EQUIPPING THE EU

FOR FUTURE SECURITY CHALLENGES THROUGH STRATEGIC PLANNING

'Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its labourers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 'The chance for peace' speech, 16 April 1953

REPORT BY

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years two different camps have presented arguments for or against the revision of the European Union security strategy. The pro-revision group argues that the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted ten years ago is out of touch with the current security environment (Grevi, 2012) or simply does not meet the criteria of a full-fledged strategy (Biscop, 2012). The other camp maintains that the ESS and the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy of 2008 continues to be relevant (Rogers, 2012) and points to risks and political dilemmas associated with the revision process (Dempsey, 2012). The European Parliament also joined the debate by issuing the so-called Danjean Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which stresses the need for a new strategic vision that 'will define the EU's strategic interests in a context of changing threats (…) and which will take account of the changing threats and the development of relations with our [EU's] allies and partners but also with emerging countries' (European Parliament, 2012: 6).

This paper recognises that the essential function of a strategy is to design ways in which the instruments of power are used to advance a 'perceived political end' (Biscop & Norheim-Martinsen, CSDP: the strategic perspective, 2012). However, we argue that an equally or more consequential issue is to identify how the security strategies are implemented towards addressing specific, future challenges. An examination of the acquis accumulated after the adoption of the 2003 ESS serves as fodder for reflecting upon what the EU is capable of delivering, and for identifying opportunities for improvement.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the on-going debate about the revision of the 2003 ESS; at the heart of our analysis is an exploration of the concept of operations that underlie current and future EU security endeavours. Our objectives are twofold. First, the paper aims to demonstrate that a more systematic focus on a middle ground between the strategic objectives and day-to-day operations might be a more meaningful endeavour than leapfrogging ahead and re-engineering a brand new security strategy – at both conceptual and operational levels. Several authors acknowledge the importance of strategic planning for foreign policy (Bonn & Christodoulou, 1996; Flournoy & Brimley, 2006; Friedberg, 2007-08). While some

underline the value of the strategic planning process itself (Bryson & Roering, 1988), whereby changes occur through disjointed incrementalism (Quinn, 1980) or by way of 'muddling through' (Lindblom, 1959), we argue that the process needs to remain purposeful, iterative, and without outcomes predefined a priori. The advantage that derives from strategic planning, therefore, lies primarily in providing a level of flexibility that would allow for timely responses to multiple contingencies rather than in producing plans that anticipate specific scenarios. Plans evolve and strategies have the ability to embody resilience. The application of systematic processes for weighing and ranking contingencies as opposed to wishful thinking and brainstorming in separation from political realities (Bryson J. M., 2010) is how we envision a more evolved iteration of the 2003 ESS. It needs to be added that our aim here is not to lay out a detailed vision or roadmap of how the process of strategic planning should be organised but rather, present a viable alternative to a politicised process of ad hoc, day-by-day policy making.

Second, this paper addresses several aspects of the on-going debate about the future of European military and civilian capabilities. The paper starts with an overview of general trends identified in existing foresight studies and their security implications. It then discusses their consequences for European security in order to eventually analyse if the current approaches match challenges posed by the evolving security environment. The paper then concludes with a discussion about possible adaptations that need to take place – beyond the adoption of a new European security strategy. It argues that the recently prevailing narrative about the need for more robust investments in military capabilities is only one possible solution, one which often fails to take into account some of the most pressing future challenges. While we acknowledge the need for keeping a certain level of military capabilities as a part of a European toolbox, we question simplistic arguments calling for increases in military spending while neglecting 'softer' security instruments (e.g. development, humanitarian aid, civilian crisis management) or attempts to address post-conflict challenges. In that context, the quote from Dwight D. Eisenhower at the beginning of this paper offers a useful reminder that in a security environment that requires multifaceted response too much focus on military capabilities might be damaging in the long run.

GLOBAL TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY

In an increasingly complex and uncertain geopolitical environment, it is critical to develop a good understanding of long-term strategic trends. It is not surprising, therefore, that various governments, international organisations and private actors today devote substantial resources to developing their foresight capacities. Despite their obvious limitations (Missiroli, 2013a), these studies generally offer a useful framework for discussing and planning for alternative futures. This section offers a brief overview of global trends identified in various studies – including the Global Trends 2030 report of the US National Intelligence Council and its European equivalent drafted in the framework of the ESPAS project (European Strategy and Policy Analysis System), followed by a brief discussion of their security implications for the EU.

TREND 1:
CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

The distribution of global power is changing rapidly. Whether in terms of GDP, military spending, population size or R&D spending, by 2030 significant portions of global economic power will have shifted from the West to countries like China, India or Brazil but increasingly also to middle powers such as Indonesia, Turkey, and South Africa. China's economy is expected to bypass the United States during the coming decade. In military terms, it has already surpassed the UK as a world's fifth largest arms exporter by volume. Chinese spending on defence is second only to that of the United States. Meanwhile, both North America and Europe will see a relative economic and military decline. This shift in global power distribution has been interpreted as either a move towards a 'no one's world' (Kupchan, 2012) or a 'polycentric world' in which no single country will be in a hegemonic position. With the evolving global environment, the concepts that laid the foundations for the 'liberal world order' are increasingly subject to renegotiation, including the debates about values, sovereignty, global responsibility or future institutional arrangements.

Security implications

Most studies tend to agree that a conflict among major powers is very unlikely, simply because too much is at stake. Nevertheless, the changes in the global distribution of power increase the level of uncertainty and the risk of miscalculations. Hence, the risk of major interstate conflict cannot be excluded in the future as the recent events in the Korean Peninsula demonstrate. Nor can the risk for increased regional tensions, particularly in East Asia where border tensions between China and its neighbouring states already are a reality. Finally, China's military modernisation begs the question of how Western military doctrines should respond. The US will increasingly seek to 'project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges' (A2/AD). As a consequence, future combat operations will likely require the projection of substantial military capability over large distances.

