The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise or Reinvent?

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The European Security Strategy:
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Executive Summary

This paper argues that a strategic discussion on the EU’s external action is overdue, and that the future of the European Security Strategy (ESS) should be the centre of that discussion. The precise nature of an eventual new strategy, the process by which it is undertaken, and its intended effects are open questions, however. We offer background, analysis, and reform options as a contribution to a wider European debate on the future role of the EU as an actor on the global stage.

The analysis in this report assumes that a new security strategy should fulfil three functions: it should have political appeal and thus potential to inspire, it should serve as a guideline for daily bureaucratic work, and it should serve as a way of communicating the EU and its views to a broad audience, within the EU as well as outside.

The first section of the report examines arguments against and in support of revisiting the strategy, the latter grouped into supportive arguments concerning timing, institutional flux, new threats, and shifting geopolitics. Key points include:

- The timing is right for a new ESS: a new EU budget cycle, review of the External Action Service (EAS), and the 10th anniversary of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can all be linked to a process revising the ESS.
- The EU’s institutional uncertainties post-Lisbon call for a new ESS to provide strategic direction for difficult reform decisions.
- The EU’s threat environment continues to shift, in the light of unexpected crises and transboundary threats to flow security.
- The global context has changed since 2003, with the continued rise of China, the shifting or perhaps declining role of the US, and the importance of new strategic partnerships.

The second section of the report tackles process questions, including how a new strategy should be drafted. We review recent processes of strategy writing and revision (both in the EU and NATO) to capture ‘lessons learned’. Such lessons include the importance of clear leadership, institutional support, member state support, and anticipating objections. The section concludes with the following key points:

- The 2003 ESS process was considered successful because of a careful balance between outside input and content control (the use of think tanks helped achieve this balance).
- The creation of a draft text, before the input process begins, ensures focused discussion.
The 2008 ESS process, in contrast to that of 2003, shows the risks of lacking a political consensus and clear mandate.

The 2010 NATO strategic review was unabashedly aimed at public diplomacy, a useful lesson for the EU. NATO devoted significant resources to public events.

NATO gathered structured input from other organisations (EU, OSCE, UN) and worked together with non-member states to enhance legitimacy of the process.

The NATO process included an expert group tasked with producing a ‘thought piece’ to facilitate the drafting process and the deliberations.

A future process must include EU institutions, key member states, and societal actors, but cannot lead to a cacophony of voices that distract focus.

The third section of the report outlines three options for addressing the current ESS: reinvigoration, revision, or reinvention. Each option has advantages and disadvantages in terms of fulfilling the three functions mentioned above. The first option is to reinvigorate the ESS, preserving the current ESS but making it more effective. This is best achieved through drafting separate sub-strategies, in particular for partnerships, operations, neighbours, EAS, and for the EU in the global multilateral environment. The second option is to revive the ESS, keeping the structure and orientation of the current strategy yet updating it for new threats, objectives, partnerships, and relevant capabilities. The third and final option is to reinvent the ESS through drafting a new document, perhaps a ‘grand strategy’ which articulates – and sharpens – the EU’s values and interests as defined in the Lisbon Treaty. This strategy would encompass a broader set of external policies, ranging from conflict prevention to trade and from internal security to humanitarian relief. As such, this document might be more aptly titled an ‘External Action Strategy’ for the EU. Key findings from this section include:

- The ‘reinvigorate’ option breathes new life into the old ESS, not by changing it but by using it to align EU sub-strategies on various topics and regions with current principles and recommendations. The political feasibility here may be high, but the effect of the process and its ability to inspire policymakers and the public might remain low.

- The ‘revise’ option retains the basic layout and thrust of the previous document and fills it with new content. This makes it perhaps more politically feasible, but may limit its visibility and potential for public diplomacy.

- The ‘reinvent’ option starts anew, perhaps aiming for a ‘grander’ and broader ‘European External Action Strategy’. This option would be more inspiring, higher profile, and impact upon EU developments more broadly. But it might be less politically feasible.
Introduction¹

‘Strategy’, in its essence, means a plan for obtaining a certain goal. Drafting a strategy is then to define a way to optimize the use of available means to that end. Drafting a strategy can, however, also be much more. In the case of the European Union and its security strategy, we clearly see how strategy in time becomes a question of identity, of credibility, and of legitimacy. A proposal to start a revision of the European Security Strategy from 2003 is thus bound to uncover a number of various – and sometimes contradictory – expectations regarding public engagement, visibility and profile.

The first ESS was constructed in a swift and rather exceptional manner considering the political circumstances; namely, the political pressure generated by the war in Iraq. That episode split the EU just as the moment it was about to establish itself as a security political actor with its first civilian and military missions. The actual ESS document was widely praised as a clear and accessible document capable of expressing the EU’s security identity to a great extent, but weak on guiding policies in practice.

Eight years on, criticism of the EU’s role in the world abounds. Recent crises in the neighbourhood cast a glaring light on the ESS’s commitment to ensure the EU acts ‘before countries around us deteriorate […] and before humanitarian emergencies arise’. The 2008 implementation report similarly urges the EU to do more to ‘shape events’, rather than simply react to them. The high-level report issued by the ‘Reflection Group on the Future of the EU’, issued in May 2010, warns of Europe’s increasing irrelevance if it does not generate common positions and speak with a coherent voice: the EU, stated the report, ‘can no longer afford to muddle through’ (European Union 2010a, p. 35).

¹ The authors would like to thank the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs for their financial support of this project.
This report assesses the prospects of a new approach to the European Security Strategy. We analyse the conditions under which the ESS might be revisited in order to address new circumstances, examine lessons learned from past experience, and offer new ideas regarding content and style of future changes to the ESS. We conclude that three plausible options are available to policymakers. First, the ESS could be reinvigorated, to identify and repair implementation problems with the original document (the ‘reinvigorate’ option). Second, the ESS could be updated in-line with its current structure and format to address today’s global context (the ‘revise’ option). Finally, an entirely new document could be rewritten with a new, broader approach to articulating Europe’s role in the world (the ‘reinvent’ option).

