



How to Progress Ukraine's Western Integration as a Prelude to Accession to the EU and NATO

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Summary

As the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their member states become increasingly absorbed by internal challenges, the friends of Ukraine need to seek new paths to increase Ukrainian security, resilience and growth before its accession to the West's two major organizations. An alternative way to reduce Ukraine's current institutional isolation would be to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, notably the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should try to create multilateral networks with post-communist member-countries of NATO and the EU.

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Introduction

The various political effects and multiple repercussions of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic for the international system will be especially far-reaching for weak states located in geopolitical grey zones.¹ Countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which are neither military nor economic great powers and not embedded in security alliances or trading blocs, are at special risk.² For Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the evolving world crisis will have the unpleasant consequence that their nations' already stalling integration with the West may be further slowed.³ In as far as the European Union and NATO will be consumed by their various internal challenges and external threats, they will become more inward-looking and even less prone than before to consider accession of new members.

It is certainly true that some of the existing special outreach programmes in which Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are included,

such as the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative or NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan scheme, will probably remain in place and may even be strengthened.⁴ In 2019, moreover, Ukraine very publicly put the aim of full membership of NATO and the EU into its constitution.⁵ These organizations will probably turn ever more introverted, however, as international and national instability increase throughout the year. As a minimum, it seems unlikely that the ongoing crisis will reduce scepticism about further EU and NATO enlargement, especially in Western Europe.

Ukraine's Ambivalent Relationship with Western Europe

In 2019, Ukrainian politicians and experts were already dismayed by a number of what they saw as scandalous decisions and signals coming from West European. These included the unjustified readmission of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary

¹ Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister (eds), *The Eastern Question: Russia, the West, and Europe's Grey Zone*. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016; Ian Bond, *Contested Space: Eastern Europe between Russia and the EU*. London: Center for European Reform, 2017; Vasile Rotaru, *Russia, the EU, and the Eastern Partnership. Building Bridges or Digging Trenches?* Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2018; Roman Tyshchenko, "Our Existence is Not the Subject of Compromises", Pavlo Klimkin during UCU Visit. Ukrainian Catholic University, 5 November 2018. ucu.edu.ua/en/news/existence-not-subject-compromises-pavlo-klimkin-ucu-visit/.

² Margarita M. Balmaceda (ed.), *On the Edge: Ukrainian—Central European—Russian Security Triangle*. Budapest: CEU Press, 2001; André Härtel, *Westintegration oder Grauzonen-Szenario? Die EU- und WTO-Politik der Ukraine vor dem Hintergrund der inneren Transformation (1998-2009)*. Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012.

³ Hilary Appel, *The Long-Term Prospects for Ukraine's Accession to the European Union: A Focus on EU-Level Constraints*. PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 330, 2014; Andreas Umland, *Ukraine's Understandable But Senseless Hope for NATO Membership*, Atlantic Council. *Ukraine Alert*, 5 April

2016.

www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-s-understandable-but-senseless-hope-for-nato-membership/; Steven Pifer, *Will Ukraine Join NATO? A Course for Disappointment*, Brookings. Order from Chaos, 25 July 2017. www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/25/will-ukraine-join-nato-a-course-for-disappointment/; Alyona Getmanchuk, *European Integration Is Taking Root across Ukraine Despite Russia's Best Efforts*, Atlantic Council. *Ukraine Alert*, 12 December 2019. www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/european-integration-is-taking-root-across-ukraine-despite-russias-best-efforts/.

⁴ Edgars Rinkēvičs, Pavlo Klimkin, Sven Mikser, Linas Linkevičius, Jacek Czaputowicz, Margot Wallström, Anders Samuelsen, Chrystia Freeland, Teodor Meleşcanu, Jeremy Hunt, Tomáš Petříček, *The West Must not Abandon Crimea and Ukraine to Russian Aggression*, *The Guardian*, 27 February 2019.

⁵ Klimkin, *Ukraine Will Continue to Move towards the EU and NATO with a New President*, *Opinion. The Way Ukraine Thinks*, 2 April 2019. opinionua.com/en/2019/04/02/klimkin-ukraine-will-continue-to-move-towards-the-eu-and-nato-with-a-new-president/.



Assembly of the Council of Europe, from which it had been excluded following the attack on Ukraine in 2014;⁶ and a strangely conciliatory turn in French President Emmanuel Macron's rhetoric vis-à-vis Moscow.⁷ Moreover, as became clear following Macron's unexpected advances, the French President has numerous supporters in Western Europe in his stated intention to change the current character of EU-Russia relations and begin a new security partnership.

