


# **From a European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Take II: Policy options**

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## **Introduction and Executive Summary: towards a European Global Strategy in external action**

UI Occasional Paper 11 (Lundin (1)) set out ten content-related issues that are likely to be discussed in the context of the European Global Strategy (EGS) debate during 2013 and beyond. This paper should be read as a direct continuation of that report, as a second “take” on providing a more forward-looking perspective of the issues ahead. The ten areas of discussion previously set out included the need to address issues relating to budgets, structures, measurements of success, comprehensiveness, and mainstreaming, along with an examination of the four paradigms according to which different European Union officials typically organise their thinking: geographic, thematic, crisis management and multilateral. The 10th issue referred to the question of what a conceptual shift from security to external action as suggested by the EGS approach might imply.

The aim of the first paper was to contribute to a debate on the content of an EGS, 10 years after the European Security Strategy was put forward in 2003, two years before the end of the current mandate of the High Representative and the Commission, and taking into account the planned review of the functioning of the European External Action Service and the start of a new financial perspective for the period 2014 to 2020.

Since the first paper was published in September 2012 a series of informal and unstructured interviews (around 30) have been carried out in the EU institutions in order to generate further ideas on the basis of the ten issues in the first report. Some of the elements in the current paper relate directly to thoughts expressed by interlocutors, others to sources indicated by the respondents, and others again reflect analysis based on comments made. The current outline does not pretend to give a representative picture of views inside the European institutions. In order to create such a picture several hundred structured interviews would have been necessary; indeed some

interlocutors mentioned a series of additional names that ideally should have been included in the list of interviews but could not at this point in time.

So how does this paper relate to the approach taken by the four institutes, which have taken on the EGS initiative? Whereas the EGS project does not seek to take as its point of departure what is institutionally or legally possible to achieve at the present time, but instead what could be desirable in a longer term perspective, this paper adopts an incremental approach: what should happen next? Both approaches in parallel would seem important: the first to allow for necessary academic freedom and creativity and the second to illustrate the need and to provide a basis for a discussion of the feasibility of the endeavour. In the more general EGS debate there will of course also be a discussion about future global trends, which goes beyond the scope of the current paper.

In the initial debate on EGS it has sometimes been argued that the current approach to EU external action lacks vision. This is a statement, which many inside the institutions cannot agree with. Even if the European Security Strategy in 2003, which many still regard as a remarkable document, may not respond to a full scope vision of what the European Union could and should aim at, the process towards the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon involved a very extensive discussion with broad participation in and around the Convention framing the Treaty. For instance, Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) sets out the very broad scope of European Union external action both in terms of values and interests. For reference, that Article is reproduced in its entirety below.

In fact, some argue that the debate on the EGS might usefully focus on the implementation of the Treaty. Many believe that there are significant deficits both in the elaboration of the Treaty vision in terms of strategic objectives and in the way the European institutions and the Member States are going about implementing what they already committed to do. This is why issues of budgets and structures belong to the

debate. There is a widespread concern that the ongoing financial debates may be imposing another de facto vision on the European institutions through across-the-board cuts, rather than the one set out in the Treaty. The fact that several Member States are trying to go back on the implementation of the Treaty in an effort to safeguard national interests and deal with domestic political concerns during the current financial crisis further complicates the picture. There is a risk that the cart is being put before the horse: that the capabilities of the European institutions to implement policies are being defined in financial and staffing terms before the strategic goals have been properly derived from the Treaty. In parallel there is a concern that political and bureaucratic infighting in the European institutions may distort and delay implementation of the Treaty.

There are a number of policy documents issued by the institutions on the table of the Council and the Parliament regarding the proposed programs to be implemented during the next financial perspective. But they have obviously been produced in a hurry – few respondents have referred to them and there are few indications of a wider debate about them outside the European Parliament. In this sense the current debate on the follow-on to the European Security Strategy is urgent.

At the same time many respondents expect the debate only to mature gradually during the remaining period up until the end of the current mandates of the Commission and the High Representative in 2014. Many seem to believe that there will need to be a catalyst, perhaps a crisis, perhaps in connection to encouragement by the next American administration to put an updated European approach on paper, in order to motivate the European Council to take a strategic approach and give the appropriate instructions to the executive structures of the European Union.

