Working in the Same Direction?
Civil Protection Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region

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Summary

Modern crisis management requires cooperation. The kinds of threats we face – those that cross boundaries, escalate quickly, and travel on interconnected infrastructures – demand collaborative responses. No matter how strong an individual country’s resources, certain kinds of crises will outstrip national capacities and test collective arrangements for common prevention, preparation, response and recovery.

This report examines one location for collaborative responses to modern crisis management: the Baltic Sea Region. A number of multilateral organisations bind the Baltic Sea states together, and several include provisions for enhancing cooperation to make societies safe and secure. Nordic cooperation, framed by the Haga Declaration, includes long-standing provisions for cross-border rescue, for example. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) is working toward improving risk assessment and responses across the region. NATO is a major player in protecting societies through its Civil Emergency Planning activities. The EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) is a focused and strong agenda for implementing common projects in civil protection.

Organisational diversity can be a strength, but it can also be a weakness. Who does what? Where should new initiatives be launched? Which has the best enforcement mechanisms? Which engenders the greatest amount of trust amongst participants? And perhaps most importantly, a central question guiding this report: who adds the most value to national efforts to protect their people?

This report takes a step towards answering these questions. It explores what the EUSBSR, CBSS, Nordic Cooperation via the Haga Declaration, and NATO do in the area of civil protection. It maps cooperation activities across organisations in terms of the four critical aspects of managing crises: prevention, preparation, response, and recovery. These activities present challenges to any government, and supranational organisations should add capacity in each area. We inventory each organisation accordingly. We identify pros and cons to each organisation’s cooperation and assess whether certain cooperation patterns may offer a ‘model’ for other regions in Europe and beyond.

To guide analysis, we use an analytical framework capable of helping to uncover different capacities related to prevention, preparation, response and recovery. Our data and material collection consist of official texts, secondary literature and interviews, which helped to give us an in-depth impression. We may not be right on all counts, and our investigation is focused on specific questions. We thus welcome input and critique – all in the interest of fomenting discussion and debate.

Our findings are significant. Research uncovered an extraordinarily rich and diverse set of cooperative arrangements covering the Baltic Sea. To a great extent, such diversity is to be welcomed: it allows local specificities to inform policymaking and provides multiple outlets depending on national needs. It also provides flexibility. The participation of Russia in the CBSS, which is a central player in the implementation of the EU’s Baltic Sea Region strategy, enables communication and interaction on technical questions that might not always be possible in the EU or NATO proper. Nordic/Haga cooperation is mainly informal and ad hoc, whereas the EUSBSR is highly institutionalised and associated with EU formalities.
That said, institutional diversity in Baltic Sea region has drawbacks. The roles of each organisation are not always clearly defined or delineated from one another. The CBSS has many roles and pursues many initiatives – but mainly initiatives from other organisations like the EU or the Sendai Framework. The question of ‘value added’ raises its head here. While the EU and CBSS implicitly allow Russia to engage, the exact opposite is the case with NATO. Highly varying institutional arrangements – including the EUSBSR’s relatively strict processes, the Haga Declaration’s mainly symbolic characters, and NATO’s operationally robust arrangements – clash with the goal of coherence since membership varies amongst organisations. And last but not least: each organisation varies in the proportion of crisis management capacities it can lend to members.

Specifically, we uncover answers to our three main questions in this report.

Where are the capacities? We find most capacities in the preparedness category, meaning that all Baltic Sea organisations support member states’ efforts to plan, practice and better organise their collective response to crises. The coordination of exercise-based training, common courses for crisis management-related personnel, and some degree of advanced positioning of resources. However, we find prevention, response and recovery activities more fragmented. Surprisingly few Baltic Sea organisations help members to prevent crises from arising in the first place; for instance, by conducting risk assessments, horizon scanning, or internal threat information sharing (the EUSBSR is a partial exception). Response coordination is also limited, mainly because response, by definition, is a national responsibility (Nordic cooperation is an exception here, where long-standing cooperation on cross-border rescue exist). And finally, only two organisations display assistance with recovery: rebuilding material and political damage, and attempting to systematically learn lessons (NATO, and to a lesser extent, the Nordic/Haga cooperation). Table 1 below summarises are findings, which reveal no consistent pattern.