We believe the time is right for a fresh look at the ESS, as a matter of urgency. The EU’s institutional reforms require strategic guidance, the EU’s security goals and methods require further focus, and the geopolitical context in which the EU operates is quickly changing. The risks of opening up the ESS debate with twenty-seven member states now involved are considerable but should not be used as an excuse for inaction. Engaging in a process of strategic deliberation and articulating a shared vision are critical steps on the EU’s journey towards global influence.

This paper is structured as follows. First, we begin by analysing prevailing arguments against and for revisiting the European Security Strategy, including a brief discussion of shifting geopolitics. Second, we draw lessons from previous strategy processes both in the EU and in NATO, looking at questions of leadership and ownership, such as the position of the new member states not included in the previous process. Third, we outline several options for revisiting the ESS, ranging from a low-key retouch to a comprehensive rewriting. Each option carries advantages and disadvantages in terms of political feasibility, strategic depth, and possibilities for effective public diplomacy.²

² The method used to construct the discussion and analysis in this paper includes the use of primary evidence, namely textual analysis and interviews with policymakers and researchers, and secondary evidence gathered from existing literature as well as minutes from think tank meetings.
Section 1: Revisiting the European Security Strategy? Why Now?

Security strategies are rarely produced on a regular basis. More typically, they are constructed when political urgencies require. Hence the case in Europe, when the 2003 US invasion of Iraq produced a deep, and rather sudden, sense of crisis. Tensions rose and fractures emerged both in the EU family and across the Atlantic. The time seemed right (particularly in the eyes of Javier Solana) to launch an exercise that could restore internal unity within the EU and maintain solidarity with the US: producing a ‘European Security Strategy’.

Is 2011 a time of urgent crisis, requiring a revised security strategy for the EU? Most observers agree that we are in a period of crisis, both institutionally and geopolitically. The EU’s External Action Service (EAS) is struggling to find its feet, while the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy is struggling to find both a role and a voice. Internationally, the rapid developments in Northern Africa and the Middle East are transforming the EU’s neighbourhood, while natural disasters, such as most recently in Japan, reveal global vulnerabilities and remind of the complexities of long-term strategic thinking in energy policy in the EU. Current events like these can be taken as examples of when a clear European strategy could have been of use. A proper strategy could have bolstered the EU’s actions regarding the Arab Spring. Many would agree with the argument that the EU must now show leadership and determination at a particularly acute moment of crisis – or risk undermining its geopolitical relevance.

But not all observers agree writing a new security strategy is the right way forward just now. A common refrain (not least amongst EU institutional officials) is that ‘action is needed, not words’ or that more focus should be placed on ‘implementing what we’ve already agreed’ rather than contemplating new strategic exercises. Many observers feel that the 2003 European Security Strategy remains relevant in today’s world, and that reopening strategic debates may distract rather than focus the EU’s ambitions.
This section assesses those arguments in order to uncover the logic and rationales behind them. We disagree, however, that now is a bad time to undergo a process of strategic foreign policy thinking in the EU. It is in times of great turbulence that stepping back even momentarily to assess values and goals can provide greater clarity. After assessing arguments against a new security strategy, this section presents four sets of arguments in favour of a new security strategy.

**Arguments against a new ESS**

Arguments against a new security strategy take a variety of familiar forms:

‘Time for action, not words’. This argument points to the fragmented and divided political context in Europe at the moment, and emphasises the serious crises facing Europe. It suggests that strategy-making exercises are distracting: energy and time should be placed on putting policies into practice and fixing existing problems. Lessons should be learned from current crises before launching new strategic reviews. We would argue that revising the security strategy need not be a ‘zero-sum’ game, drawing energy from operations. On the contrary, placing more focus on EU security questions might signal resolve and intent to strengthen EU capacities.

‘It is too early to talk strategy’. One line of reasoning says that the EU’s current crises require all available attention, and that lessons should be learned from current crises before launching new strategic exercises. This argument reasons that strategies are best constructed under periods of consideration and reflection. Going further, some observers argue that the institutional uncertainties of the EAS should be ironed out before embarking on strategic reform. However, we would argue that crises will be a recurring motif of the EAS; the time is now to give the EU direction before the next crisis emerges.

‘We are tired of talking strategy’. Some arguments suggest that European governments may be suffering from strategic fatigue. More generally, some observers argue that if strategies are updated and revised too often, people will stop paying attention to them. We would argue that for the EU, eight years between strategic
reviews is hardly ‘too often’; strategies must be adapted to major world changes if they are to remain relevant.

‘Do not open a can of worms’. This argument questions the wisdom of opening a strategy review amongst 27 different governments. The process would be cumbersome, and even if consensus is eventually found, the end-product may be fatally diluted. We might counter, however, by arguing that according to this logic, there will never be a good time to revise the security strategy. Process (and the benefits of public diplomacy) is as important as product.

‘Implement and focus’. Other arguments state that the EU should implement what already exists: the current European Security Strategy requires greater implementation and effect. Commentators note that several of the promised follow-up efforts from the 2003 ESS never materialised and require attention. Another set of arguments counsel ‘focus’ for the EU. Rather than grapple with an unwieldy broad strategy, the EU should aim at strategies towards particular geographical regions or topical questions. We argue, however, that a new security strategy could reenergise efforts, point the way towards sub-strategies, but also tie together fragmented strategies at the EU level.

We believe in a more compelling list of arguments favouring a revision of the European Security Strategy. Those arguments can be grouped in four broad categories: timing, institutional flux, new threats, and shifting geopolitics.

**Arguments for a new ESS**

**Timing**

Several arguments related to timing support a reassessment of the ESS sooner rather than later. Most of these argument concern EU internal timelines.

_EAS ‘New Phase Assessment’ scheduled for mid-2013_. The EAS’s implementation texts refer to 2013 as the date at which the ‘first phase’ of the EAS should be completed and an evaluation of a ‘new phase’ undertaken (European Union 2010b).
This would be the perfect moment to have a new ESS in hand, to guide the next phase of development of the EAS.

**EU budget cycle 2014-2020.** The EU institutions are already gearing up for a new round of budget negotiations, scheduled for completion in 2013. Now would be the right time to have a revised ESS in hand, so that the EU’s new budget can match its new ambitions.