In the present paper, to be read more as a checklist than a full-scope analysis, an effort is made to combine comments made in the interviews in order to indicate a series of policy options which could help things happen in the right sequence. Once the

European Council has defined the overall financial envelope available for external action, the stage would be set for deliberations on the follow-up in terms of strategic objectives.

In summary, this paper argues that efforts to move forward towards a European Global Strategy should take as its point of departure the vision set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union.

The vision must then be combined with a set of priorities set out in an EGS approved by the European Council, coupled with the necessary capability commitments and a code of conduct for cooperation between the institutions, services and Member States. It should emphasise the obligations of all institutions and services to work on the basis of the fact that the European Union is now the legal personality externally, not the European Community. This requires a broader sense of ownership in all external policies and puts the responsibility on all those who represent the EU externally not to describe their actions as being undertaken on behalf of any one institution or service but on behalf of the EU.

It should seek to develop strategic objectives derived from this vision in the form of an EGS as clearly linked to a series of existing or future prioritised action plans/sub-strategies, including the Internal Security Strategy of the EU. In this context the need to further clarify and unify the legal basis for EU external action when adapting existing regulations (or, when applicable, creating new ones) - without entering into lengthy legal proceedings - should be taken into account.

These objectives should in broad terms set out that EU values do not on the highest level contradict its interests while making clear that the way EU works with its partners will depend on the context. It should be a “Grand” Strategy in the sense that it expands strategy beyond military means and takes internal and external capabilities into account while considering both everyday policymaking and periods of crisis.

It should try to re-establish a common sense of purpose on the basis of the Treaty.

A new EGS should set the stage for developing capability commitments within realistic financial parameters across the entire scope of the Treaty - civilian as well as military – including staffing of EEAS, fighting transnational threats (such as organised crime), crisis communication and a broader definition of civilian capabilities for crisis -- to mention a few of the most critical areas beyond the existing military and civilian headline goals.

It should develop policy guidelines aiming at EU unity in policy and unity in action. It should set the stage for drawing together EU policies. It should focus and prioritise what the EU should do over the coming financial perspective and beyond, within the scope of the Treaty. It should enhance the capabilities of the Union in critical areas, through prioritisation and concentration of resources. It should promote the capabilities of the High Representative/Vice President to focus on a selective set of issues and counteract the natural tendency to fragment the efforts of EU external action.

Prioritisation will for a considerable period of time probably lead to the Union to be seen as less of a full scope global player, but hopefully more as a serious regional player with some important thematic, crisis related and multilateral priorities on the global level. In so doing the different administrative, legal and budgetary exercises ahead need to be properly used in order to make a new strategy possible.

## **1. New structures require an updated strategic setting**

An early opportunity after the definition of the overall budgetary ceilings would be the agreed review of the structure and functioning of the EEAS in 2013. This cannot be seen as a one-time endeavour but an action plan in itself where the implementation needs to be adapted to the outcome of the EGS. The EEAS will need still quite a number of years to align with the vision set out in the Treaty. How many years will



depend on budgets available and the willingness of Member States to support the process. The absence of a dedicated reform budget for the establishment of the EEAS has already delayed implementation and there still exists legal difficulties in terms of interpreting who is in charge of what and what can be done with what instruments. If not sufficient cooperative efforts are undertaken on the highest levels there is a risk that the services will bog down in new legal battles – perhaps even worse than the one which took place over the competencies in the area of small arms some years back.

As of yet, no real debate seems to be taking place about this, although several respondents mentioned the importance of broadening the consultation process. Credibility of what the EU sets out to do through its structures will be key, but also the overall description of the function of the service will be important. Several respondents stress that the HR/VP needs to make a further effort to depict the EEAS as “her service” both in her capacity as High Representative and Vice President of the Commission. She also needs to have more time to interact with defence ministers. Further steps will need to be taken in order to make it possible for her to apply a more strategic view by reducing her daily representational and administrative duties. For this, she will need to be covered politically not only by foreign ministers but by the European Council as well.

