISS it undermines the potential benefit of the strategy since the EU’s internal security field is already so fragmented and reliant on national implementation (Allum & Den Boer 2013, Carrera & Guild 2011).[4]

In short, the content of the ISS argues for a particular model of security but does not follow through

ANALYSIS: AFTER THE ISS

What happened in the aftermath of the ISS? Looking at policy and institutional developments offers an indication of whether the ISS is affecting cooperation.[5]

We can start with the Commission, which was requested in the final paragraph of the ISS to “adopt a Communication on the Internal Security Strategy which will include action oriented proposals” (Council 7120/10: 18). The Communication, adopted by the Commission in November 2010, was titled “The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps Towards a More Secure Europe” (COM(2010) 673). The Commission narrowed the discussion to just five strategic directions, but with more substance and detailed action proposals. The central threats are drawn from the ISS, and consist of: serious and organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security and natural or man-mad disasters. The more diffused threats such as “violence itself” and phenomena such as “road traffic accidents” are excluded in the communication.

Through their Communication on the ISS, the Commission sought to pay homage to the ISS but to improve upon its weaknesses; in the words of one insider in the Commission, “we had to do something in relation to the ISS, but the choice was made to create a more strategic document in substance and not just title; with that document in place, we hoped to leave the ISS behind” (Interview 2010). The Communication also represented an attempt by the Commission to reintroduce its views on questions of strategy and to remind national governments of its “added-value” (Brady 2011: 66). In some respects, the Commission Communication achieved those goals. As Brady argues, the Communication is the only document which has managed to “bring a set of priorities to EU action in this area”, in contrast to both the Stockholm Programme and the ISS (2011: 71).[6]

The Commission’s Communication did not put questions of ownership to rest. Discussions on the ISS continued to take place in parallel: informally within the JHA Council structures as COSI was being established, and within the Commission. As a result, frictions first generated in the origin of the ISS have persisted. Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs, for instance, refers to “my strategy” while the ISS is simply “the Council proposal” (Malmström 2010: 10, 13). The Council holds the opposite view, and in fact expresses frustration that the Commission has become too involved in shaping the follow-up to the ISS. In Brady’s words, “the Council (all the interior ministries together) does not even like this communication document… It does not like the Commission putting its stall out like this; it is very shocking for some of them” (2011: 86). Scherrer, Jeandesboz & Guittet argue that on the ISS, there is a strong cleavage between the Commission and a handful of member states hostile to ambitious JHA initiatives. That cleavage helps explain the “incapacity to alter courses of action previously agreed upon, based on the difficulty to find an agreement on new orientations.” (2011: 33). The UK, in particular, argues that the Commission’s response runs “counter to the focus of the ISS and COSI on practical measures and cooperation instead of new EU legislation” (Storr,
Institutional conflict over the ISS extends to the European Parliament. Not only was the Parliament displeased with the origin, formulation and content of the ISS (as described above), but it reserved some criticism for the Commission’s Communication, too. The rapporteur of the LIBE committee states that “neither the Member States nor the Commission have as yet envisaged any role for Parliament in this process” and repeats that “the European Parliament is now a fully-fledged institutional actor in the field of security policies, and is therefore entitled to participate actively in determining the features and priorities of the ISS and of the EU Security Model” (P7_TA(2012)0207: 5-6). It should be noted, however, that the Commission has accepted some of the Parliament’s requests, including a proposal for a “parliamentary policy cycle” where the parliament together with national parliaments could debate the Commission’s reports on the ISS (SP(2012)542).

Adding more confusion, at COSI’s first meeting in March 2010, a decision was made to “develop, monitor and implement” the ISS (Hillebrand 2010a), thus adding yet another implementation approach to the ISS. Interior Ministers, perhaps frustrated with the Commission’s approach, stated in July 2010 that the ISS “will be translated into an operational strategy” and put in place in 2014 with the assistance of COSI and Europol (Council 15358/10). Europol was assigned to define criminal phenomena and analyse statistics, while COSI had the role of “drawing up an operational action plan for any priorities identified by the JHA Council” (in Hillebrand 2010a). It could be noted here that COSI has had a difficult start, with unclear membership criteria and a confusing role in “operational” internal security issues (Shapcott 2010: 18). Europol has played a strong role in helping to set COSI’s agenda, for instance, by helping to implement the Harmony Policy Cycle. That process involves expert groups stipulating concrete actions that can help achieve general objectives. For COSI, therefore, the ISS has been supplanted by the Harmony Policy Cycle (Bossong and Rhinard 2013). ISS has thus failed to live up to even the most modest expectations of providing COSI with an “integral concept” (cite to Luxembourg) to guide its operations.
CONCLUSION