Table 1. Distribution of crisis management capacities in Baltic Sea Region organisations.

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What are the cooperation patterns? An important question for effective cooperation is the nature of cooperation. Baltic Sea cooperation is heterogeneous, not only in terms of membership but also institutional design. Membership ranges from the fairly closed Nordic cooperation structures to the rather wide-open CBSS, which includes Iceland and even draws Russia into cooperation. Institutionally, the organisations are diverse. While all relations are voluntary and, at best, linked to political agreements, the EUSBSR is underpinning by some binding EU rules and regulations. NATO has a relatively strong political framework for cooperation. The CBSS is perhaps the least obligatory, in that it has few of its own policy frameworks rooted in international law (although it works to pursue EU and UN Sendai obligations, perhaps as a result of its own voluntary nature). In terms of general versus specific tasks, the CBSS takes a general approach to efforts on creating a ‘Safe and Secure Region’,
working across organisations to get things done. Nordic/Haga cooperation is perhaps the most specific, with clear objectives and sector-oriented agreements.

**What is the cooperation strategy?** Each organisation takes a slightly different approach to furthering effective cooperation. The EUSBSR is mainly a rules-bound strategy, setting out guidelines (through collective discussion) which then are expected to be implemented (with a considerable degree of oversight). NATO has few compliance mechanisms but is politically robust in its set-up and expectations: membership has its clear obligations, as newspaper headlines remind us. On the other side of the equation, Nordic/Haga cooperation is more trust-based. Over time, cooperation has emerged through clear identification of need – and facilitated by civil protection community building. The CBSS, which has few rules of its own, is clearly inspired by this approach. A main task is to generate a ‘common security culture’ over time, as a way to facilitate effective cooperation.

With this in mind, we now formulate a modest set of recommendations for increased ‘value-added’ in Baltic Sea cooperation:

- Evidence shows that trust-building strategies work well to facilitate effective cooperation. We encourage **common exercises, increased exchange, and intensive communication** as a way to breed familiarity and healthy reliance upon one another – from a bottom-up perspective. These interaction strategies need not be aimed towards the building of common protocols or standard-operating-procedures, which may not suit the diversity of members in Baltic Sea cooperation. Incremental, bottom-up practices

- Evidence also shows that sector-specific initiatives bear the most fruit. Rather than launch broad framework initiatives, **concrete steps towards well-specific goals** might be the best way forward. Nordic/Haga cooperation shows success in rescue service coordination, for instance, NATO takes specific steps in discrete areas such as air transport during disasters, and the CBSS is engaged specifically on nuclear safety question. However, an ‘all hazards’ approach, and the potential for ‘transboundary’ crises with unclear solutions, warrant against specialising too narrowly in a particular kind of response. A combination of specific capacity-building with more generic oversight would be useful here.

- Our research suggests institutional complexity in the Baltic Sea Region, and we see a need for some degree of rationalisation. We find the ‘broad platform’ approach of the CBSS – while occasionally confusing – a possible **umbrella approach to link various initiatives** and bring all actors together. This already takes place regarding the CBSS and the EU, but should include Nordic/Haga cooperation and possibly observer status for NATO. Currently, the latter two organisations work fairly independently. More connections could be made with the EU’s Emergency Response and Coordination Centre, through enhanced networks between the Centre and Baltic crisis managers.
Introduction

Transboundary crisis management has increasingly come to the fore in Nordic and Baltic cooperation. While civil protection is a national responsibility, in order to ensure the safety of the public from regional emergencies and disasters, regional and sub-regional bodies have a built up capacities related to handling transboundary crises. Transboundary crisis management in the Baltic Sea Region is found within macro-regional cooperation bodies such as the European Union, NATO, the CBSS, and sub-regional inter-governmental cooperation like Nordic Cooperation. These organisations are increasingly facilitating common prevention efforts, preparation guidelines, response assistance, and recovery plans. However, in the web of existing institutions, it is not clear where, in what form, and to what degree these capacities are applicable. Our central interest here is understanding what ‘value added’ these institutions provide to Swedish transboundary crisis management efforts; and if possible, suggesting ways to add value.