TREND 2:
DIFFUSION OF STATE POWER

It is predicted that non-state actors, particularly national and transnational civil society networks and private corporations, will have a significantly larger imprint on global policies in the coming decades. Enabled by the spread of communication technologies, these 'micro-powers' (Naim, 2013) will in some cases even exceed that of many traditional states, possibly giving rise to new forms of governance (EUISS, 2012:19). The weakening of the state's grip and the rising imprint of networked non-state actors produces a two-fold consequence: it democratises international politics by bringing in voices previously silenced, but potentially also facilitates the operations of transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups. Furthermore, weakening state power can promote 'criminal or illegal networks exercising economic and even territorial control' in some weak states (EUISS, 2011:19). When combined with domestic violence and civil strife, weak governments, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, is a major cause for concern.

UNDERSTANDING AND ACCEPTING THE EU'S ROLE IN EAST ASIA

Security implications

While terrorism will certainly remain a concern, transnational criminal networks and low-intensity conflicts such as urban violence will increasingly pose a serious challenge. This is particularly the case in countries with weak governments combined with poverty, unemployment and a large young population. These kinds of social vulnerabilities enhances the risk for civil strife 'and thus reinforce the 'state fragility-conflict' cycle' and lead to state fragmentation (EUISS, 2012:96). Additionally, transnational crime will continue to be a growing priority – one that is often related to other challenges such as illegal immigration, piracy, and even terrorism.

TREND 3:
EVOLVING NATURE OF FUTURE WARFARE

Whether cyber, bioterrorism or precision-strike capabilities, the risk for proliferation of new instruments of war will be a key issue over the coming two decades. Many of these types of capabilities can potentially enable both state and non-state actors to wreak havoc. Instruments of cyberwarfare are already available and could be used by non-state actors to conduct an attack on military systems, electricity grids, communication networks or financial systems. Arms trafficking and CBRN proliferation – particularly when combined with transnational crime – will pose a particularly worrisome challenge in the coming decades. While the threat from Islamic terrorism is generally predicted to be less severe by 2030, the widespread availability of new lethal and disruptive technologies means that the focus of terrorist attacks might shift from causing mass casualties to inflicting widespread economic and financial disruptions (NIC, 2012). At the same time, the Global Trends 2030 report clearly downplays the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Security implications

The effects of sophisticated and coordinated cyberattacks are already starting to be felt throughout the world, giving rise to a tendency to see cyberspace as a new security frontier. In response, the US has declared computer sabotage from another country an 'act of war' to which the US will respond using traditional military force while NATO has recently adopted its own handbook for cyber warfare. However, many doubts have been raised concerning the use of force as a response to a cyberattack due to the difficulties in identifying and locating an attacker. The consequences could be extremely serious and prompt an interstate conflict. Increased cyber espionage targeting governments and corporations alike is also increasingly becoming a serious security threat.

TREND 4:
GROWING POPULATION AND RESOURCE SCARCITY

One of the major trends identified in numerous studies concerns the combination of demographic data and predictions of aggravated resource scarcity. In particular, rapid population growth – the world's population is expected to reach 8.3 billion by 2030 – will have significant consequences. Although absolute poverty is expected to diminish globally, extreme poverty and inequalities will still prevail in some regions, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa where the population is projected to rise by 500 million people, and in South-East Asia where we will see an increase of 400 million. The growing population and increased standard of living means that there will be a demand for more resources, including food, water and energy. The NIC Global Trends 2030 report forecasts that the demand for food will rise by 50 per cent by 2030 (NIC, 2012). Estimates by the OECD suggest that nearly half of the world's population will live in areas with high water stress, including northern Africa, the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia, and northern China. Rapid urbanisation

and climate change might further adversely affect this trend, posing a serious threat to food supply and food security. The interaction between state fragility and conflict will be especially pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, where a combination of growing income inequality and a massive increase in urbanisation risks paving way for increased social vulnerabilities in the decades to come. Such vulnerabilities can give rise to a negative cycle by accentuating state fragility. At the same time, rapid economic growth in the developing world will increase these countries' appetite for energy, with energy demand expected to rise by 45 per cent over the next two decades.

Security implication

There is a risk that we will see more resource strife in coming decades. Even though historical trends indicate that the number of inter and intrastate conflicts has been in decline since the early 1990s, the combination of demographic trends and resource scarcity suggest that conflicts may multiply in the future. Growing populations combined with the impact of climate change and environmental degradation also increase the risk for natural disasters which may give rise to massive refugee flows and climate migration, posing a host of both political and security challenges. In particular, humanitarian emergencies triggered by water and food scarcity may combine with failing state situations to generate major humanitarian crises. The exposure of those areas to natural or man-made disasters will require significant improvements in crisis management capacities.

TREND 5:
EMPOWERMENT OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITIES

A combination of various factors including advances in communication technology, reduction in poverty and middle class growth will continue to empower individuals. The 'global political awakening' of repressed or marginalized peoples in Central and Eastern Europe and – more recently – in the Arab world is a force to be reckoned with for sure in the decades to come (Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2012). At the same time, the increased demand from civil society for political participation also risks giving rise to new forms of radical populism. In particular, nationalist populism will be a force to be reckoned with in authoritarian regimes facing rising domestic opposition.

Security implication

While individual empowerment leading to enhanced political awareness can give rise to peaceful democratic transitions, such processes can also be turbulent – as seen during the Arab Spring. Moreover, the lure of various forms of radical populism and nationalism has the potential not only to undermine traditional political institutions but also to 'cause societal fragmentation and conflict.' (EUISS, 2012: 14) Fragmentation stemming from retrenchment into religious, ethnic, cultural and nationalistic lines is a real possibility in many countries. Therefore, 'wars fuelled by nationalism and extremist identity politics, and the associated dangers of mass murder and genocide, will be the core security challenge of the coming decades.' (EUISS, 2012: 17)

A quick overview of challenges identified in the ESS of 2003, the Review document of 2008 and the trends identified in various studies (Table 1) demonstrate that, while we observe certain evolution in nature of different phenomena and of the security context environment in general, the primary challenges has not changed significantly over the last decade. Terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organised crime, regional conflicts and state failure remain at the top of the list although their intensity and nature have changed (i.e. the linkages between organised crime, terrorism and foreign policy are increasingly visible in failed or failing states). Therefore, a more fruitful approach – contrary to the voices calling for a revision of the security strategy – could be to focus more on: 1) the changing nature of those threats, and 2) the assessment of what capabilities – already existing and/or required in the future – with which to effectively counter those challenges. The most significant overarching new development is clearly a need to address the consequences of the financial crisis, the national debt problems of several EU member states and the crisis of confidence in Europe. The risks stemming from launching new big debates about European security strategy at this specific time (e.g. a less ambitious approach due to the financial limitations, a more trade driven agenda) further underline the added value of a more focussed 'middle-level' approach