**Upcoming presidencies.** Future presidencies of the EU Council may lend additional support to a drive to update the ESS. Some appear particularly ambitious in the area of security policy and external relations; in particular Poland in the latter half of 2011.

**ESDP anniversary.** 2013 will mark 10 years of operations for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now called Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although there is no official word on a ’10 year review’, there are a number of smaller investigations already completed and more in progress. Many of those investigations call for a more strategic (and thus coherent) approach and cast significant criticisms on past actions: an ad hoc and reactive approach to CSDP mission planning, an inability to mobilise all the instruments of civilian crisis management, field leadership problems, expanding ‘mission creep’ once missions are underway without clear exit strategies, and lack of familiarity with local context (Asseburg and Kempin 2009; Freire et al. 2010). Such problems could be (partly) rectified with a more effective ESS.

**New regional strategies.** The EU has already taken steps towards new sub-strategies. In fact, some of the EAS’s first actions have been linked to the adoption of such strategies; for example, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Such strategies have been quietly adopted by the Council, however, rather than subject to a public process. Moreover, such strategies are not tied to a broader strategic framework. A new ESS could provide this framework.
Other strategic exercises. The EU’s 2003 Security Strategy now looks out-of-date, if only because NATO has updated its own strategic concept to account for geopolitical circumstances, political realities, and its own mission repositioning. Similarly, the US has undertaken a review of its National Security Strategy in 2010 – with several commentators suggesting that its approach to diverse global threats, multilateral approaches, and civil-military operations looks more ‘European’ than the strategies in Europe. A new ESS would allow the EU to seize momentum and place its own stamp on the strategic positioning of Europe.

Institutional flux

There are a number of institutional arguments for revising the EU’s ESS as soon as possible. Many of these arguments relate to changes wrought by the Lisbon Treaty, which have led to instability and uncertainty within the EU’s institutions.

Development of the EAS. The new External Action Service should draw the EU’s political, financial, and material resources under one roof to sharpen the EU’s impact on world affairs and allow it to finally ‘punch above its weight’. Yet the development of the EAS has been problematic from the start: not least because of explicit and implicit questions regarding its identity. Officials from the Commission, Council and member states serving in the EAS have unsettled loyalties, while legal arguments over competences remain. Amongst officials interviewed for this report, there is a sinking feeling amongst EAS staff that the days of knowing ‘who does what’ and ‘who answers to whom’ still lay far ahead. A new ESS could provide a unifying narrative for the troubled External Action Service. In turn, that narrative would help link different goals, engender staff loyalty, and offer guidance for the day-to-day work of the Service. A new strategy might also clarify tasks and give organisational identity in the EU’s delegations and for Special Representatives.

New leadership questions. The position of a double-hatted head for the EAS was innovative and well-intentioned, but may be in danger of becoming a ‘mission impossible’. Catherine Ashton is being pulled in multiple directions, with multiple
demands and myriad complaints. The President of the Commission and President of the European Council also hold legal competences over EU external relations generally, and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters specifically. A revised ESS could give Ashton the opportunity to consolidate her position and provide intellectual leadership. It would also give Ashton (and her planning unit) an opportunity to be able to think more strategically about the EU’s objectives in the world and how these can be achieved.

New cooperation modes. Permanent Structured Cooperation now allows EU member states to embark on ‘coalitions of the willing’ in security policy goals. The obvious risk here is increasing fissures and splintering amongst the EU family of nations. Some way of providing an encompassing normative framework for action, to guide even smaller groups of willing states, seems critical as a way to preserve coherence. To avoid the divisive potential of Permanent Structured Cooperation, a new guiding document for foreign policy coherence is critical.

New defence obligations. The EU’s ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Art. 42.7, Treaty on European Union) obligates EU member states to cooperate in cases of armed aggression to their territories – but comes with a number of question marks and concerns about implementation. This provision requires elaboration and a framework for ‘triggering’ it– a strong argument for carrying out a revised ESS as part of that effort.

New threat assessment obligations. Separate from the mutual assistance clause, the EU’s Solidarity Clause (Art. 222, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) calls upon the European Council to ‘regularly assess threats facing the Union’. The Internal Security Strategy (European Union 2010c) also calls upon the EU to develop collective threat assessment procedures. These two requirements, in addition to existing assessments in the areas of civil protection, immigration and neighbourhood policy, suggest that a new ESS revision process is overdue. A revised threat assessment within the ESS could usefully satisfy these provisions and requirements.
New players. The European Parliament, thus far largely excluded from foreign and security policymaking in the EU, has taken on a more assertive position post-Lisbon. This offers an opportunity: to bring in another institutional supporter for a new ESS as well as to provide useful perspectives on the EU’s global outlook.

New opportunities for policy coherence. The Lisbon Treaty abolished (formally speaking) the old ‘pillar’ system between internal market, foreign policy and home affairs policies. Each of those former pillars contains an external policy dimension which can now be more robustly linked together. This linkage will not be under a single leader (since formal leadership remains with respective institutional heads), but could be made through a coherent intellectual framework – set out in a new ESS.

New threats

The EU’s threat environment has changed since the 2003 ESS and 2008 ESS review. The threats outlined then – terrorism (including cyber security), weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, regional conflict, state failure, organised crime, energy security, and climate change – are still with us, but their character and context may have shifted.

North Africa/Middle East. The breadth and speed of revolution in the EU’s neighbourhood caught most governments off guard and revealed the pace of change in the modern threat environment. It also revealed the lack of strategic thinking in the EU’s past and its weaknesses in preparing for quickly shifting events. A new ESS would learn lessons from the current crisis, namely in terms of stating what the EU stands for and emphasizing preparedness for unforeseen events. It would also help reaffirm the EU’s role in its neighbourhood and stipulate when the Union should resort to civilian or military crisis management missions (thus reducing the risk of EU member states being divided over whether and how to respond to future crises).

Migration. Uncontrolled migration usually occurs after other ‘tipping point’ events, but the EU is particularly susceptible to movement across the external frontier. Normal surges (e.g. from Turkey to Greece) can be exacerbated by surprises (e.g.
following revolutions and other breakdowns), which further stress social services and take the blame for rising criminality and violence. Governments must plausibly react, or they will fall. In the EU, uncontrolled migration is a supranational security issue requiring thoughtfulness and advanced planning. A new ESS could recognise this fact, set security goals in relation to civil liberty standards, and refine the meaning of solidarity.