It should be made clear that the EEAS is not a separate institution; it is the coordinating external arm of the EU as a whole, including the European Commission. Coordination capabilities will need to be further developed in order to make sure that the external action of Commission services and the EU delegations are coherent with the EEAS. The coordination meetings on the level of concerned Commissioners with the High Representative should be reinstated -- inspired by the system in place before the entry into force of the Treaty with RELEX Commissioners, sometimes in the presence of Javier Solana. The status of the current informal interservice meetings on lower levels needs to be upgraded.

The line of command inside the EEAS needs to be further clarified following priorities coming out of the EGS. Services need to know who is in the lead. If - as would seem the most natural - the choice is made to put geographic departments as a rule in the lead during non-crisis mode, re-allocations through prioritization will be necessary in order for the most important ones to fully coordinate and develop policy.

In this context it will be important to further clarify the line of command in crisis management and on security issues, both internally in the EEAS (including in the military structures) and in relation to the Commission (including notably civil protection and humanitarian assistance as well as the overall crisis response setup called ARGUS led by the General Secretariat of the Commission). This again will need to be worked out in harmony with the EGS.

This is the one issue most often mentioned by respondents both inside and outside the EEAS where further reform is deemed to be necessary. Finally, after more than a decade, the EU has an external action crisis platform but much more work will be necessary in order to make it work coherently and in a timely and effective manner.

The defence part of the EEAS seems to be more on the sideline than during the times of Javier Solana, one reason being that the appetite for building capacity through deploying in different contexts, so visible ten years ago, now has diminished considerably. At the same time the work of the European Defence Agency set up a decade ago is focussing attention on capacity issues in a more systematic way.

The role of the EEAS in relation in particular to DEVCO in terms of instructions to EU delegations and the implementation of projects needs to be further clarified. DEVCO, the combined Directorate General for Development and Cooperation, has, despite a major deconcentration of staff to delegations in recent years, acquired significant staff resources with development objectives at the top. This does not automatically lead to the same strategic approach that might be articulated in a future

EGS. This is particularly important as regards the very large development programs in the budgets. A debate is going on inside and outside these structures as to what programs aimed at poverty reduction need to include. The Commission and the High Representative have jointly set out a global agenda for the next financial perspective (Global Europe, 2011). But in the specific agenda focussing on development objectives the scope is more limited (Agenda for Change, 2011). Sometimes the role of the EEAS in relation to DEVCO is described as providing security in volatile regions rather than coordinating external action as a whole (Fotiadis, 2011). And the methodology of budget support, very prominent in the implementation of several budgetary instruments, is hotly debated. Is it enough to help partner countries fight corruption? Or is more robust conditionality necessary at times?

Staff allocations need to be adapted in line with an EGS in order to create a critical mass wherever the EU decides to prioritise strategic objectives. As globalisation forces more and more complex programming methods, and agonising reappraisals need to be made in changing environments (Middle East/North Africa and Afghanistan, cases in point), this may require significant reallocation of staff from project implementation to policy development and programming. There will also need to be staff resources available to manage consultations inside and outside of the institutions with stakeholders in order to broaden the sense of ownership. In this context more staff from Commission line DG's are needed to assure coherence in EU delegations on prioritised topics such as energy, environment, justice and home affairs.

Without clear strategic priorities, staffing levels at headquarters level and in delegations risk being spread too thin across the world in a way that will undercut the impact of EU policies. Current levels - with some delegations having one to two diplomats - will not be sufficient in the long run. There will be a need for new capability commitments in terms of staffing within the context of a new EGS as well. If new tasks are added, for instance in the area of consular cooperation, staffing

requirements will be considerable. So far, the budget to be implemented seems to be the dominant criterion for the allocation of staff. The EU has with its national diplomatic services perhaps still more diplomats than the United States. However, as in the case in defence, the fragmentation of these capabilities is severely undermining the EU's potential.

In the context of the EGS, leaders will also need to counteract the risk that the integrity of EU staff, in terms of loyalty to the institutions, will be diminished. The issues are well known in this context: staff needs to see a future within the institutions, even if their career in the EU may no longer, as a rule, be life-long.