CURRENT APPROACHES TO SECURITY CHALLENGES

Over the past few years the debates about the EU's security policies and capabilities have taken place through the prism of a false choice between civilian and military power (Simon, 2013; Rasmussen, 2013). An inferiority complex paralysed European elites whenever confronted with the criticism coming from Europe's most trusted ally, the United States. In 2011, only a few months before stepping down as the US defence secretary, Robert Gates questioned the commitment of Europeans to mutual security objectives and signalled that 'future US political leaders - those for whom the cold war was not the formative experience (…) may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost'. He further described as 'unacceptable' the situation whereby two groups of members – those specialised in 'soft humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks' and those 'conducting the "hard" combat missions' – exist within a two-tier alliance. This statement was in line with both the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) reports and the new defence guidance 'Priorities for 21st Century Defence' which stress the importance of 'partnerships' and building partner capacity as 'important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership' (Department of Defense, 2012).

European spending on traditional military capabilities is indeed much lower than that of the United States. It is no mystery that European cooperation on defence and the use of force is subject to numerous structural and political impediments (Mölling, 2012; Techau, 2013). But in light of the above discussion about trends and their security implications and combined with data on spending on internal and public security (Figure 1) the picture does not look that gloomy (O'Donnell and Pawlak, 2012).

TABLE 1.
THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN THREAT PERCEPTION
**AND A TYPE OF CAPABILITIES NEEDED**

THREAT	2003	2008	Trend	Assessment	CAPABILITIES NEEDED
Global terrorism, in particular catastrophic terrorism, using unlimited violence to cause massive casualties	Listed as the most important threat, especially WMD terrorism	Emphasis on crime-terror nexus	The threat from Islamic terrorism is in decline. Terrorism will remain a challenge, particularly when related to new technology such as cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure	Threat has evolved. Less emphasis on Islamic terrorism today. Also shift from risk of mass casualties to risk of destruction/ disruption of critical infrastructure	Primarily non-military tools aiming at protection and prevention of any accidents and capacity building – both internally and of third parties
Proliferation of WMD, in particular in combination with international terrorism	"Potentially the greatest threat to our security". Risk for nuclear terrorism seen as high.	Risk has increased since ESS 2003. Still strong focus on WMD terrorism.	Broader focus on CBRN, not just nuclear proliferation. Also trafficking of arms a growing priority. Nuclear terrorism a lesser threat. Traditional proliferation to rouge states more salient threat.	Shift of emphasis away from nuclear to broader framework of CBRN. Shift towards stronger emphasis on broader critical infrastructure protection.	Primarily non-military capabilities aiming at capacity-building in third countries in order to prevent undesired proliferation to non-state actors
Organised crime with an important international dimension	"This internal threat to our security also has an important external dimension". Can be related to terrorism.	"Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with trafficking in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering."	Transnational crime a growing problem. Crime-terror nexus. Linked to fragile states.	This problem is seen as increasingly challenging, especially when coupled with weak states.	Primarily non-military law enforcement and civilian measures
Regional conflicts, which become themselves a source of other threats like extremism, terrorism, state failure, organised crime and WMD proliferation	"Impact on European interests directly and indirectly"…can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime."	Emphasis on regional instability in the neighbourhood but devotes relatively little attention to the subject otherwise.	Emphasis on protracted conflicts, nationalist and populism, East Asia, MENA,	Risk is particularly worrisome in MENA (post-Arab spring) and East Asia (where linked to rise of China).	A mix of prevention tools like development and capacity building AND military means whenever response is necessary
State failure, often due to bad governance, creating the breeding ground for other threats like organised crime and terrorism	"Related to terrorism and organised crime…undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability."	"State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy"	Linked to weak state combined with inequality, unemployment, nationalist and populist uprisings.	Definition of state failure has widened as well as the relative importance attached to it.	Non-military tools needed to enhance capacity building in third countries and hard security to respond to crisis situations

The EU funding for 'traditional' foreign policy – to cover support for democracy and human rights, development and humanitarian aid, partnerships with third countries – will amount to €58.7 billion until 2020 – a sizable sum even by global comparison. But EU governments are also likely to devote a share of the €15.7 billion EU budget for security and citizenship to foreign and security issues. Both the 'Migration and Asylum Fund' and the 'Internal Security Fund' are expected to have significant resources earmarked for EU internal security priorities in relations with third countries. The money could be used to help implement admission agreements, develop border surveillance capabilities or fight criminal networks. In addition, EU countries are likely to spend at least €1.4 billion on research and innovation in support of internal security. This is the amount they allocated in the EU's previous multian-

nual budget (in order to develop, amongst other things, intelligent maritime and land border surveillance systems and to make surveillance systems interoperable). European governments still need to negotiate how much of the EU's total research and innovation budget (worth €80 billion) will be allocated to security. But in light of the growing political importance of homeland security in recent years, the expectation is that they will devote a larger share than in the past.

Such an approach is also in line with the report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence adopted by the European Parliament, which notes that new trends 'call for European responses and a comprehensive security approach that addresses internal as well as external security and can combine civil and military means' (European Commission, 2004, p. 6).