This paper offered a historical perspective on the creation of the ISS, showing that the particular context and nature in which the strategy developed had a formative effect on its eventual impact. We demonstrated the ISS’s potential — and unrealized potential — by assessing the ISS against the ostensible benefits of strategy, in general. Those benefits are to signal renewed intent to a broad audience, to improve coherence amongst a fragmented institutional landscape, and to provide indications and measures for day-to-day policymaking. While few strategies may achieve these “ideal goals”, and continued research needs to be conducted, current evidence suggests the ISS seems to be failing to achieve any of them.

We found that the notion of creating an ISS for the EU dates back more than a decade, but far from a wide-ranging, political-symbolic exercise, the original idea for an ISS was to give direction to a single committee operating in the EU. Thus, while catching Brussels observers off-guard and raising expectations of newfound intent, the ISS in reality was a fairly narrow, institutional exercise. We also found that the ISS was formulated in a fairly small, Spanish-centered drafting group. That group, led by the Spanish Minister of the Interior did not consult widely or early amongst EU institutions or civil society. Thus, any potential cohering effect of the strategy, to draw together agencies, institutions and governments towards a common purpose, was lost. Finally, we found that the ISS contains very little information helpful for guiding — or signposting — daily activities. Strategies rarely contain detailed information, but they do help lower-level officials to connect means with ends and to justify certain action steps. The ISS thus fails in the third benefit that strategies can possibly provide an organization or polity. These historical features of the ISS’s evolution provide plausible explanations for the limited effect of the ISS, at least in the short term. Additional data collection on future developments, however, is required before strong conclusions can be drawn.

This paper offers a rare perspective of the ISS, including historical detail, which should be useful for academics and practitioners alike. Not only is the “story” of the ISS important to recount for posterity’s sake, but it also gives us analytical traction on why the ISS may not prove as influential as some might hope. With the benefits of hindsight, it may have been a mistake to call the Council’s document a “strategy”, since it neither contains the traditional elements of strategy nor does it help set a long-term, focused vision for a broad array of actors. A strategy worthy of the name would have included a broader set of actors in consultation, adopted a commonly held set of priorities worth mobilizing resources towards, set out a set of metrics for achieving success, and perhaps set a symbolic notion with broader appeal than the rather vacuous “European Security Model”. A review of the ISS is scheduled for 2014, but the prospects of altering course and developing a full-blown strategy look unlikely at a time when the “political consensus that has driven JHA cooperation over the past decade is fraying on several fronts” (Brady 2011: 66). Ironically, such a situation may make strategy more relevant than ever, but it also makes the creation of strategy — amongst diverse member states and EU institutions — more difficult than ever.
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ENDNOTES

[1] The authors are grateful for the helpful comments and constructive critique provided by Björn Fägersten, who helped improve the quality of this paper. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors alone.

[2] Earlier drafts of the Stockholm Programme, including references to the creation of the Internal Security Strategy, were circulated on 6 October 2009 (Stockholm Programme draft 6/10.2009) and a second on 16 October 2009 (Council 14449/09) and a third on 2 December 2009 (Council 17024/09).

[3] Mitsilegas argues that “The Commission’s list contains a mix of security objectives (e.g. combating crime) and means of achieving security (security via border management)” (2011: 56).

[4] Indeed, those two facts throw into question the wisdom of trying to achieve a single “model” for EU internal security cooperation at all (Burgess 2010: 4).

[5] For a more detailed analysis of outcomes after the ISS, see Bossong and Rhinard (2013).

[6] It can be debated whether the Commission’s Communication brought something substantively new. The Parliament criticized both the Council’s ISS and the Commission’s Communication as lacking substance “in terms of a hierarchy of priorities and justifications for the course of action proposed” (Scherrer, Jeandesboz & Guittet 2011: 33). The content is criticized as “recycling” earlier policies on internal security issues, “to reiterate past orientations and to reframe past initiatives” (Scherrer, Jeandesboz & Guittet, 2011: 33; see also Rees 2010: 62).
REFERENCES


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