## **2. New budgets require updated strategic objectives**

A second important exercise to be properly integrated into the EGS discussion is the further elaboration of the legal basis for the new budgetary instruments covering the period 2014-2020. Here the European Parliament obviously has a central role and is commissioning studies, putting forward reports, etc. in order to promote a more open debate. This process needs to open possibilities for using EU funds in the most effective way. The financial crisis obviously will define stringent constraints and for this reason alone there is a need to use the available resources in a more coherent and flexible way, also allowing for reallocation in crisis. Important language pointing in this direction is already included in the overall financial perspective proposal put forward by the Commission and the High Representative (Global Europe, 2011). There is a link to the financial regulations as such, for instance with regard to the need to allow for more speedy procurement of capabilities necessary in crisis management, a problem high on the agenda since ESDP was put in place a decade ago. As in the case of military operations, a certain level of risk taking needs to be described as necessary on the civilian side as well.

The process of discussing proposed regulations for the new instruments under the next financial perspective is already well underway in the Council and the European Parliament, but this is not very well known outside the institutions.

Studies are available (as an example see Tarschys, 2011) urging a more serious calculation of the cost of non-Europe, regarding how EU Member States may actually be able to save resources by pooling and sharing both military and civilian capabilities. In general terms it could be argued that: the more serious and complex the problems are, the longer the time necessary for policies to be in place, and the more EU Member States face these threats and challenges together, the greater will be the cost of non Europe. The debate on this would no doubt continue in the context of EGS, also when considering specific capabilities such as consular cooperation particularly in crisis situations.

Overall the most important effort will need to ensure that the updated consensus on development referred to above will be maintained when the legal basis for the deployment of development assistance in different contexts is defined. This will take up the largest part of the external action budget. The available resources for programmes set up in order to address transnational and transregional threats (e.g. the Instrument for Stability) will require particular analytical support. The EU Nonproliferation Consortium of think tanks set up to promote implementation of the EU WMD strategy sets a good example for this.

Close attention needs to be given to certain types of assistance that have become more prominent in recent years; a case in point being the already mentioned budget support to recipient governments. It would be important for the EU to continue to develop the methodology aimed at ensuring overall effectiveness of such programmes.

Whenever rules for development assistance seem to limit the possibilities of regaining stability in volatile regions (a case in point mentioned by several respondents is the

Horn of Africa), it will in any case be important to have possibilities to derogate, in order to implement the necessary conditions for stability.

### **3. Developing measurements of success**

The example of the Horn of Africa illustrates what might be one of the most difficult problems at the current time: if budgetary regulations are developed in a way to allow for intermediate goals to determine success, this may reduce the effectiveness of EU external action. It is not only the issue of creating secure conditions for the implementation of development assistance; the whole area of state building, governance and corruption illustrates the need to always take into account broader societal factors when determining how budgets and other resources could be used. In reality one is often reminded of the need to look not only at consequences locally, but also at the national and regional and even transregional levels when implementing programs and operations.

In this area an EGS may have one of its most important functions. If EU strategies are so vague as to make it impossible to derive overall measurements of success, the EU will have lost an important opportunity to promote effectiveness in a period of serious resource constraints. The Global Europe paper put forward by the Commission and the High Representative in 2011 is commendable in enumerating quite a number of aspect that need to be taken into account, but the key will be to move further towards combining them into a *coherent set of prioritised* objectives.

EGS language no doubt can build upon experiences from programmes implemented under the previous financial perspective and from CFSP/ESDP operations carried out during the first 10 years. An important test for the viability of the current set up in terms of budgets and programs may be the extent to which the highest level, in particular HR/VP herself, feels ownership and pride of the programs for which she is overall politically responsible. One can expect that this at present may be the case more in short-term highly politically visible geographic situations than in the case of

long-term complex transregional programs. More attention to, for instance, the long-term part of the Instrument for Stability would be warranted, given the correspondingly high priorities of counterterrorism, organised crime and WMD programs among EU strategic partners.