FIGURE 1.
COMPARISON OF THE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE AND PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY IN THE EU-21 AND THE US (USD MILLIONS, CURRENT PRICES, CURRENT PPPS)


Note: Excluding: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania
Source: Author's compilation on the basis of the OECD Economic Outlook 2012

The Long-Term Vision for European defence capability and capacity needs (LTV) adopted by the European Defence Agency in 2006 also notices the general public's inclination to favour spending on 'security' over 'defence' as stemming from the growing concern over homeland security wholly concerned with interventions abroad or deterring conventional external attacks. Furthermore, it acknowledges that the success of future interventions will be influenced by a much broader range of policies – including human rights, rule of law or security sector reform whereby armed forces are 'but one component of a wider, comprehensive and integrated approach to CSDP operations'(European Defence Agency, 2006). More recently, top European officials have underlined the multifaceted nature of threats like terrorism or maritime security by underlying their 'potential threat to the

arteries of globalised modern life: telecommunication, banking systems, airports or energy grids (…) No less than 90% of EU external trade is carried by sea, so this is a priority that none of our countries can ignore. And one on which Europeans, together, can make a difference (…)' (European Council, 2013). This new complexity is reflected in a new study conducted at the EU Institute for Security Studies which concluded that in order to better respond to future challenges the EU and its member states will not only need to develop new capabilities but also achieve higher efficiency and net savings from current defence expenditure (Missiroli, 2013).

**FIGURE 2.**
THREATS TO EU AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Source: Author's compilation on the basis of the Special Eurobarometer, Internal Security, November 2011

One important element in the discussion about capabilities and future investments is dealing with the consequences of the financial crisis, which most citizens and governments consider as a number one security challenge. According to the Eurobarometer survey published in 2011, at least one in three Europeans identified the economic and financial crises as the main challenge to European and national security (34 and 33 per cent respectively – see Figure 2) (European Commission, 2011). The on-going debate between member states and other European Union institutions about the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework reflects this new reality: spending on competitiveness and security and citizenship has increased by 37.3% and 26.8% respectively while direct payments from the Common Agricultural Policy and 'sustainable growth' have been reduced by 17.5%

and 11.3% respectively. The comparison of the MFF currently in place with the proposal recently approved by member states (Figure 3) clearly demonstrates that security and citizenship chapter is one of the 'winners,' even though in relative terms it is still only a very small percentage of the total EU budget.

FIGURE 3.
COMPARISON OF MFF 2007-13 AND MFF 2014-20
(IN THE BRACKETS % CHANGE COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS MFF)

Source: Author's compilation on the basis of the European Council conclusions

ADAPTATIONS: MATCHING CAPABILITIES WITH FUTURE CHALLENGES

In order to better understand the direction in which the EU is currently developing one needs to differentiate between discourses, policies and resources. The EU's commitment to a given issue could be considered firm if these three levels overlap. This is for instance the case of internal security which in addition to being expressed as one of the main Treaty objectives is also a guiding principle for implementing documents, like the EU's Internal Security Strategy or a recently adopted communication on cyber security. Declarations and policies were then followed by concrete resources commitments expressed either through the development of new institutions, growing manpower or funding. The European cooperation on defence, on the other hand, is a good example of a policy area with clear divergence between declarations and practice (i.e. numerous statements on the importance of military capabilities on one hand, and cuts in defence budgets on the other).

The European commitment to closer defence cooperation has been expressed on many occasions. The European Council in December 2013 will be devoted to defence issues which provides additional impetus to the debates on the subject. At the same time, however, the defence budgets in most of the European countries have been substantially reduced in line with a new dominating paradigm of doing 'more with less'. At the most recent EDA annual conference the President of the European Council confirmed the importance of a common European defence: 'In the new strategic environment, we need to be able to fulfil our responsibilities. (…) We are responsible for our security and we must contribute to that of our neighbourhood. But do we have the means?' (European Council, 2013). However, High Representative Ashton speaking at the same event made it clear that defence is only part of the solution. 'The choice is simple', she said, 'either cooperate to acquire capabilities; or risk losing those capabilities altogether. But defence cannot and must not be viewed in isolation, not least because the distinction between military and civil technology has become increasingly blurred. So many technological innovations have both civil and military applications, in sectors such as space, cyber, maritime surveillance, and unmanned aerial sys-

tems, to name just a few' (European Union, 2013).

The divergence between declarations and actions in conjunction with the assessment of future challenges make the discussion about designing suitable approaches and policy instruments all the more relevant. If one takes into account the evolving nature of challenges and threats, political challenges related to closer cooperation and decreasing resources, the need to look critically at prevailing policy discourses is no longer an option but a necessity.

Many of the identified security challenges require closer cooperation between civilian actors (i.e. law enforcement, emergency response, border management, urban planners) and military (armed forces), whereby all partners work towards similar or identical objectives. Too often, however, the working methods and time frames differ (i.e. more long-term-oriented in case of humanitarian actions). To that aim their relationships need to be built on a shared understanding emerging from the development of shared situational assessment and planning concepts, better interactions at different stages of problem management and learning throughout the mission planning. The record up to date in the regions like the Horn of Africa offers evidence that this exercise can bring benefits to all parties involved (see Case Study 1). The Strategic Framework for Horn of Africa adopted by the EU integrates security and development - humanitarian assistance components under one over-arching policy agenda for the region. The framework calls for a multi-sectoral EU strategy, one which encompasses five areas of EU action: building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth; and supporting regional economic cooperation. To combat maritime piracy, the framework further asserts that the EU will work to counter piracy through seeking to enhance local and regional capacity (including maritime capacities and prosecution and detention capacities) and better track financial flows from piracy. No other actor in the region is currently pursuing (or would be able to pursue) such a broad approach.

 A comprehensive approach is not only an issue for designing civilian military relations but also for organising the work across several government agencies (homeland, emergency management, criminal justice and law enforcement) responsible for public safety and security – so-called public safety networks (PSNs) (Federowicz & Sawyer, 2012). Due to their cross-agency nature and the need to connect different – sometimes diverging missions – public safety networks face challenges similar to those in civilian-military relations, most notably with regard to funding, information sharing and communicating across agency boundaries. In the European Union context, one example of such network is the European Union Large Information Systems Agency (eu-LISA) responsible for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. This new agency is responsible for the operational management of data from the second-generation Schengen Information System (a common database which facilitates the exchange of information on individuals between national law enforcement authorities), the Visa Information System (a database that will allow member states to enter, update and consult visa data, including biometric data, electronically) and EURODAC (an IT system for comparing the fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants).

The discussion about the comprehensive approach is not only a conceptual one but touches upon very concrete decisions about the future role of armed forces and actors who have developed new security functions only recently, or whose function has evolved towards a hard security core. The following sections discuss some of the challenges faced by those groups, especially in the context of a changing security environment.