*Economic crisis.* A collapsed European economy would present the most fundamental security threat discussed thus far. Although the EU has avoided this problem, the recent economic recession and euro instability demonstrates the extent of social unrest and political protest that could result. The security ambitions of the EU will rely upon economic stability, leading to two requirements: a concerted focus on restoring the health of the European economy, and an explicit link made between economic security and other forms of security.

*Transboundary threats.* According to system managers and threat specialists, new species of threat are on the horizon. These threats prey on European-level infrastructures and cross sectors with relative ease – but with unknown effects. Possible examples include cyber sabotage shutting off internet-based systems, which in turn affect energy supplies and communication systems. Today’s complicated technical systems overlap and interconnect in ways even experts do not fully understand. In this security environment, only the EU is positioned to address these problems from a comprehensive regulatory perspective. A new ESS could take on the challenge of ensuring ‘flow security’ against these transboundary threats.

Using new threats as a rationale for a new ESS should be qualified, however. One problem with focusing on the latest threats as a motivation for policy change means that any new strategy is quickly outdated. Another problem is that twenty-seven EU governments are unlikely to agree on common threats. Threat perceptions differ widely across Europe. Options to overcome these problems include: (a) focusing on the nature of the threat environment, (b) elaborating security goals rather than threats per se, or (c) allowing for mutual recognition of threats across EU member states.
A last set of arguments is related to the international system and shifting geopolitical context of EU security. These observations generate a sense that ‘Europe is falling behind’ – and remind us that a security strategy can help reassert Europe’s position in global politics. Major changes in the geopolitical context have taken place since 2003, including the inexorable rise of global powers, new strategic partnerships, and evolving relations with international organisations.

New Strategic Partners. EU relations with different global powers differ widely, as even a cursory glance at a newspaper reveals. Some countries are a struggle for the EU: Russia, Turkey and Iran are good examples of the EU’s inability to come to a definite position on the character of the relationship. Other countries the EU sees as less problematic: India, Brazil and the US cause a relatively small degree of disagreement amongst EU governments. The EU signs onto ‘strategic agreements’ with third countries for rather ad hoc reasons. A broader strategic document could guide EU prioritisation of strategic partners and guide the content of those partnerships.

The rise of China. Few issues are dramatised as much as the ‘rise of China’, although this rise needs to be seen in relative rather than absolute terms. China’s role is nevertheless growing in Europe, whether seen in economic terms (funding bailouts) or in terms of political role and influence (in the UN context, in Africa, in climate negotiations). The different positions amongst EU member states allow China and others to exercise a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach. The EU has not effectively articulated its values and interests to China in any coherent way. A revised ESS could move the EU in the direction of a strategic actor towards China.

US ambivalence. The US clearly wants the EU to increase responsibility for its neighbourhood, and the recent NATO action in Libya signals the US is taking steps (unilaterally) to force that issue. From ‘unilateral intervention’ to ‘unilateral retrenchment’, changes in US foreign policy are becoming clearer. The EU must
show relevance in its own neighbourhood if it is to be taken seriously on global security questions. A related discussion concerns defence spending in the EU, and the lack of political will to contribute and cooperate more (despite the fact that institutions and venues are in place, such as the European Defence Agency). A new ESS could take up these issues.

**Renewed multilateralism.** The 2003 ESS prioritises multilateralism as the EU’s ‘modus operandi’ in world politics, but did not take the concept any further. A more aggressive ‘multilateralism’ is in order, in which the EU improves its own relations with international organisations (NATO is a case in point here), drives enhanced participation from global actors (the G20 framework is obvious here), and leads constructive reform efforts (such as the UN or climate change structures). The next revision of the ESS must specify the EU’s principles and action points on multilateralism.

**EU enlargement.** The 2004/2007 enlargements of the EU have expanded (and complicated) the geopolitical issues on the EU’s agenda. This can be seen as a problem for a new ESS, in that the list of issues on the agenda may foreclose agreement. On the other hand, two issues demand that the concerns of the newer member states and candidate countries be taken into account in a new ESS. First, their ‘buy-in’ is required to any strategic statement issued by the EU, and their ‘ownership’ is required if the principles in that statement are to be carried forward. Second, a new ESS can contribute to a nascent strategic culture that might eventually envelop all member states.

These geopolitical arguments collectively suggest the EU has not placed enough attention on partners, and that it tends to act without thinking about broader multilateral implications. They suggest a larger debate is needed on three broad issues: first, relations with strategic partners, including how to work with them and on what to base diplomatic relations; second, effective EU action in its own neighbourhood; and third, strategic thinking on multilateralism. In general, a new ESS
process could tap into this debate, identify answers, and lead to another outcome lacking in Europe today: shared analysis of the threat situation and global trends.

Section 2: Lessons from the Past

Process matters, because the way in which the EU arrives at a new ESS will affect not only outcomes. It will also determine the extent to which participants feel ownership and whether any sort of inclusive ‘strategic culture’ takes root. Broadly speaking, a strategic review process needs to be initiated with a sufficient degree of legitimacy, carried out in a way that reconciles diverse interests without sacrificing clarity and purpose, and completed with a general feeling of success externally and internally.

This section examines lessons from past review processes, in terms of their initiation, process and outcomes. The section then turns to some tactical ‘rules of thumb’ regarding the initiation of a new process in 2011 or beyond.

Past review processes

2003 European Security Strategy

Starting with the 2003 European Security Strategy, we see that this document did not emerge out of a conceptual vacuum. Long before, EU officials had recognized the need for a joining up of shared ideas and principles, many of which existed prior to the ESS in the form of different statements and policy strategies. The Amsterdam Treaty from 1997, for example, introduced the concept of the ‘Common Strategy’, which led to several regional strategies (Smith 2004). The actual initiation of an overarching review process in early 2003, however, came about through the convergence of several factors.