A close eye on the measurement of success for such programs would therefore be necessary since they often must be implemented in more difficult situations, in cooperation with more difficult partners, with less openness and transparency. And it is in these areas, including trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings, that the European Union will need to become ever more sophisticated in its methodology. This can only happen if the best expertise is used which requires excellent cooperation with line DGs, in particular between DG Home and the EEAS, in order to consider defence in depth in all its dimensions (geography, going to the roots of the problem, early action, sustainable implementation). Here there is a clear link to the Internal Security Strategy of the EU.

It would not seem unjustified, given the significant failures of the international community to address these problems in recent decades, to develop capability commitments in this area based on the EGS to be followed up in action plans. Such a capability commitment in order to determine measurements of success would include better coordination arrangements covering the entire project cycle, the full involvement of relevant EU delegations, better implementation and strategic planning capabilities and a stronger link to academic research.

The EU may still be suffering from the consequences of the debate around the resignation of the Santer Commission over a decade ago. Criticism from the European Parliament against the overstaffing of EU institutions and slow implementation of EU assistance programmes may have had some damaging side effects. The priority put on developing indicators for implementing the budget resulted in a need to play it safe with large programs and over-simplified measurements of success. Contrary to what should have been the real intention, namely to make EU assistance more effective,

this might in some cases have redirected the attention on the wrong indicators. More early attention was often given to implementing the budget, without formal criticism from the Court of Auditors, than to evaluating real impact.

The stereotypical notion that the job is done on the political level when the money is committed obviously has to be contradicted. It is known from the last decades that in some regions (case in point: Central Asia) it took a very long time before it was even possible to start implementing EU projects properly. The level of corruption that exists worldwide does not make the situation in Central Asia unique.

The EU also needs to look at how it defines security in crisis situations. During the first decade of ESDP the EU institutions *de facto* adopted NATO's security regulation for the handling of classified information. For many years this regulation was operationalized in the form of more detailed rules for handling classified information while there was no commitment from the budgetary authority; all of which made it impossible to implement this regulation across all the EU offices and delegations worldwide. Therefore, it was often not possible to respect the rules and at the same time protect EU broader security interests in crisis situations: There was even the risk that security of information in a formal sense became more important than the security of people.

This is a second example with regard to measurements of success where a realistic capability commitment would be welcome in the context of an EGS. Such a commitment would need to allow for the cost/benefit analysis in terms of security of information and other crisis management provisions, which by necessity is used by the military in war.

A proper analysis of measurements of success will in certain contexts also require broad public consultations in order to square the circle when it comes to EU values and interests. A recent case in point is the very broad debate around the future EU cyber security strategy, which needs to take into account both aspects of Internet freedom and cybercrime.



A broad debate is also necessary when it comes to the application of conditionality in EU external action. Traumatic examples in recent years include nuclear energy cooperation with India, conditionality in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the extent to which the EU should portray itself as a moral judge (see DGAP, ECFR). This would also have to counteract double standards in EU Member States postures towards other countries, avoid asking the EU to do more in terms of human rights conditionality than the Member States are ready to accept in their own bilateral relations with the countries in question.

Finally, on the level of EGS, it will be important to counteract a Christmas tree approach when defining mandates for the work of many EU entities, in particular EU delegations. If these mandates are not prioritised and selective in terms of objectives it will not be possible to measure success of the work carried out. It is often argued that foreign policy cannot be planned and that political objectives of an EU representation need to be constantly adapted to reality. However, this does not mean a “free for all” in terms of objectives and areas to be covered. The notion of *different levels of engagement* should and must be introduced in order to make EU work in the field credible, particularly in delegations with very few staff or in multilateral settings with a plethora of meetings and organisations. Otherwise, the result is that decisions on priorities are delegated to the local level.

#### **4. Moving towards more comprehensive strategies**

Available capabilities in terms of budgets and structures will set the stage for what is possible to accomplish in terms of comprehensive strategies over the coming years. Some aspects of comprehensiveness refer to more specific questions, such as coherence in crisis management (see below). Still there will be the need to codify on the level of EGS the trend towards more comprehensive EU external action policies using all the tools at the disposal of the EU, including by referring to actions through Member States and other international organisations where either the EU and/or

Member States contribute substantially. This can be done on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty Art. 21 (TEU): "The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect."