THE ROLE OF DEFENCE BEYOND WAR-FIGHTING

The analysis of future security threats suggests that the tasks that the military will need to address are likely to undergo substantial change. This is reflected, for instance, in the US Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the UK's Joint Doctrine Note on Peacekeeping. German Federal Minister of Defence, Thomas de Maizière, has similarly envisaged a reorientation of the Bundeswehr in that 'the decision

to make the mixed civilian-military planning of billets at the Ministry and offices a continuous principle will change the organisational culture of the Bundeswehr as well. We bet on specialisation of the civilian personnel, on the military expertise of the soldiers, and on the common experience of both groups' (de Maizière, 2013). The task of peacekeeping, moreover, has evolved from traditional military model of observing ceasefires towards more complex models incorporating military, police and civilian tasks (United Nations, 2008). Past experiences from Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya also exemplify the evolution of basic components of peacekeeping operations. The strategic environment will not only include regular military forces but may entail organised crime groups, militias, terrorists or other illegal armed groups. Operations might unfold within more multi-actor structures that include humanitarian actors or non-governmental organisations – all with different interests and mandates (UK Ministry of Defence, 2011). The blurring of the military-civilian divide may evolve to the point of including emergency and crisis management or the implementation of humanitarian and development tasks (see Case Study 2).

Indeed, the past two decades have witnessed a trend of growing use of armed forces in carrying out humanitarian tasks (Wheeler and Harmer, 2006). With a series of major natural disasters overwhelming the disaster response communities, and with stronger pressures to perform due to the intense and highly dramatic media coverage, there is an increased recognition in the international donor community that the military can play a key supporting role in disasters. This is particularly the case in severe disasters that occur in weak states with limited local capacities. In such situations, international assistance will be critical to ensure security (also for humanitarian relief agencies on the ground), improve infrastructure and provide logistical and medical support, etc. There is of course a need for civil and military actors to coordinate plans prior to engaging in joint actions overseas. This implies that, in addition to performing traditional tasks, the military needs to master both expectation management and communication tasks. These developments in addition to challenges and dilemmas stemming from the use of new advanced military technologies will require adaptations of a cultural and legal nature and consequently additional training.

CASE STUDY 1:
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

In order to assist five countries on the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean with the development of their maritime security capacity, the European Union has established the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR) for the initial duration of two years. This civilian mission is a part of the EU's wider effort to fight piracy and takes place alongside Operation Atalanta (and the EUTM Somalia training mission based in Uganda) and an integrated CSDP approach. As such, the mission has as objectives to strengthen the Rule of Law sector in Somalia (in particular, the mission will train and equip maritime police forces in these areas) and strengthen regional maritime capacities (i.e. coast guards). While Nestor is a civilian mission it will likely involve some military expertise since the coast guard function can be carried out by both civilians and military personnel depending on the host country in question. Other EU development programs, such as the Critical Maritime Routes Programme (CMR) under the Instrument for Stability and the European Development Fund, feed into the overall framework.

Additionally, the EU has sought to counter maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa through the 'Enhancing Maritime Security and safety through Information sharing and Capacity building' (MARSIC) programme within the EU's Instrument for Stability (IfS). Focusing on the Western Indian Ocean, this programme supports maritime security and safety in the region by enhancing information sharing and training capacities. The project seeks to contribute to the implementation of the regional Djibouti Code of Conduct targeted at fighting piracy and armed robbery against ships. As such, the project focuses on capacity building and training of maritime administration staff, officials and coast guards from the region (i.e. Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya, Tanzania). This includes assistance to setting up the Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC) for maritime affairs and the Regional Maritime Information Sharing Centre (ReMISC) in Yemen, established in March 2011. Another component of MARSIC, implemented by Interpol, supports national law enforcement capacities to combat maritime piracy in

East Africa. It does so by assisting with advanced investigation techniques, ransoms and assets tracing and recovery, and providing equipment for performing investigations including on piracy financiers and organisers.

Another example of EU support to countering piracy in the region is the regional 'Maritime Security Programme' (MaSe), which falls under the European Development Fund (EDF). This programme provides support to Eastern and Southern Africa in support of the implementation of the Indian Ocean Regional Strategy and Action Plan to Mauritius to fight piracy and promote maritime security. The EU's support will primarily focus on help 'develop a strategy to tackle piracy on land in Somalia; enhance judicial capabilities to arrest, transfer, detain and prosecute piracy suspects; address economic impact and financial flows related to piracy; and improve national and regional capacities in maritime security functions, including surveillance and coastguard functions.' Currently, a pilot project of €2 million is underway providing rapid mobilization of immediate counter-piracy activities in the region in preparation for the establishment of MaSe in 2012 or early 2013. The preliminary funding for the period 2013-2017 is €37 million.

The multi-initiative engagement of the EUCAP Nestor, the CMR and the MARSIC combined with the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission in the Horn of Africa and other development efforts on the ground illustrate how the EU is leading the way when it comes to taking a comprehensive approach to complex security challenges. This includes addressing increased linkages between security challenges and the benefits offered by close cooperation between a wide spectrum of actors.

THE SECURITY ROLE OF CIVILIAN ACTORS

The parallel process will imply increasing investment and build-up of security components in organisations and institutions dealing with law enforcement, home affairs, health care or urban planning. In turn, this would imply various adaptations to the extent that existing parts of state and sub-state structures acquire new responsibilities. This might have two-fold implications.

First, civilians actors may be required to perform tasks that were previously reserved for military or law en- forcement agencies in the territories of third countries. For instance, in case of an outbreak of an epidemic, health care experts may be posted to other parts of the world in order to contain the contamination and thereby perform a de facto homeland defence func- tion. A concrete example is the quasi-military tasks performed by humanitarian aid and crisis response agencies in case of the tsunami off the Eastern coast of Japan. The EU's team on the ground included experts in logistics, radiology and nuclear technology who in close cooperation with Japanese authorities coordinated the storage, transport and distribution of assistance on the ground.