Germany has in many ways been supportive of Ukraine since 2014.⁸ The Federal Republic will probably continue or may even strengthen its support for Ukraine in the future.⁹ Nonetheless, Berlin continues to irritate Kyiv with its myopic insistence on the completion of Gazprom's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea.¹⁰ The German and Austrian governments have not changed their strong support for the controversial underwater conduit even in the light of growing resistance to the Russian project in East-Central Europe and the United States.¹¹

The geopolitical climate for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova seems likely to deteriorate further during 2020. Following the outbreak of COVID-19, world politics is becoming more complicated with every passing week. The EU and its member states are today confronted with the pandemic and its uncertain economic repercussions.¹² At the same time, they face a new refugee crisis in the South, complicated situations in the Middle East and Africa, increasingly difficult relations with Turkey and an awkward US president with a different understanding of transatlantic solidarity than previous inhabitants of the White House.

Russia's Weakening as Result of COVID-19

It is true that not all recent foreign trends have been disadvantageous for Ukraine. The currently multiplying economic and social repercussions of the pandemic in Russia are likely to dampen the Kremlin's

⁶ Givi Gigitashvili, Russia's Return to PACE. Irrational Compromise or Defending Russian Citizens from Their Government? *New Eastern Europe*, 10 July 2019. neweasterneurope.eu/2019/07/10/russias-return-to-pace/.

⁷ Mark Leonard, Macrons Russlandinitiative. Eine Innenansicht, *Project Syndicate*, 2 October 2019. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/macron-russia-diplomacy-eu-security-strategy-by-mark-leonard-2019-10/german.

⁸ André Härtel, The EU Member States and the Crisis in Ukraine: Towards an Eclectic Explanation, *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2019, pp. 87-106.

⁹ Andreas Umland, Can Germany Become a Major Ally of Ukraine? Counterintuitive Deliberations on a Coming Partnership between Kyiv and Berlin, *World Affairs*, Vol. 183, No. 1, 2020, pp. 74-89.

¹⁰ Sabine Fischer, Nord Stream 2. Trust in Europe. CSS Policy Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2016; Andreas Goldthau, Assessing Nord Stream 2. Regulation, Geopolitics & Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK. European Center for Energy and Resource Security Strategy Paper, No. 10, 2016;

Kai-Olaf Lang and Kirsten Westphal, Nord Stream 2: A Political and Economic Contextualisation. SWP Research Paper, No. 3, 2017.

¹¹ Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk, Marcin Terlikowski, Bartosz Wiśniewski, Szymon Zaręba, Nord Stream 2: Inconvenient Questions. PISM Policy Paper, No. 5(165), 2018; Margarita Assenova, Europe and Nord Stream 2: Myths, Reality, and the Way Forward. Center for European Policy Analysis Report, June 2018; Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines, Towards a Common European Energy Policy? Energy Security Debates in Poland and Germany. The Case of the Nord Stream Pipeline. In: Anne Jenichen and Ulrike Liebert (eds), *Europeanisation vs. Renationalisation: Learning from Crisis for European Political Development*. Leverkusen: Barbara Budrich, 2019, pp. 169-182; Piotr Przybyło, The Real Financial Costs of Nord Stream 2: Economic Sensitivity Analysis of the Alternatives to the Offshore Pipeline. Casimir Pulaski Foundation Report, May 2019.

¹² Daniela Schwarzer, Shahin Vallée, How Leaders Can Stop Corona from Undermining the EU: The Health and Economic Crises Require Coordinated Handling. DGAP Policy Brief, No. 6, 2020.



foreign adventurism.¹³ Moscow made an ill-conceived attempt to push back against – especially US – producers of shale oil and gas in the world's energy markets.¹⁴ Russia's refusal to agree to an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries proposal to cut oil production in order to prop up the oil price may also have been intended as the Kremlin's rebuttal to the US sanctions placed on Gazprom's Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project via the Baltic Sea in December 2019.¹⁵