In this report, we map and assess the capacity of the institutional landscape of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) for transboundary crisis management cooperation. Although transboundary crisis management is a wide-ranging responsibility,¹ for clarity’s sake we focus here on civil protection (CP) cooperation. We do so by examining the four phases of crisis management - prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery – for the following organisations: EU, CBSS, NATO, and Nordic Cooperation. By mapping and assessing the capacity of the institutional landscape of transboundary crisis management cooperation, we accomplish several goals. First, we expose gaps and overlaps in the transboundary management of crisis in the BSR. Second, we examine where cooperation interlocks and where it ‘inter-blocks’². Finally, we issue recommendations regarding how to ensure BSR cooperation can enhance the protection of citizens through more effective cooperation.

This report is organised as follows. After outlining the contours of our analytical framework, we then examine the four BSR cooperation in turn, using a common set of questions. We end the report by summarising our findings and setting out recommendations.³

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¹ See Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013
² Sundelius, 2005.
³ The authors of this report are grateful for research support provided by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) in relation to a broader project on ‘Building Societal Security in Europe’ (2014-2017) in which the authors took part. More information at www.societalsecurity.eu. This report reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of MSB.
Part 1: Theoretical framework

To guide our analysis, we build an analytical framework drawn from existing literature on international cooperation, crisis management and civil protection. In particular, we use a well-known framework for studying the crisis management potential of an organisation – prevention, preparation, response and recovery – and examine whether the organisations below have ‘capacities’ related to each challenge of crisis management. The discussion below outlines each challenge, discussing what each means according to some of the latest research, and then presents how related capacities can be empirically discovered.

1.1. Capacities for Crisis Management?

1.1.1 Prevention

The first challenge of crisis management concerns prevention, but this concept is often poorly defined. Three aspects related to ‘prevention’ can be found in the crisis management and security literature: prevention *per se*, precaution, and pre-emption. Prevention is aimed at minimising the possibility of known events from occurring at an early stage of threat. Preventive measures are twofold: first, they focus on threat and risk recognition through systematic monitoring, and then intervention to forestall a possible risk from becoming a threat or reduce the likelihood of an accident or incident from happening. Threat and risk recognition assumes that we have the data/information relevant to uncovering threats (even those we cannot yet imagine) and that we know what we are looking for. Such activities are becoming particularly popular at the European level and across societies, reflected in data mining, algorithmic applications, and predictive analytics operating on the notion that patterns and regularities emerge from analysing large swathes of data. Intervention assumes that we have a clear picture of what is happening and the confidence to confront political actors with the situation assessment. The underlying assumption here is that ‘ignorance’ must be countered with a more enlightened understanding of what might be happening – a set of assumptions that are problematic at best.

Precaution is another prevention-related challenge. It follows the same logic as prevention in respect to intervening before a possible threat becomes manifest. The ostensible aim is to suprervene any catastrophic event. The ‘precautionary principle’ has become familiar to policymakers in various sectors, proposed in situations in which scientific uncertainty suggests the potential for irreversible damage. In contrast to risk management, which is associated with the notion of risk and its numerical calculability, precaution has been seen as a ‘rationality of uncertainty’ that defies probabilistic models of management. As Klinke and Renn put it, ‘the denotation of ‘precaution’ implies prudent handling of uncertain or highly vulnerable