CASE STUDY 2:
THE MILITARY ROLE IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF – THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE 2010 CASE

Illustrating the important role of militaries during severe disasters, the massive devastation brought about by the Haiti earthquake in January 2010 called for a combination of large military and civil- ian relief efforts. In response to the earthquake, the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) quickly launched Operation Unified Response. This operation included personnel from all the military branches. In the first days after the disaster, around 13,000 troops were deployed. These troops includ- ed some 2,200 Marines and heavy equipment to help clean debris-choked roads. At one point, total deployment reached 22,268 (U.S. Southern Com- mand, 2010). Besides the Army, other branches of the military also provided relief support. At an early stage in the relief efforts, the U.S. military helped to provide security for UN personnel in Haiti, supplied medical services and food to the Haitian people, assumed certain critical government func- tions such as the controlling the Port-au-Prince air- port and clearing the port and maintaining law and order, and worked to promote a workable environ- ment for the international humanitarian community. Allowing the US to respond swiftly and effectively to the Haiti earthquake was the highly institution- alized civil-military links with the US government.

The U.S. has well-established civil-military links, including DoD staff located inside USAID and vice versa. DoD also maintains certain responsibilities in foreign disaster relief and response. Its Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs di- rects the military's response to disasters overseas (Sylves, 2008).Providing response to disasters overseas is a top priority of the U.S. military, as demonstrated, for instance, in the most recent ver- sion of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
In carrying out its humanitarian assistance to Haiti, SOUTHCOM coordinated its efforts with the State Department and USAID. The overall U.S. response to the Haiti disaster was led by USAID. The U.S. government immediately set up an interagency task force to coordinate and facilitate humanitar- ian response through the Response Management Team (RMT), headed by USAID and carried out by OFDA (Congressional Research Service, 2010). Civil-military cooperation was facilitated by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), set up by the Task Force-Haiti at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince, to integrate the mili- tary with other relevant stakeholders, including the USAID and UN.

In sum, the US military played a critical role in re- sponding to the disaster, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake.

Second, civilian actors are already required to partici- pate in operations in conflict or post-conflict regions. Many tasks, like security sector reform or training mis- sions, are implemented primarily by law enforcement officials though designed through a mix of civilian and military concepts (see Case Study 3). A com- mon problem, however, is that either the availability of civilian personnel is limited which consequently shifts the burden back to the military, or – even when such civilian expertise is available – the military takes the lead by default. Contrary to what is generally argued (Lindley-French & Hopkinson, 2012), this situation

places additional burden and responsibility not on military – whose deployment is usually constrained by time and mission factors – but on civilian elements whose traditional missions might be compromised unless the military mission evolves to include broader elements of governance and development work.

CASE STUDY 3: MARITIME SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (MSSR) GUIDE

Maritime activities include international transport of goods, national revenue generating activities (i.e. fishing, aquaculture), recreation and tourism, marine-based resources. It involves a broad number of challenges to maritime sector: illegal and unregulated fishing, smuggling, trafficking in persons, narcotrafficking, piracy, proliferation of WMDs, terrorism or environmental degradation. Many of the functions addressing those challenges – both internally and in third countries – are performed by coast guards which are responsible for protecting the maritime economy and the environment and defending maritime borders. In order to assist actors involved in maritime security tasks in dealing with this new security environment, the US Department of State prepared the Maritime Security Sector Reform (MSSR) Guide. The MSSR Guide has been created by the US State Department as an analytical tool for a wide range of stakeholders in the maritime realm encompassing oceans, seas, lakes, rivers, coastlines and Harbours. As such the MSSR Guide is an analytical tool designed to: a) map and assess the maritime sector; b) assess existing maritime security sector capabilities and gaps; and/or c) to enable coordination and collaboration to improve maritime safety and security.

The MSSR Guide derives from recent work on security sector reform (SSR) which underlines interdependencies between the security sector and the need for coordination and cooperation among security-related and civil institutions. The MSSR Guide applies those concepts to various components of maritime security, including regulatory, operational, institutional, policy and human resources. It can be applied at multiple levels, including private-public partnerships (e.g. in case of ports), individuals (e.g. in case of privately owned coastal land), shipping and transport companies (e.g. for maritime commerce) and to several levels of governance at national, regional, sub-regional and agencies (in case of maritime law enforcement). The MSSR Guide can be also used to facilitate discussion among national actors with maritime responsibilities.

The maritime sector is fundamental to the national defence, law enforcement, social, and economic goals of many countries and the MSSR Guide therefore performs numerous functions that organise relationships between various actors and jurisdictions.

Maritime Governance Function: highlights the importance of accountability and oversight in a broad range of public administrative activities that maritime agencies must perform and which eventually help to attract capital, encourage growth and improve quality of life. As such, this function highlights the supportive and connective roles of 'non-maritime' actors at every level of government.

Maritime Civil and Criminal Authority Function: highlights the contribution that all elements of civil and criminal authority make to maritime security ranging from non-proliferation efforts that target weapons of mass destruction to licensing, inspection, and enforcement efforts. As such this function includes the broad array of civil and criminal justice-related activities required to support rule of law in the maritime domain. Maritime authorities may sometimes act as police on and near the water but also perform functions more closely related to customs and border control. In addition to their traditional tasks like the prevention, detection and interdiction of maritime crime or terrorist attacks, they also can enforce national and local laws that protect against other threats, such as threats to the maritime environment.

Maritime Defence Function: The maritime realm is a national resource but at the same time a national border that needs to be defended from threats originating abroad or at home. This function groups together capabilities for the effective detection, deterrence, and interdiction of aggressive acts against a state's sovereignty, assets, and infrastructure within or adjacent to its coastal waters and to effective participation in international maritime partnerships. Navies and coast guards are organisations dedicated to maritime defence mobilised in response to natural disasters, humanitarian crises, or other national emergencies.

In sum, MSSR Guide reflects multifaceted nature of security challenges facing civilian actors and new roles that they are required to undertake.