As of May 2020, however, it looks as if this attempted Russian manipulation is backfiring. The recent decline in the world market prices for crude oil seems to have been much deeper and may last much longer than the Kremlin probably intended. If recent research on a causal link between economic well-being – largely determined in Russia by world energy prices – and a Russian inclination towards foreign military interventions is to be believed, this should be good news for Ukraine.¹⁶ There is,

moreover, an increasing likelihood of a disruption to the Putin regime at some point in the future.¹⁷ Such a scenario would arguably have positive rather than negative repercussions for Ukraine.¹⁸

Moreover, some domestic political developments in the West may also – at least indirectly – be to Ukraine's advantage. Both Russia and Ukraine will apparently be topics in the US election campaign throughout the summer and autumn of 2020. Kyiv may well also, as in the case of the December 2019 decision to sanction Nord Stream 2, benefit from further discussion of Moscow's continuing malevolent actions – for instance, in the cyber space – against the United States and its allies.¹⁹ Various details on and a better understanding of Russia's past, current and possible future covert intrusion into US and European electoral and other political affairs are also accumulating in Western societies.²⁰

¹³ Igor Torbakov, *After Empire: Nationalist Imagination and Symbolic Politics in Russia and Eurasia in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Century*. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2018; Ostap Kushnir, *Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism: The Divergent Break*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018; Serhii Plokhy, *Lost Kingdom: A History of Russian Nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin*. London: Penguin, 2018.

¹⁴ Nigel Gould-Davies, Russia's Failed OPEC Gamble, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 15 April 2020. www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/russia-opec-agreement.

¹⁵ Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Sanctions against Nord Stream 2 in the US Defence Budget, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 18 December 2020. www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2019-12-18/sanctions-against-nord-stream-2-us-defence-budget.

¹⁶ Maria Snegovaya, What Factors Contribute to the Aggressive Foreign Policy of Russian Leaders? *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2020, S. 93–110; Maria Snegovaya, Guns to Butter: Sociotropic Concerns and Foreign Policy Preferences in Russia, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 12 April 2020. DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2020.1750912.

¹⁷ Martin Kragh, Russia in 2045: A Scenario Analysis. Swedish Institute of International Affairs UI Report, No. 2, 2020.

¹⁸ Andreas Umland, Preparing for and Working towards a Democratic Russia, *Open Democracy*, 28 December 2017. www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/preparing-for-a-democratic-russia/.

¹⁹ E.g., Alina Polyakova and Spencer Phipps Boyer, The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, the West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition. Brookings Report, March 2018.

²⁰ E.g., Anton Shekhovtsov, *Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017; Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, Russia's Strategy for Influence through Public Diplomacy and Active Measures: The Swedish Case, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2017, pp. 773–816; Alina Polyakova (ed.), *The Kremlin's Trojan Horses* 3.0. Atlantic Council Report, December 2018; Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, The "Macron Leaks" Operation. A Post-Mortem. Atlantic Council Report, June 2019; Andrew S. Weiss, With Friends Like These: The Kremlin's Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Report, February 2020; Anton Shekhovtsov, Conceptualizing Malign Influence of Putin's Russia in Europe. Free Russia Foundation Report, April 2020.



Moreover, certain purely domestic current and future developments in a number of EU and NATO states might be to the advantage of Ukraine. In October 2021, for instance, Germany's parliamentary elections may result in the entry into the Federal Republic's new government of the relatively pro-Ukraine Green Party.²¹ In the spring of 2020, however, these and other possible positive developments abroad and their presumably benevolent effects on Ukraine remain uncertain.

The Distant Prospect of EU and NATO Accession

The prospects today for Ukraine's two major foreign political targets – accession to NATO and the EU – look gloomier than before the start of the ongoing worldwide crisis. Since the victories of the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine's political and intellectual elite has repeatedly been disappointed. During the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, for instance, Kyiv's and Tbilisi's official applications for membership were not rejected. The summit's final declaration even stated that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members. Yet, curiously the actual admission of the two countries to the Alliance was postponed to an uncertain later date.²² No Membership Action Plan or any other road map for accession was adopted in response to Ukraine's and

Georgia's formal requests for entry into NATO.