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5 Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013.
6 Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2014.
8 Ibid., 37.
9 Sunstein, 2005.
situations’. The EU, for example, advises the precautionary principle be used when: ‘scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and where there are indications that the possible effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level of protection’. The precautionary model does not imply suspension but rather the reinforcement of risk assessment. One of the conditions that needs to be in place to invoke the precautionary principle, for example, is ‘the existence of a science-based scenario of significant and/or irreversible possible harm’. Therefore, the creation of knowledge is not necessarily to reduce unknowns, but for the purpose of early warning. Early warning also involves the use of foresight and scenarios to raise even higher the attempt to calculate risks in a supposedly ‘rational’ manner. Scenarios explore the possibility that something might happen and offer clues that may function as early warnings. They create analogies with the real world and attempt to replicate conditions of early warnings for the purpose of decision-making.

Pre-emption is a third aspect of prevention. It can be seen as temporally prior to prevention and precaution of immediate harms because it seeks to intervene when the risk is unspecified, uncertain and beyond view. Here the strategy is almost more idealistic than prevention per se. It hopes to create a world in which every possible threat can be identified earlier and prevented even without clear indication of an impending threat. Pre-emption thus takes analysis (and practice) beyond a focus on a particular activity such as crisis management – it also suggests a broad-scale effort to make society perfectly safe.

Of course, in everyday life, complete prevention, precaution and pre-emption is impossible. And, as the literature above suggests, perhaps not even desirable. But it still stands to reason some degree of prevention activity can greatly enhance – if not substitute for – crisis management. The overall goal is to horizon scan for potential problems, to identify outlying trends in societal functions, and to try to ‘nip problems in the bud’.

**To assess whether organisations have prevention capacities, we search for:**

- Collection of and analysing of data (risk recognition and sense-making): mapping, monitoring, and surveillance systems to track disturbances.
- The drive to enhance cooperative risk assessment, such as risk assessment guidelines to guide national efforts.
- Databases and systems for disseminating information.
- Risk assessment programmes.
- Disseminating/pooling knowledge through cooperation in order to reduce uncertainty.
- Rapid alert or early warning systems.

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11 Klinke and Renn, 2002: 1074.
16 Aradau and van Munster, 2011: 43.
17 Hebenton and Seddon, 2009: 343-362.
1.1.2 Preparedness/Resilience

Preparedness refers to a state of readiness to respond to unexpected and potentially catastrophic events. Preparedness planning is used as a strategy of readiness for all forms of incidents, events, crisis, disasters or catastrophes (all hazards). Preparedness entails setting up capabilities to deal with a range of incidents, ensuring swift recovery, and training and equipping crisis management actors. Preparedness responds to the problematisation of the unknown that cannot be addressed by preventive measures of risk detection and assessment. Preparedness knowledge shifts risk assessment from the pre-stages of prevention and precaution to the time of the event. Unlikely precautionary knowledge, which has been one response to non-probabilistic, catastrophic threats, preparedness does not depend on the avoidance of catastrophe. Rather it entails a rationality of ‘living with catastrophe’, even if the catastrophe remains virtual, projected as coming in the future. Preparedness focuses on the planning and the development of plans, procedures, and capabilities that provide an effective prevention or response to an emergency or disaster of an unlikely, unforeseen or surprising nature. From floods and other weather disasters to the ‘next terrorist attack’, preparedness exercises create worse case scenarios in order to foster readiness for anything smaller.\(^\text{18}\) Exercises simulate an emergency situation and aim to prepare to respond to surprising and novel events.\(^\text{19}\) Preparedness includes emergency plans, training, simulations and exercises. Simulations are supposed to test emergency management plans against the ‘reality’.