In addition to missions performed abroad, one needs to consider certain homeland protection tasks performed by internal security actors and which might be interpreted as de facto defence tasks. A clear example is the integrated border management and the tasks performed by coast and border guards as it has been the case of many new programmes introduced in the EU. For instance, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) is a crucial component of crisis management in the Southern Mediterranean where several migration and trafficking routes into the Schengen area exist and pose constant or incidental challenges, such as in the aftermath of the 2011 Libya crisis. The objective of EUROSUR is to provide member states with a technical and operational framework for increasing situational awareness and improving the reaction capabilities of national authorities surveying the EU external border, with the aim to ultimately reduce number of irregular migrants and prevent cross-border crime. The need to address instability that may result from the growing population and social inequality in the Southern neighbourhood offers a good example. According to the Eurostat data, the total number of asylum applicants in the EU rose to more than 330 000 in 2012 (Eurostat, 2013). The asylum-seekers from Syria became the second largest group of applicants.

To be sure, in other parts of the world law enforcement or customs authorities are also used for quasi-military tasks. China, for instance, has undertaken significant reforms of its civil maritime forces which may result in the creation of Asia's largest coast guard. This is an important development given that Chinese and Japanese customs, maritime surveillance and fisheries agencies are in the frontline of the on-going disputes in the South and East China Seas.

In short, the dominant narrative of the past few years has reinforced the notion that a more extensive investment in European military capabilities is in and by itself a sufficient condition for ensuring that the EU remains relevant at the international stage in the future. This argument is mainly based on the assumption that future conflicts and security challenges will resemble those in Afghanistan or Libya where the limitations of European actions were manifested. But such an understanding is too deterministic as it assumes that the EU is destined to deal with the negative consequences instead of addressing the root causes before the worst-case scenarios materialise. In that sense, military responses and capabilities constitute the last resort in an event where all other measures fail. Conversely, civilian capabilities are being used in an increasing number of conflict or post-conflict settings. Overall, these developments bring up the issue of what research and technology are needed to prepare the Union for new security threats.

THE ROLE OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

The risks associated with terrorist attacks, proliferation of CBRN weapons, and cyber attacks pose unprecedented obligations on governments to prepare for the unthinkable and allocate the resources so as to minimize the impact on people and society from such events. As a result, activities such as counterterrorism and the fight against organized crime, border control, critical infrastructure protection and preparedness and recovery in times of crisis, now represent fundamental aspects of national security policy in both the United States and the European Union.

The focus on the development of new technologies as a key 'force enabler' (European Commission, 2004) and the promotion of a security-oriented research accelerated the development of new security industries in Europe. In 2004 the European Commission concluded that 'there is an increasing overlap of functions and capabilities required for military and non-military security purposes (such as is found between border police, coast guard and emergency response teams) that often allows the use of the same technology for the development of both security and defence applications. (space technologies, drones, etc. – decisions political in character and not technological)' (European Commission, 2004: 12). The result is the emergence of multi-purpose capabilities which constitute the technology base along the continuum between defence, security and civil applications – with a distinct technology flow from the civil to defence sector.

Predictably, the rise of a European security industry has resulted in an increase of security research. While most security funding in the European Union remains available at the national level, the development of a European security research program might over time help increase the EU's competitiveness on the global security market.

FIGURE 4.
HORIZON 2020 BUDGET DEVOTED TO SOCIETAL CHALLENGES

Source: Author's compilation on the basis of the European Commission data

Following FP7[1], the Horizon 2020 research program will serve to implement Europe 2020 initiative by providing €80 billion between 2014-2020 (Figure 4). Horizon 2020 is not just a new framework program; it also seeks to provide simplification through introducing a single set of rules. Furthermore, it will fuse the research and innovation funding currently provided through the Framework Programmes for Research and Technical Development with those of the Innovation Framework Programme and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology. The overall goal of Horizon 2020 is to strengthen the EU's position in science (including an increase of funding to the European Research Council); strengthen industrial leadership in innovation (including investments in

key technologies and support for Small and Medium Enterprises; and provide funding for addressing major concerns such as climate change, energy security, and food safety and security. Specific topical issues mentioned as priorities in the Horizon 2020 security theme include counter-terrorism, border security, cyber security, and disaster resilience. Regarding security research, the EU Commission further refers to states that "the coordination and improvement of the security research area" is an "an essential element" in this regard. The European Organisation for Security (EOS) estimates that the security R&D budget in Horizon 2020 amounts to €410 million.

The European Global Strategy project headed by four European think-tanks: http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/
The Civilian Headline Goal of 2008 set out the EU's ambitions to strengthen the civilian capabilities need for crisis management.

1. The FP7 denotes the EU Commission's multiannual framework programme for research and technological development.

CASE STUDY 4:
GLOBAL MONITORING FOR ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY (GMES) / COPERNICUS

GMES will provide accurate, timely and easily accessible information to improve the management of the environment, understand and mitigate the effects of climate change and ensure civil security. Coordinated by the European Commission, European Space Agency and European Environment Agency (EEA), GMES provides a unified system through which vast amounts of data, acquired from space and from a multitude of in-situ sensors, are fed into a range of thematic information services designed to benefit the environment, the way we live, humanitarian needs, and support effective policy-making for a more sustainable future.

ESA is developing five families of Sentinel missions specifically for GMES, the first of which is scheduled to launch in 2013. The Sentinels will provide a unique set of observations for GMES, starting with the all-weather, day and night radar images from Sentinel-1 to be used for land and ocean services. Sentinel-2 will deliver high-resolution optical images for land services and Sentinel-3 will provide data for services relevant to the ocean and land. Sentinel-4 and Sentinel-5 will provide data for atmospheric composition monitoring from geostationary and polar orbits, respectively. The Space Component forms the European contribution to the worldwide Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). The In situ Component is managed by the European Environment Agency and focuses on data acquired by a multitude of sensors on the ground, at sea or in the air.

These services fall into six main categories: services for land management, services for the marine environment, services relating to the atmosphere, services to aid emergency response, services associated with security and services relating to climate change. GMES will provide services for a range of different applications such as air-quality forecasting, flood warnings, early detection of drought and desertification, early warnings of severe weather, oil-spill detection and drift prediction, sea-water quality, crop analysis, forest monitoring, land-use change, agriculture, food security and humanitarian aid – to name but a few. GMES services provide standardised multi-purpose information common to a broad range of application areas relevant to EU policies, many of which are implemented at national or regional levels aiming at sustainability.

In sum, GMES is currently being developed to provide the EU with an operational Earth observation capacity of its own. Such a capacity, once successfully implemented, will allow for improved data that can serve both environmental and security purposes.