One factor was institutional developments, namely the growth of the ESDP’s organisational apparatus. This apparatus, including staff, venues, and policy instruments, provided the foundation and resources (not to mention the conceptual ‘space’) to begin thinking about strategy explicitly. A second factor was perceptions of a widening gap between the EU’s practical tools and its vision of its own security
role. Even within ESDP, military and civilian capacities were being built without an overall set of strategic principles for when they would be used, for what purposes, and towards what long-term ends. The EU, it was becoming increasingly clear, lacked an overarching strategic framework for rationalising its role in international security matters (Bailes 2005).

A third factor was the movement towards the EU’s first military operation outside Europe (eventually launched in the summer of 2003). Operation Artemis, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, raised awareness of the need for more coherent strategic thinking if EU troops were to be deployed far ‘out of area’. Another factor was the entrepreneurial leadership of Javier Solana, who developed a knack during his time as HR for encouraging governments to take steps on issues he could demonstrate wider support for. But surely the most obvious factor behind the initiation of an ESS process was the US invasion of Iraq, sparking a crisis in Europe and testing the coherence of the EU. Solana saw this window of opportunity and used it to propose (with several key insiders) a ‘strategic statement’ that could soothe tensions and heal diplomatic wounds after Iraq. From there, the process of devising a security strategy was born (Bailes 2005).

In terms of process, Solana engineered a clear mandate from EU foreign ministers at a 2-3 May 2003 meeting on the island of Rhodes to draft a document identifying key threats and security challenges facing the EU, and making recommendations for an overall European security strategy. This ‘Rhodes Agreement’ provided the legal basis on which to act.

The drafting team formed by Solana was a fairly small group and kept under close control by a few key individuals, including Robert Cooper, Director-General, Politico-Military Affairs in the Council Secretariat and Christoph Heusgen, Director of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat. The perceived advantage of this style of process was that it offered the chance of preserving a ‘personal’ and non-bureaucratic approach to drafting. The team worked quickly and after one month had produced a first draft. ‘A Secure Europe in a Better
World’, was unveiled by Solana at a Council meeting in Thessaloniki on 16 June 2003 (Bailes 2005; Biscop and Andersson 2008).³

Subsequently, the Thessaloniki European Council agreed on 20 June 2003 to endorse the recommendations and to commission Solana with presenting the document for adoption by heads of state and government in December 2003. Meanwhile, Solana was asked to work with ‘member states and the Commission’ to refine the text, which ‘should also encapsulate member states’ interests and citizens’ priorities. The remaining time from October to December was used for internal discussion among member states and with the Commission and Council officials.

In the intermediate period, Solana turned to selected European think tanks to solicit expert opinion on the draft. Three research workshops were held in Rome (19 September 2003), Paris (6-7 October 2003), and Stockholm (20 October 2003) under the overall coordination of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris.⁴

The first workshop, which was held in Rome and organised by the Istituto Affari Internazionali, focused on the threats facing Europe. Participants agreed that terrorism had become a major global threat; they also agreed it had to be looked at in a broader political context and that there is no ‘quick fix’ against terrorism. Debate sprung up, however, around the definition of terrorism as well as the use of military pre-emption, especially against suspected illegal WMD facilities. The group stressed the need to consider giving some negative security guarantees, in order to deter some states from proliferating; and the importance that the EU Security Strategy be followed by

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The discussion papers prepared for each of the three seminars are available at: www.ui.se//forskning/forsvar-sakerhet-och-utveckling-1/europeisk-sakerhet-och-den-europeiska-sakerhetsstrategin.
specific Action Plans (with a geographical focus) or policy papers on structural issues (such as aid and conditionality).

The second workshop, hosted by the EUISS in Paris, focused on the EU’s global objectives. These included the importance of effective multilateralism; preventive engagement, working through the United Nations, and the need to secure a UN mandate prior to military engagement in external crises; and the importance of the EU’s engagement in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as in Russia and its neighbours. The debate focused on the role of pre-emptive deployment, on whether to pursue an EU seat at the UN Security Council, the role of future EU foreign policy high representative, the link between enlargement and security, and the nature of the EU’s cooperation with the US and Russia. The participants recommended that the document should stress more the importance of the UN, both militarily and politically, as well as the importance of the Balkans.

The third and final workshop, hosted by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) in Stockholm, focused on capabilities and coherence of EU foreign policy. Participants agreed that the price of non-coherence is high (and that it extends beyond CFSP), as well as on the importance of civilian capabilities and strategic partnerships. The debate circled around how to finance security policy (whether more or better spending is necessary), how to better use the EU’s diplomatic force and its delegations, what NATO’s role should be, and on the nature of the transatlantic relationship. The workshop recommended that the document better underline links between internal and external security, focus more on Russia, and pay tribute to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as an important partner for the normative dimension of foreign policy.

The use of the three workshops by Solana represented a tactical effort to broaden participation in the revision process without losing control over content. The workshops were not pro forma, however. The conclusions of several workshops (which were attended by government officials) led to specific changes in Solana’s draft text.
In terms of outcomes, the final draft adopted by the European Council in December 2003 reflected the work of a small drafting group within the Council Secretariat and Solana’s policy unit. That group incorporated insights from the workshop series, along with pressing comments from various member states. Even in this relatively closed process, consensus could not be reached. This problem is reflected in the vague articulation of how the EU should respond to possible future US interventions occurring in the absence of a Security Council mandate. While the early draft of the ESS included a reference to ‘pre-emptive engagement’ this was later changed to ‘preventive engagement’ in the second draft. Conversely, some issues, such as ‘effective multilateralism’, were included in the ESS only because of potentially strong criticism had they been excluded. It is also clear that the second draft ‘toned down’ the first draft’s strong emphasis on terrorism, WMD proliferation, and failed states.5

The ESS, finally entitled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, represented an explicit, overarching statement on the EU’s external security perspective – the first of its kind. Moreover, it is one of more pithy policy statements ever made by EU governments, containing a common threat assessment and agreeing on principles for global action, even if not stipulating specific steps forward or conditions for triggering EU involvement. Even parts of the ESS that were vague and unspecified can be justified as part of the feasibility of a security strategy that encompasses a variety of different states. Thus, from a process and public diplomacy perspective, it is hard to argue that the 2003 ESS was not a success.