Resilience has to do with imagining uncertain and traumatic futures. This aims to create subjects that are capable of adapting and responding to situations of radical uncertainty. Resilience approach to risk management forego the limits to predicative knowledge and incorporate the prevalence of the unexpected in order to absorb and accommodate future events in whatever forms they might take.\(^\text{20}\) Resilience responds to the challenge of the ‘unknown unknowns’ – the high-impact, low-probability threats, which evade actuarial capture and strain actuarial-based forms of risk management.\(^\text{21}\) The challenge of radical contingency is managed through anticipatory techniques of risk management which are not grounded in probabilistic methods but instead invoke a cross-section of the multiple futures which could actualise in order to facilitate precaution, preparation, and pre-emption.\(^\text{22}\) Scenario planning seeks to imagine different types of dangers in order to create a more resilient society. Developing plans to manage the unimaginable, and to prepare for recovery and continuity after a catastrophic event.

Ultimately, preparedness is about the capacity to prepare for a range of contingent threats, to put plans in place, and update those plans based on practice and discussion. Preparedness is far-from-easy, not least given the challenge of preparing for ‘the unknown’ and considering the typical lack of organisational resources to take part in an activity seen by some managers as

\(^\text{18}\) Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1155-1175.
\(^\text{19}\) Ibid.
low priority. Nevertheless, organisations are increasingly engaging in preparedness activities and attempting to build resilience.

**To assess whether organisations have preparedness capacities, we search for:**

- Emergency planning and the development of plans, procedures, and capabilities that provide an effective prevention or response to an emergency or disaster.
- Worse case scenarios to foster readiness for anything less dramatic.
- Simulation to test emergency management plans against ‘reality’.
- Implementation of tools and instruments to deal with the response phase of crisis management: plans for preparedness strategy, contingency planning or equivalent.
- Advancing planning regarding information management systems, communication networks and decision-making protocols -- but also implementation of the same.
- Concerted effort to prepare a coordinated response to crises: identifying resources, including expertise and equipment, and facilitating practice coordination and civil protection training.

### 1.1.3 Response

The response phase of crisis management is concerned with the immediate reaction to an emergency or catastrophe and focuses on critical decision-making and implementation of these decisions. Response involves *coping*: dealing with unfavourable conditions, coordination issues, information dissemination, procedures for international assistance, and making decisions on immediate repairs to critical service. Transboundary crisis capacity-building involves ‘concerted efforts to prepare a coordinate response to crisis’ including measures such as mobilising ‘relevant assets in the service of improved crisis response’. This includes an operational response (make resources available to a stricken partner) and a political response (obliged to coordinate response in accordance with set of rules).

There are many challenges to effective response – and a requisite number of helpful capacities. Broadly speaking, a crisis demands critical decisions that must be made under conditions of stress and uncertainty. Crisis managers at the strategic level must decide and deal with complex dilemmas without the information they demand or require; they must do so in fluctuating organisational settings marked by bureau-politics and miscommunications. If we consider the dilemmas that emerge during crises, crisis management may well be qualified as an impossible job. Crisis management is hampered by the sheer substantive complexity of the conditions and characteristics of the unfolding crisis and by the resulting uncertainties. Crisis managers must balance the perceived necessity to know with the need to stay in control. Crises are characterised by an explosion of data and communication. At the same time, a significant lack

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24 Ekengren, Matzen and Svatnsson, 2005: 40.
of accurate information continues to plague decision-makers. They receive masses of raw data, only to discover that it is very hard to distil vital information from the stream of data.

While the response phase of crisis management is a challenge, one should recall that few regional or international organisations have decision-making responsibilities during a crisis. The EU has a few exceptions to this rule (such as banking aid or some civil protection activities) but is the rare case. Most organisations at the supranational level coordinate response decisions, at best, rather than take decisions. Nevertheless, there are a number of capacities required for effective decision-making, or coordination of decision-making, that we can investigate in the organisations in this report.