The widening of the security agenda has also had profound effects on some of the major defence companies in both Europe and North America. Although many traditional large defence companies have not been adequately prepared for the new security environment, a number of them are now entering the security market. Reflecting the growing importance of the civil security market in Europe, the European Organisation for Security was set up in 2007 to serve as an industry association for European private security sector actors in the civil security arena. SAAB Group accordingly provides an interesting case of a defence company that utilises its technological expertise and innovation to expand its business into the civil security sphere. While this industry still accounts for a fraction of the traditional defence business area and while European civil security market remains highly fragmented and unstructured, it nevertheless holds significant potential for the future. As defence budgets are currently getting slashed across Europe, the nature of defence companies will inevitably have to change, as the defence industry increasingly must look elsewhere for business.

CASE STUDY 5:
CHANGING NATURE OF MILITARY COMPANIES

One example of a traditional defence company who has already taken steps towards expanding its 'civil security' business is the Swedish aero-defence company, the SAAB Group. Today, civil security represents one of the company's five core business areas. Although traditional defence products such as jetfighters and weapons systems still remain the core business area for SAAB, the company's expertise in developing technology for civil security functions has gained prominence in recent years.

Today, SAAB offers a wide platform of different technologies solutions, ranging from critical infrastructure protection to air traffic management to border security and police solutions. Other SAAB civil security solutions include aerial and costal surveillance, event security, transportation management, port security and energy distribution security. For example, one of SAAB's products for surveillance is the "Skeldar", a medium-range UAV system that could be used for civil security purposes. SAAB also offers a variety of training and simulation solutions in the civil security area.

SAAB's leading role in the area of civil security is not accidental. The company merged activities from different business areas in 2008 so as to create a separate civil security business unit, on par with its defense portfolio. The creation of the new civil security business unit followed a rapid increase in the company's civil security solutions.

The company's expansion into the civil security sphere stems from a realization that the civil security market is growing as well as a realization that the threats and challenges are changing. Official publications from the company note the importance of global trends such as population growth, climate change, resource scarcity and instability threaten the ability of countries to provide security for their populations.

Although a relatively small aerodefence company, SAAB Group still provides a good case of how the defence industry is consciously taking the step into civil security through acquisition of small and medium size companies, dual-use technology and in-house R&D.

WAY FORWARD: STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR FUTURE SECURITY CHALLENGES

The purpose of this paper was to place two specific aspects of the European debate about security under a magnifying glass.

The first aspect is the debate about a revised European security strategy. As we have attempted to demonstrate with an analysis of major trends and their implications for European security, the overall assessment of the security environment and main challenges identified in the European Security Strategy of 2003 remain relevant. In any case, even though some threats have evolved and new trends emerged, they do not necessarily need to be addressed by opening any new, grand debate. Both research and policy communities have been operating with the same concepts and different dialects of the same vocabulary for the past ten years (i.e. 'pooling and sharing' and 'smart defence', 'polycentric world' and 'multipolarity'). Even though the meaning of those concepts might have been refined and their relative importance evolved, their principal meaning remains largely unchanged. Therefore, while we do see a value in getting to the bottom of numerous issues in the European security debate, we believe that many aspects of the discussion about European security and strategy are research- rather than need-driven.

Nevertheless, we do see a real gap in 'middle-level thinking' that connects strategic objectives with day-to-day security policy making and operations. Bridg-

ing this gap should be the task of strategic planners across EU institutions. The establishment of an inter-institutional task force in the framework of the ESPAS project is a step in the right direction. Moreover, we believe that a long-term planning process capacity devoted exclusively to foreign and security policies ought to be developed under the European External Action Service. Such a process capacity might gradually evolve from a multi-annual programme aimed at outlining the EU's priorities and providing a general orientation to European foreign and security policies. Such a programme – tied to the EU's institutional cycle – could be further supplemented by more detailed situation assessments delivered to the High Representative at the beginning of each year. By introducing a strategic process that institutes regular, annual assessments, controversy surrounding European foreign and security policy debate could be mitigated. Furthermore, removing 'ad hocism' should contribute to additional depoliticisisation. Similar processes are already underway and drive the policy in the equally politically sensitive area of freedom, security and justice (e.g. by the so-called Stockholm programme, the EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) by Europol). Initiatives like the EGS[2] or ESPAS could be viewed as precursors to the strategic planning process. Bringing together key stakeholders (e.g.. international and regional organisations, think tanks, private sector actors, and international non-governmental organisations) could help frame issues in technically feasible and politically acceptable ways.

Another debate linked directly to the one about the strategic planning process is the one devoted to European capabilities. A cursory overview of global trends identified in various foresight studies led us to the belief that the challenges that the EU will need to confront in the future will require not only different kinds of military tools but also more and better civilian capabilities. As we have suggested above, the good news is that in many policy areas the EU is well on track toward generating relevant resources and capabilities through policies and instruments that have little direct link with hard core security policy. The EU is

also doing quite well with respect to the humanitarian and development aid it provides. The EU has diversified CSDP operations it undertakes (i.e. rule of law, border management, security sector reform, monitoring peace agreements) even though shortcomings related to the achievement of the Civilian Headline Goal 2010[3] cannot be ignored. A better assessment of EU needs in this specific area might help identify alternative ways towards achieving them.

 There is no doubt about that European armed forces make substantial contributions to global security through their involvement in CSDP, NATO or UN missions. And, the analysis of future trends and their implications for European security indicates that there will continue to be a demand for maintaining European military capabilities at a level that allows for interventions in the EU's immediate vicinity – at the very minimum. However, the extrapolated trends also suggest that the role of military will keep shifting beyond the traditional mission of fighting wars. The discussion about capabilities, therefore, needs to move beyond 'hardware' and address the questions of what 'software' is needed, meaning the skills, tools, potential synergies with other European policies, as well as enhanced interoperability. All these are considerations that planners should be aware of when they design programs that eventually may result in a strategic process capacity.

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2. The European Global Strategy project headed by four European think-tanks: http://www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu/

3. The Civilian Headline Goal of 2008 set out the EU's ambitions to strengthen the civilian capabilities need for crisis management.

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