The need to move further in terms of elaborating regional and transregional policies is also key. In some areas, such as in the interface between Afghanistan/Pakistan and the post-Soviet space, there is a need to create transregional policies. In other areas, there is a need to update regional frameworks - the one for Asia is, as several respondents noted, older than a decade.

Referring to the experiences gained in ESDP there would be a need to further reinforce the sustainability of EU actions in areas where ESDP operations are discontinued, through, for instance, security sector reform programmes. There has been no automaticity in this regard in the past, but the Lisbon Treaty allows for more continuity in these efforts.

Comprehensiveness is also, as noted above, important in relation to what Member States as well as like-minded countries and organisations outside the EU are doing. This is more than an issue of donor coordination: it also links to the overall question of effective multilateralism (see below), which more and more is not just an issue of interaction between organisations but also between organisations, states and civil society.

All of this will require strategic planning on a new level, thus requiring considered reappraisals of old policies where the context is changing in an unexpected ways. The need for adaptation and review needs to be explicitly recognised in a new EGS.

## 5. Mainstreaming other perspectives into the geographic paradigm

If the geographic paradigm is used as the main organising principle in terms of strategies, policies and programmes, the issue of mainstreaming takes on added importance. Several respondents argued that there should not be a contradiction between *values* and *interests* in the implementation of EU geographical programs. Others noted that in some geographical situations the issue is not as straightforward as in others. Ukraine was mentioned as an example where EU values and interests go hand-in-hand in a relatively clear way. However, when discussing Russia, the overall need to pursue closer cooperation even when there is a divergence on some important values was stressed. Respondents did not go as far as suggesting that the EU needs to apply double standards (see Cooper) in its external action depending on the context, but the need to prioritise different values in different situations was stressed.

Access to the EU internal market has been described as a major leverage for the EU (Van Rompuy, 2012) and continues to be a credible *de facto* type of conditionality. Visa liberalisation belongs to the same category. Sanctions are important but their effectiveness is sometimes questioned in research. In all conditionality situations, close coordination should take place with relevant international organisations in the same area. Interviewees noted recent contributions to the debate on the future neighbourhood policies to the east and to the south. The EU should be less of a moral judge since democracy cannot be exported, only promoted through cooperation (DGAP, ECFR).

It was noted that conditionality is easier to apply at the time when new cooperative endeavours with other countries are considered; once particular development programmes are in place, there is a resistance inside the EU against applying conditionality.

Several respondents from different perspectives commented upon the difficulties involved in the process of integrating security related programs into geographical

policies. These are often smaller in size in financial terms and therefore less acceptable to those doing project implementation. Moreover, they are more sensitive and difficult to agree on with partner countries, they are more difficult to fit into development budgets, and, according to some views, are difficult to develop within the current structure of the EEAS.

Again it would seem important at the level of EGS to develop clear guidelines in this area, also in terms of capability commitments.

## 6. Geography

The geographic paradigm brings several questions to the forefront: what are the priority regions for the EU? The neighbourhood? Strategic partners? Areas where the EU has significant trade and other interests? Areas where the EU needs to take up defence in depth?

On this topic Lisbon Treaty Art. 21 (TEU) is laconic: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries —”. This underlines the need to prioritise and to concentrate resources in order to create a *critical mass*. Many respondents argue - as do several think tank products in recent years - that the European Union lacks impact in a number of regional policies, starting with the neighbourhood.

Among respondents, perhaps predictably, nobody argued that the current set of strategic documents is perfect. Some believe that the existing documents, starting with the European Security Strategy from 2003 and the report on its implementation from 2008, provide a sufficient basis to move forward. Some argue that the need to do additional work should be concentrated on the level of regional and thematic strategies. For example, several interviewees stressed the need to have an updated framework for working with partners in other regions (as noted above, Asia was mentioned in particular).

Most officials seem to appreciate the added value that the High Representative and the EEAS can bring to the work with strategic partners. At the same time the question has been put whether a common framework for this work can be established given the very different contexts in which this work is pursued. The current definition of what a strategic partner is (beyond the obvious case of the United States) remains arbitrary. Current strategic partners are all very different, some may never be on the list, such as Turkey, some may be on or off the list such as Ukraine, and some might be seen as natural strategic partners in some contexts but not in others, such as Mexico.