5 In the first draft, a distinction was also made between ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, which was later removed in the second version. State failure and organised crime also became separate entries in the list of threats and regional conflicts were added to it in the second draft. Another example is that while the first draft specified three Eastern countries (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) for enhanced political and economic cooperation, the second draft omitted references to any specific country, arguably as to not infringe on what Russia still considers its sphere of influence given the EU’s ambition for a strategic partnership with Russia.

In the years following the adoption of the ESS, a number of key developments took place, both within the Union and abroad, that suggested member states ‘revisit’ the 2003 strategy. One such development was EU enlargement to twenty-seven member states, many of which were not involved in the drafting of the original ESS. Another development sprung from an evolving security environment. Russia, in particular, had taken a more assertive stance in its neighbouring region. This stance intensified during the war with Georgia in August 2008, which became of great concern to many EU governments. The more general security environment was also changing, with the outbreaks of the H5N1 (2006) and H1N1 (2008) pandemics, growing appreciation for the devastating effects of climate change, the global financial crisis, and increasing cyber attacks. Arguments began to build that the ESS, which said little or nothing about these latter threats, required revision. Leaders such as Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and French President Nicolas Sarkozy went on the record advocating a review (Biscop 2009a).

A high level conference was also held in Stockholm in November 2007, hosted by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) in association with the EU ISS. This conference took stock of developments since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003 and served as a platform for discussions in the re-evaluation process of the ESS. General conclusions from the conference included the need for a revitalised debate in Europe on the strategic foreign and security policy challenges facing the EU, and the need to update the ESS to take into account recent developments within and outside of the EU (Andersson 2007).

Not all governments agreed on the need to review the ESS, however. Some countries, especially Germany, feared that reopening the ESS would unleash an uncomfortable

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debate about Russia, creating or even reinforcing divisions between new and old member states. Other countries feared it would risk ‘securitising’ EU polices in the fields of energy and climate matters. Other concerns included the risk of ‘watering down’ the ESS into a less successful product, and that a rewriting of the ESS would hamper ongoing efforts to approve the Lisbon Treaty. Finally, there were some general reservations about Solana’s drafting method (e.g. a small team and revision by a committee of member states), and concerns about the breadth of a drafting mandate (Toje 2010; Biscop 2009a).

As a result, the initiation of a process of review in December 2007 revealed scaled-back ambitions. Solana was instructed to ‘examine the implementation of the ESS, and if necessary, ways to ‘complement’ it. Solana himself appeared reluctant to update the ESS for fears that the policy climate was not conducive to such an undertaking. The European Council finally agreed on a compromise: to write an ‘Implementation Report’ on the ESS. Such a report would not replace the ESS, but rather examine how it has fared in practice, and discuss what more needed to be done.

In terms of process, the drafting team for the ‘ESS Implementation Report’ was slightly larger than during the previous occasion. It included several Commission representatives and a similar mix of practitioners and experts. Similar to the 2003 process, a number of high-profile seminars coordinated by the EUISS were held during the latter half of 2008 in Rome on 5-6 June (providing an overview of the security environment), Natolin on 27-28 June (focusing on the EU neighbourhood), Helsinki on 18-19 September (focusing on ESDP), and Paris on 2-3 October (focusing on EU strategic considerations).7

Despite workshops focused on different strategic topics, respectively hosted at international affairs institutes in Rome, Natolin, Helsinki, and Paris, the drafting

process succumbed to a lack of political will (Biscop 2009a). Unlike 2003, there was no ‘existential’ political crisis motivating member states to agree on a common strategic outlook. Furthermore, unlike the 2003 process, the institutional expert groups in 2008 lacked a draft text from which to work, and therefore discussions lacked focus. Workshop topics were broad and unwieldy. The absence of member state consensus on both the need to revise the ESS and on the nature of the current security environment undermined meaningful debate, both in the workshops and in the broader policy community. Because of these impediments, the role of think tanks in the revision process proved less influential than in 2003. Recommendations were thus wide-ranging and lacked specificity, resulting in that few were taken up in the final document (Brattberg and Rhinard 2011).

Nevertheless, the ESS review process was completed and endorsed by the European Council on 12 December 2008 as the ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy’. The implementation report should not be interpreted as a revision or update of the ESS. The ESS Review expanded the scope of the threats to include threats such as cyber security, climate change, and pandemics. This expansion was driven not just by functional realities, but also by the fact that different departments within the Commission, such as DGs Justice and Home Affairs and Environment (the latter was allowed a greater role in the 2008 ESS Review) pushed for a broadening of the threat spectrum. The implementation report also included a broader inventory of tools and resources as the means by which the EU could pursue security goals.

The report offers very little guidance as to the kind of situations where military instruments may be called upon. It does not acknowledge the considerable difficulties facing the pursuit of security policy in the EU, especially regarding issues of institutional coordination. It offered few concrete recommendations for change, and did not, despite some criticism following the 2003 ESS, include any mechanisms for follow up and review. As such, the implementation report cannot be ascribed a ‘strategic review’ in the sense that it does not assess effectiveness, address the interaction between sub-strategies, policies and actions, or define the EU’s foreign
policy priorities. The ESS Review notes, however, that the ESS remains a work in progress.

2010 NATO Strategic Concept

A discussion of lessons learned from previous strategic review exercises would not be complete without a look at NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. NATO has no regular schedule for revising its strategic concept, although it typically takes place every ten years or so. To a certain extent, NATO’s strategic concepts tend to codify past decisions and developments. They serve as NATO’s main guiding document, defining the scope and setting out a common vision for the organisation. Since the 1990s, the elaboration of the Strategic Concept has become more a political exercise than a military one. Thus, the public diplomacy aspect of the process (‘telling the NATO story’) has been prioritised in recent years.

In terms of process, the exercise started with a reflection phase during which a series of seminars were held in allied countries to enhance the strategic debate. Each seminar covered a specific aspect of the strategic concept. Furthermore, the 2010 strategic review – rather than initiating negotiations directly within the existing NATO structures – appointed an external ‘Group of Experts’ to advise on the new strategic concept. Headed by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the Group included diplomats and experts from the private sector and academia from both small and large NATO member states. The Group also had a group of civilian and military advisors from the allied countries.