In 2014, the conclusion following the victory of the Revolution of Dignity of a far-reaching EU Association Agreement did not lead to a formal change in the EU's traditionally noncommittal position on the possibility of Ukraine's future membership. Accession has never been excluded by the Union's Council and Commission, and an official membership perspective has repeatedly been demanded by the European Parliament. However, the texts of Ukraine's, Georgia's and Moldova's lengthy Association Agreements do not make any reference to the option of future admission to the EU.²³

It is true that Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova are currently far from the standards required for EU accession in terms of the quality of their governmental, administrative and economic systems. However, the Western Balkan states, which either have been granted an official membership perspective or are already negotiating their accession, are no more – or certainly not significantly more – advanced than Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia. The latter three countries certainly continue to be hampered by their inability to move beyond a post-Soviet oligarchic form of governance to a more modern model. Yet, it is the lack of a long-term strategy and an absence of political will in Brussels, as well as excessive fear of Russia

²¹ Dalibor Rohac, Should Vladimir Putin Be Afraid of German Greens? American Enterprise Institute: AEIdeas, 14 August 2017. www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/europe-and-eurasia/should-vladimir-putin-be-afraid-of-german-greens/; Roderick Kefferpütz, Green Is the New Normal in German Politics, *Green European Journal*, 25 October 2019. www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/green-is-the-new-normal-in-german/.

²² Anke Hagedorn, Streit über den NATO-Beitritt von Georgien und Ukraine, *Deutsche Welle*, 6 March 2008. www.dw.com/de/streit-über-den-nato-beitritt-von-georgien-und-ukraine/a-3170607.

²³ Andreas Umland, Tor zum Osten oder Krisenherd? Wie das EU-Ukraine-Abkommen den postsowjetischen Raum verändern würde, *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 68, No. 6, 2013, pp. 108–112; The best guarantee for Ukraine's security is a successful implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU, Pavlo Klimkin, *Yalta European Strategy*, 13 September 2014. yes-ukraine.org/en/news/naykrashcha-garantiya-ukrayinskoyi-bezpeki-uspishne-vtilennya-ugodi-pro-asotsiatsiyu-z-yes-pavlo-klimkin.



in Western Europe, that provide the main explanations for the dearth of clear language in the decisions of the European Council or Commission concerning a future accession of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.²⁴

The current accumulation of domestic issues in the NATO and EU member states, as well as the mounting tensions within these international organizations, are bad news for aspiring applicants such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. The ongoing NATO and EU enlargements in the Western Balkans may proceed more or less unhindered, as North Macedonia's recent accession to NATO illustrates, but this is because the former Yugoslav republics and Albania are already - if not yet parts, then - surrounded by members of NATO and the EU. With the partial exception of Serbia, they therefore have more or less clear membership prospects.²⁵ A current or future successful Western integration of the Balkan states may therefore have few implications for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, while any future setbacks there could have negative repercussions for the chances of former Soviet republics joining NATO and the EU.

A Reboot of US-Ukrainian Relations

All this means that Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova need a tactical rethink of their short- and medium-term foreign policy priorities and the means of their implementation. Achieving EU and/or NATO membership will certainly remain

their primary aim. In the light of growing geopolitical instability, however, these targets should be acknowledged as achievable only in the long term. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova might instead need to make plans on what to do during a more or less prolonged interregnum, during which their current lack of international embeddedness and grey zone status will continue.

The most obvious interim solution for Ukraine will be to deepen as quickly and as far as possible its bilateral ties with those states that already or might soon have pro-Ukraine leaderships. Thus, Ukraine could seek an upgrade of the little-known 2008 Charter on Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and the United States. Kyiv could refer Washington to the US respect for Ukrainian borders, sovereignty and integrity expressed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.²⁶ The content of an updated text of the 2008 bilateral charter could give clear US security guarantees for Ukraine prior to NATO membership and contain a new package on US-Ukrainian defence cooperation.

An upgrade of the 2008 charter could lead to a new type of agreement between the two states. (It might also include the UK, as another signatory of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, or Canada and other especially pro-Ukraine Western states.) Ideally, a newly defined pact between Kyiv and Washington would contain provisions

²⁴ Pavlo Klimkin, Putin's Desire for a New Russian Empire Won't Stop with Ukraine, *The Guardian*, 25 March 2017.

²⁵ Marek Dabrowski and Yana Myachenkova, The Western Balkans on the Road to the European Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 4, February 2018.

²⁶ Mariana Budjeryn, The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum. NPIHP Issues Brief, No. 3, 2014; Andreas Umland, The

Ukraine Example: Nuclear Disarmament Doesn't Pay, *World Affairs*, Vol. 178, No. 4, 2016, pp. 45-49; Mariana Budjeryn and Andreas Umland, Amerikanische Russlandpolitik, die Souveränität der Ukraine und der Atomwaffensperrvertrag: Ein Dreiecksverhältnis mit weitreichenden Konsequenzen, *Sirius. Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2017, pp. 133-142.



approaching those in the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea, or similar security guarantees given by Washington to its closest non-NATO allies around the world.