The concept of strategic partners counteracts, however, the tendency to put absolute priority on the neighbourhood and underlines the need for the EU to develop its capabilities on the global stage. This does not necessarily mean that the EU will ever be a superpower, but many argue that it should be a global power at least in terms of promoting its values and interests in multilateral and other fora. And its weight in some dimensions of power, including trade and international assistance, is already globally prominent.

Another important counterweight to the analysis of priorities in the neighbourhood is the notion of taking up defence in depth when it comes to problems such as proliferation of WMD, terrorism, drugs trafficking and other transnational threats.

The notion that EU relations with its partners are not just about money has been implicit in many of the discussions with interviewees. Beyond some enlargement situations, it has been noted that the EU cannot buy influence in other countries, not even in terms of trade leverage. Every country has its pride, of course, and immaterial factors play a strong role in creating a good cooperative relationship. This is particularly true when it comes to redefining the EU's Neighbourhood Policy in the Middle East and North Africa where the EU and some of its Member States will no doubt be expected to take a bigger role in the future. Again, the notion of concentration and analytical depth comes to the fore as essential ingredients. The limits of development indicators in the context of poverty reduction were in this

context stressed by several interlocutors. State building is a key aspect of development following the Arab Spring. The importance of Turkey is clear and the need to make sure that Turkey issues does not fall between the cracks of enlargement policies and the Eastern and Southern dimensions.

## **7. Crisis prevention and response**

As noted above, crisis management continues to be a controversial topic in the discussion inside the European institutions. Some appreciate the initiative of the High Representative to create an entity which can work outside normal structures and appear immediately at the scene of different crisis situations. Some believe that this has helped the EEAS to create a platform for coordination and consultation among different actors in the institutions in crisis situations. However, others believe that the line of command is not clear in this work. EGS would need to include language about the principles according to which the European Union acts both as a humanitarian aid provider and in the context of the ESDP. Some believe that the overall crisis response system (ARGUS) set up inside the European Commission as a follow-up to several crisis situations after 9/11 is sufficient, albeit mainly as a tool to help the President of the European Commission to react properly in a serious crisis situation. Others question whether the current setup is sufficient to include all actors in all institutions in the case when the crisis would concern both the European Union internally and externally.

It is important to reinvigorate the dialogue among defence ministers and chiefs of defence staff with a future orientation. Structural solutions could be found in order for the EEAS to be able to lead this work in a continuous fashion and on the appropriate level.

The issue of sovereignty of Member States came into the picture both in the context of ESDP and in later years as regards consular affairs. In the latter, Member States have been unclear in their messages to the EU. In the context of the financial crisis,

more and more Member States have been calling for the pooling and sharing of resources in this domain, but agreement is held back by one or several Member States.

## **8. Mobilising thematic capabilities and deploying them in context**

As noted above, the Lisbon Treaty sets a very broad scope thematically in external action, which makes coordination a challenging task.

First, there are the large thematic areas where *external relations services* of the institutions are in the lead. There is an urgent need to address the common sense of purpose when dealing on the one hand with the ESDP and on the other with development policy. There seems to be a mismatch of perceptions of the role of the different services in this context, which may have existed before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and has been further accentuated afterwards. On the one hand, there are the services dealing with security in the EEAS, while on the other hand there are the services dealing with development mainly in the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO). From the perspective of DEVCO, the role of the EEAS seems to be to provide security in volatile regions and countries so that development work can proceed. From the perspective of EEAS, the role of the service is to coordinate all programs and all work of EU delegations, not only in the area of security.

ESDP was a high priority of the previous High Representative, Javier Solana. During the first years its focus was on capacity building: the first operations were clearly deployed in order to provide experience in different types of operations. Today there is little appetite for this and it is widely expected that if the European Council addresses defence issues it will do so more from the perspective of the defence industry rather than from the perspective of the ESDP. An EGS will need to take stock of the situation in this area and determine realistic goals for the future.

Enlargement is a self-contained service tasked with both programming and implementation, but many respondents lamented that the overall mission for enlargement has been overshadowed by the current financial crisis. Again this will be an important – and of course controversial – area of discussion.