The process then entered a consultation phase. Working in close coordination with the Secretary General, the Group organised several seminars with national and NATO officials, along with think thanks and the private sector, in different capitals to discuss their findings and proposals. Public outreach events were also organised on these occasions. The Group of Experts submitted a progress report to the foreign ministers in December 2009. In addition, partner organisations such as the EU, the UN, the OSCE, and NATO partnership countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Sweden had
opportunities to provide inputs to the strategic review. The Group of Experts presented its report ‘NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement’ in May 2010 to the Secretary General.⁸

Following the presentation of the Expert Group’s report, the Secretary General assumed leadership over the process. The process turned to a drafting and negotiation phase. It consisted, first, of consulting directly with member states to collect feedback on the report, and second, of writing his own draft and discussing it with Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers in order to receive a general approval and further input (in the past, this has been primarily elaborated within the NATO committees). Beyond the official seminars, dozens of secondary events were organised to discuss specific issues with different participants in order to gather even more input and feedback.

In terms of outcomes, on November 2010, the new Strategic Concept ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defence’ was approved by the North Atlantic Council. The document attempts to strike a balance between NATO’s post-Cold War posture (‘out-of-area’ operations and partnerships) and the Alliance’s traditional core task (collective defence of the North Atlantic Basin). After outlining core tasks (collective defence, crisis management, and collective security), and describing how NATO will manage those tasks, the document provides a general assessment of the security environment. The document notes that while conventional threats remain (for example, growing militarisation), NATO should prepare for a number of ‘new’ or ‘emerging’ security challenges, including WMD proliferation, terrorism, transboundary threats (e.g. organised crime, trafficking of humans, arms and drugs), cyber attacks, vulnerabilities against communication and transport flows, and environmental concerns (e.g. public health concerns and climate change).

By most accounts, the 2010 NATO review process was more inclusive than past ones. Partners such as the EU had the opportunity of providing input to the Alliance’s strategic review. Moreover, the process increased transparency with respect to the

wider public; for example, through the set up of a dedicated official NATO website where individuals could post comments and upload texts. The final document was translated to a wide variety of languages including Arabic.

**Lessons from the past: procedural rules of thumb**

Based on the lessons learned from previous processes, some considerations for future ESS reform processes emerge.

**Leadership.** One clear finding from the discussion above is the importance of entrepreneurial leadership. A person with personal and professional stakes in the matter must be found to ‘spearhead’ any effort to reconsider the ESS. In today’s EU leadership landscape, the obvious candidate for primary leadership is the High Representative/Vice President. The HR/VP would surely find mutual benefit in providing collaborative leadership on this issue, which would, in turn, bring benefits to her management and policy efforts.

**Institutional Support.** Past history suggests other EU institution leaders must be vocal in support – if not provide outright leadership – if a revision process is to succeed. The European Council President would be a helpful ally since the Lisbon Treaty gives him a formal role in common foreign and security policy. Another institution is the European Parliament, which could lend its significant post-Lisbon backing to calls for a new ESS from within the EU system, in particular because of its own growing interest in strategic thinking on external relations, its strong position on the EAS, and its overall role in the EU. Support from the Commission is also critically important considering the range of external policy instruments at its disposal.

**Member state support.** Experience suggests that member states must support calls to re-evaluate the ESS, at least tacitly. Not all member states need to be fervent supporters, but most should at least support the initiative to open-up the ESS debate. The (continuing) role of the rotating Presidency is crucial in this regard. An ESS debate potentially holds diverse benefits, which appeal to different member states in different ways. This consideration deserves attention from ‘process leaders’.
Process considerations. Past experience shows that the process of addressing a new ESS should be carefully planned. In the past, reform processes have included: (a) a high-level, informal steering group including a small selection of well-placed national diplomats, (b) an advisory group of institutional players, and (c) a process group focused on steering the revision process, including representatives of key research institutes. This latter group has been used to devise a schedule of meetings, workshops, and ultimately a conference, using input from the steering and advisory groups.

Section 3: Pathways to the Future

The European Security Strategy of 2003 broke new ground and has in many respects stood the test of time. The ESS, however, was never meant to be preserved for eternity, but rather to be a living document that would evolve and develop as the EU developed and as its strategic environment and the challenges associated with it evolved. There are many options for what a new security strategy should contain and indeed if it should be called a security strategy at all. In this section, we will propose three alternatives for thinking about new substance for a new strategy.

The first option is a (relatively simple) reinvigoration of the current ESS. This would involve using the still-relevant elements of the document to breathe new life into EU geographical and topical sub-strategies along with country-specific strategies. Such sub-strategies could be brought in line with the precepts and principles of the existing ESS, thus satisfying demands to ‘make the ESS work’ in practice.

The second option is a revision of the current ESS. This option would maintain the basic layout and thrust of the original document but evaluate and revise the various sections. Such a revision would involve, perhaps, examining whether the EU’s strategic goals and methods remain relevant in today’s world and possibly updating the threat picture facing Europe.
The third option is a (more ambitious) reinvention of the ESS into a new comprehensive ‘European External Action strategy’. This option involves starting from scratch and aiming to extend the reach of the document to guide all of EU’s external action, from aid and trade to diplomacy and CSDP missions. Such an option might also include adding the elements of a ‘grand strategy’ to the EU’s approach.

**Reinvigorating the ESS**

The EU has made substantial progress in its role as a security policy actor since the adoption of the ESS in December 2003. However, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains weak. The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS stated that to realize the full potential of the EU, it needs to be ‘still more capable, more coherent and more active’ and that the EU ‘must do more to shape events’. The main challenge for the EU may therefore not be the lack of an updated security strategy but rather the lack of effect of the existing ESS. The main challenge would therefore be to revitalize existing strategies and develop new EU sub-strategies on various topics and regions to be coherent with the overall principles and recommendations laid out in the current ESS.