While the prospects for such a fundamental change in Ukraine's international embeddedness are not entirely clear, other avenues for improving Ukrainian foreign affairs are less uncertain. Above all, there may be ways to improve Ukraine's relations with several Eastern European countries with pro-Ukrainian and/or Russia-sceptic governments. This would involve both smaller states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, as well as larger ones such as Poland and Romania.

Towards an Intermarium Alliance

Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova should not just be seeking closer bilateral ties with the above partners. They should also try to build multilateral networks that transcend the borders of NATO and the EU. This has already been tried, when Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine founded the Community of Democratic Choice in Kyiv in December 2005. Some of these nine states were then already members of the EU and/or NATO, others were not and are still not. The Community never really got off the ground, however, and today is largely forgotten.

A different strategy for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova would be to seek to participate in existing regional multilateral

projects, in particular the Three Seas Initiative started in 2016 by twelve Central and East European EU member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), and the so-called Bucharest Nine group of nine countries constituting NATO's Eastern European flank (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria), founded in Bucharest in 2015.²⁷ While the Three Seas Initiative focuses on infrastructure and transportation, the Bucharest Nine group is about security and defence. Both networks therefore touch on issues that are central to the geopolitics and -economics of Eastern Europe, and that are of crucial relevance to the protection, resilience and development of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. An Eastern enlargement of the Three Seas Initiative can be accomplished with the support of the EU and United States, while an extension of the Bucharest Nine could be envisaged within NATO's existing special partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia.²⁸

A further alternative for Georgia and Ukraine, as NATO applicants, and also perhaps for Azerbaijan and Moldova, which have no such ambitions, would be to persuade the United States to support more intensely the four states' Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), which was founded in 1997. The US administration might be even persuaded to create with these four states an equivalent to the 1988 US Baltic Charter with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, or the

²⁷ Vasile Rotaru and Andreas Umland, How Romania and Poland Can Strengthen NATO and the EU: Two New Cooperation Initiatives Could Improve Regional Security, *Foreign Affairs*, 10 November 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2017-11-10/how-romania-and-poland-can-strengthen-nato-and-eu>.

²⁸ Andreas Umland, Mehr Sicherheit in "Zwischeneuropa": Die alte Idee eines Intermarium-

Staatenblocks wird wieder aktuell, *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2016, pp. 88–94; Kostiantyn Fedorenko and Andreas Umland, How to Solve Ukraine's Security Dilemma? The Idea of an Intermarium Coalition in East-Central Europe, *War on the Rocks*, 30 August 2017. <https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/how-to-solve-ukraines-security-dilemma-the-idea-of-an-intermarium-coalition-in-east-central-europe/>.



2003 US Adriatic Charter with Albania, Croatia and North Macedonia. A US-GUAM Charter would upgrade the existing bilateral Strategic Partnership charters with Ukraine and Georgia, and provide the four former Soviet republics with at least a modicum of international security.²⁹

creativity, resolution and flexibility in exploring novel paths to cross-border cooperation and all-European integration.

Conclusions

The possible scenarios mentioned above do not exclude the possibility that completely new formats of interaction in East-Central Europe might emerge. They should all make better use of the region's human and economic potential by relying on a common Central European identity as a subset of all-European society. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, along with their international friends, can and should think today more than before the Corona crisis about new schemes to strengthen their international embeddedness. There are a number of alternative avenues through which Ukraine might pursue its Western integration, even before the commencement of accession negotiations with NATO and the EU.

In 2020, the effects of the spread of COVID-19 mean that geopolitical uncertainty is increasing rapidly. Even before the pandemic, domestic developments in a number of states, among them the United Kingdom, the United States, Hungary and France, were creating uncertainty about the identity and future of NATO and the EU. In such circumstances, the two major Western organizations were already becoming less rather than more open to new applicants, and this trend is likely to continue. In the years to come, increasing Ukraine's international security and deepening her ties with the community of the world's liberal democracies will be a moving target. Ukraine and its partners will require

²⁹ Iryna Vereshchuk and Andreas Umland, How to Make Eastern Europe's Gray Zone Less Gray, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2019, pp. 38–41.



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