With trade comes the issue of conditionality and mainstreaming. The financial crisis in this area may have further reduced the appetite for conditionality. Civil society organisations dealing with, for instance, religious freedom and freedom of the press, typically seek to increase the number of countries with which human rights dialogue should be pursued. Those defending trade interests of course wish to reduce this number. There may also be a tendency for Member States to focus on conditionality on the EU level, while at the same time developing bilateral ties with China and other countries by focusing mainly on business. There would seem to be a need to realign attention in this context.

In the area of terrorism and organised crime the generic methodology developed in the EU, multipurpose border management, is often probably more effective than dedicated counterterrorism programs and this may also usefully be reflected in an EGS. This illustrates that the contribution of the EU in fighting terrorism is often understated. Counterterrorism programs tend to be complicated to set up and implement due to difficulties in both the terms of legal basis in the EU context and difficulties to agree with host countries externally. Experience in the discussion of terrorism recruitment and radicalisation also indicates the need to integrate this analysis into broader development programmes. Separate efforts as regards drugs trafficking, human trafficking and trafficking in arms as well as money-laundering also need to be situated within a wider framework, as organised crime today integrates many of these types of illegal activities in corporate structures. A clear link to the Internal Security Strategy of the EU needs to be made in this context.

Beyond this example, the list of issues mentioned in the Treaty (see below) as relevant for cooperation in the external action area is very long. Already the first



Barroso Commission stressed the need to strengthen the link between *internal and external* work in this domain – and this needs support from the Member States. The references in the Internal Security Strategy to external action also need to be followed up with more operational language on the external side.

Other areas of major importance for EGS include energy and environment.

Finally, it should be made clear that the issue of corruption cannot be addressed only in the context of bilateral cooperation with one country. Each Member State is very small in this context and it should be obvious that all Member States would benefit from a significant level of cooperation to fight this scourge.

The HR/VP has so far chosen to activate her role as Vice President in the Commission in a few specific areas such as water and education. She will obviously need support and capability to broaden that effort considerably in coming years and the EGS could provide essential language to that effect.

## **9. Towards effective multilateralism**

Lisbon Treaty Art. 21 (TEU) stipulates that the EU should “promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.” The multilateral issues, despite their prominent place in the ESS 2003, do not seem to be foremost in the minds of officials inside the institutions. They have been given little prominence in the establishment of the EEAS. A lot of attention has been given in the first years to procedures and legal problems (not least due to the issues raised by the United Kingdom) related to the EU’s role in international organisations. Some efforts have been made in order to bring multilateral work closer to other policies; a case in point is the OSCE where instructions are now given from the geographic service in order to guarantee complete harmony between geographic and multilateral policies. There is a need to further anchor the principle that the European Union can only be effective in multilateral institutions if it gets its act fully together, if it aligns all its institutional capacities in particular in the Commission, and if it engages with Member States and like-minded countries while focussing on the objectives of

cooperation rather than formal relationships (see the principles for effective multilateralism discussed in Lundin (2) and Lundin (3)).

Member States cannot expect the European Union to be very successful in international negotiations, particularly not in multilateral contexts, if no significant capacity is deployed both in the Commission and in the EEAS and EU delegations to promote this. In terms of structure, understaffed EU delegations are not able to do this kind of specialised work and there will be a need for strict negative priorities.

For many years, the EU has chosen to channel large funds through the UN system and developed an overarching inter-institutional agreement for this purpose. Similar agreements also exist *inter alia* for the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Working through international organisations should be described as a way for the EU to implement its strategic goals while avoiding unnecessary overlaps and inter-institutional competition. The emphasis on EU action *proper* was perhaps natural in an initial period of the ESDP. But in the second decade, not least against the backdrop of the financial crisis, it would seem important for the EU to benefit more extensively from the fact that the EU Member States staff and finance large parts of the operations and programs of other regional and global organisations.

## **Lisbon Treaty: Article 21 (TEU)**

TITLE V GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION'S EXTERNAL ACTION AND  
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY  
CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION'S EXTERNAL ACTION

### **Article 21**

1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles, which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations.

2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance.

3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies.

The Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect.

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