Today, the EU has a multitude of ‘Common Strategies’ and ‘EU Strategies’ on topics ranging from the fight against proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction), to the trafficking of small arms, and relations with Latin America and other parts of the world.⁹ Some, but far from all, of these strategies can be said to be coherent with the ESS. There are also many topics and geographical areas that lack an EU strategy. In many cases, the missing links between the ESS and current sub-strategies as well as between sub-strategies make EU action and policy difficult to understand and communicate. Furthermore, the ESS, without explicit links to sub-strategies, provides little political guidance. Given the stated ambition to do more to shape events in a fast changing world, the EU may be better served by focusing on revising and developing effective and coherent sub-strategies on topics such as what CSDP missions the Union should engage in, and what countries strategic partnership relations should be

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⁹ For example, see European Union (2003); European Union (2006).
developed with rather than focusing on once again analyzing global challenges and threats.

The alternative of focusing on revising and developing sub-strategies coherent with the stated strategic objectives in the ESS would avoid opening up the discussion on threats and the role of certain actors and partners that made many member states reluctant to engage in a comprehensive review of the ESS in 2008. The need to look closer at the coherence of the proliferating number of European Strategies is also growing as clashes between immediate EU interests and the longer-term promotion of EU values becomes increasingly evident in many policy areas. One example of this clash is in the EU’s neighbourhood, where EU long-term goals of democracy promotion and human rights protection is repeatedly overshadowed by practical cooperation on energy security, migration, and anti-terrorism issues.

**Revising the ESS**

The European Security Strategy of 2003 was widely praised for its ability to forge consensus on identification of threats, principles for global action, and promotion of international norms and effective multilateralism. The original ESS has also been praised for being short and easy to read. It has even been described as an ‘expanded visiting card’ for the Union. The ESS, however, was written in a specific historical context and is in need of an update to better reflect both an expanded Union and a changing world. The option for revising the ESS would in all essence maintain the basic layout and thrust of the original document divided into three parts focusing on the (I) Security Environment, (II) Strategic Objectives, and (III) Policy Implications for Europe. While many of the global challenges and key threats remain the same, there is an increasing need for updating and revision. The 2008 Implementation Report provided some updating of the ESS but did not replace the original document that was judged to remain ‘fully relevant’.

Given that a number of years has passed since the Implementation Report was issued, it is arguably time to make a comprehensive review to update and revise the Security Strategy itself. Some possible new challenges and threats to emphasize in an updated
ESS, and already mentioned in the Implementation Report of 2008, are for example, cyber security, energy security, and climate change, but also issues such as ‘flow security’ could be included. Other issues to consider would be a reflection on the EU’s role in the world in terms of its neighbourhood policy, a more strategic approach to multilateralism in practice, and a more strategic approach to CSDP operations.

However, the key purpose of revising the current ESS may be the discussion itself rather than adding or subtracting specific issues in the document. The original ESS and the process that led to its adoption in December 2003 was an important step in promoting European strategic thinking and culture. A new European-wide discussion on global challenges and threats, strategic objectives and policy implications for Europe may further contribute to the fostering of a European strategic culture that is only now starting to take shape.

Also, if the original method is to be followed, both process and (to a large extent) outcome will be known to EU member states and institutions as there would be an existing draft document (the original ESS) and a stated goal of maintaining basic layout and thrust of the strategy itself.

**Reinventing the ESS**

While the ESS has been praised for identifying threats, principles for global action and promotion of international norms and effective multilateralism, it is lacking guidelines for EU action and intervention, and on strategic partnerships and priorities. The third and most ambitious option is therefore to start over from a blank slate and reinvent the ESS into a new comprehensive ‘European External Action Strategy’ on the basis of the current Union and its global challenges. In this option, the discussion broadens to the extent to which a new strategy explicitly states that its aim is to guide all of EU external action, from aid and trade to diplomacy and CSDP missions. By taking in elements about coherence between the EU’s different policies and about the relationship between the EU and its member states, we may replace security by
external action.\textsuperscript{10} A useful concept in developing thinking in this option is ‘grand strategy’.

Grand strategy is about the broad, long-term foreign policy objectives to be achieved and the large categories of instruments or means to be applied towards those objectives. Grand Strategy is the calculated relationship of means to large ends. As the set of major objectives that unite a country’s external policies at any single moment, it is meant to provide a coherent view over the long term of its values and interests and how it protects itself. Grand strategy thus serves as a reference framework for everyday policy-making, and guides the definition of civilian and military capabilities to be developed. Grand strategy therefore includes all external policies (Kennedy 1987, 1991; Gaddis 2004). For the EU, grand strategy thinking must therefore encompass not only security and defence policies, but all relevant Community policies as well, not least trade and foreign aid. To be put into action a grand strategy must also be accompanied by coherent sub-strategies and policies.

In its current form, the European Security Strategy of 2003 has elements of a grand strategy. After analysing the global environment, the ESS outlines a holistic approach and a policy of prevention and stabilization employing a comprehensive range of civil and military instruments, partnerships and multilateral institutions. While all this is important, the ESS can be criticised to focus mostly on how to do things but little on what the concrete objectives and priorities of the EU are. A grand strategy should also be clear on which values and interests the grand strategy should protect (Biscop 2009b). After all, the EU is a Union of values made explicit in the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 2, Treaty on European Union). These values are important to remember when short-term interests often clash with core values in everyday policymaking.

A debate on reinventing the ESS into a new comprehensive ‘European External Action Strategy’ would not only provide a venue for discussing fundamental

\textsuperscript{10}Here a parallel to the US could be made. The US National Security Strategy serves as the guiding document of US foreign policy while several sub-strategies, ranging from defence to development to WMD proliferation, supplement and elaborate on the NSS.
European values and interests, objectives and ambitions but also be an inspiring project for citizens, politicians and civil servants. Many surveys show that EU citizens are convinced that it is in their own interests and that of their governments for the EU to speak with one voice in international affairs and to become a more relevant and effective global player. As has been discussed in section 1 of this report, a new strategy may also provide a unifying document for the European External Action Service to gather around.

The political feasibility of launching a comprehensive European external action strategy may be less than for any of the other two options suggested. However, the EU’s power to influence international affairs depends on its ability to overcome divergent national interests through the shaping of common positions. The reinvention of the ESS into a comprehensive European external action strategy would strengthen the EU’s efforts to achieve greater coordination in order to speak with one voice.
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**Further Reading**


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