**To assess whether organisations have response capacities, we search for:**

- Critical decision-making and implementation of these decisions, for example: making decisions on immediate repairs to critical service; procedures for international assistance.
- Capacities useful for the coordination of member states’ responses: information management systems; communication networks; decision-making protocols; information dissemination.
- Ability to mobilise relevant assets in the service of improved crisis response; implementing tools and instruments in place to deal with the response phase of transboundary crisis management.

### 1.1.4 Recovery

The recovery phase of crisis management consists of activities that continue beyond the acute emergency period. In effect, it concerns the *aftermath* of crises: rebuilding material damage, coping with human loss, learning lessons from crises, maintaining accountability, and restoring legitimacy to weakened government institutions. Such issues rarely garner sustained attention either from practitioners experiencing a crisis (who are anxious to move on) or from researchers (who tend to focus on the ‘action’ in the response phase of crises).

Regarding learning, one of the key political-strategic aspects of effective crisis management, even the most effectively handled crises offer opportunities for learning. Yet, organisations must have the capacity to learn lessons, build on experience, and institutionalise new insights for use in future crisis management. An assessment of learning capacity raises questions on whether assessments are conducted, reports commissioned, committee or boards established, and plans readjusted in light of recent crisis experiences? Are these efforts institutionalised so that they become a regular occurrence after crisis? Considering the many different actors involved in the supranational governance in the Baltic region, major questions arise as to who is ‘learning’ in the aftermath of crisis: where are reports sent, and how are findings disseminated?

Restoring ‘damage’ after a crisis is a two-part challenge. One part concerns material damage, and how swiftly broken supply systems, infrastructures and bricks-and-mortar can be rebuilt to

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27 Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, Sundelius (2016)
ensure continuity. One would look to the available resources and funding available to address such damage. More broadly, and some would argue even more importantly, is the damage to public institutions, including government. Legitimacy is regained by an active demonstration of a willingness to learn from events, to hold officials and organisations accountable, and to make necessary reforms. Our empirical investigation raises the following questions: How will accountability mechanisms work after a crisis? To whom will Baltic crisis managers be held accountable? What other actors might be involved, and how might blame be apportioned? These processes are crucial to restoring legitimacy after a crisis.

To assess whether organisations have response capacities, we search for:

- Damage assessment teams and impact assessors.
- Processes for crisis evaluation; traditions of learning lessons.
- Demonstrated implementation of lesson-learning exercises.
- Dissemination internationally (sharing of experiences).
- Review of management performance and accountability hearings.

The previous pages set out the analytical framework to guide our study. We now turn to the various cases of Baltic Sea regional cooperation to answer the objectives of this study.
Part 2: Mapping civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region

In addition to bilateral cooperation, civil protection cooperation also takes place in multilateral institutions. The most important supranational organisations in the BSR, in which civil protection and crisis management are addressed, are discussed in this section; namely, the EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), NATO, and Nordic cooperation under the ‘Haga Declaration’ banner. In this part of the report, we present the results of empirical analysis, which was guided by the analytical framework discussed earlier. The results allow us to uncover: basic cooperation patterns on civil protection, along with degree of capacities related to prevention, preparation, response and recovery challenges of crisis management.

2.1 EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)

2.1.1 Fast facts

**EUSBSR**

- **Established:** 2009. The first of the EU’s ‘macro-region’ strategies.
- **Purpose:** The Strategy is divided into three objectives, which represent the three key challenges of the Strategy: saving the sea, connecting the region and increasing prosperity. Civil protection was one priority area set out in the Strategy.
- **Members:** In the first instance, the Strategy primarily concerns the EU member states in the Baltic Region: **Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.** Some countries outside the EU also participate actively in projects under the Baltic Sea Strategy. **Norway** is often involved, as is **Russia**, as a partner country. **Iceland** and **Belarus** also participate at times.

2.1.2 Background

Regarding the EUSBSR and civil protection, two aspects are inextricably linked: EU civil protection cooperation generally, and the EU’s approach to the Baltic Sea Region, specifically. EU civil protection cooperation began as early as 1985, when the foundation for Community cooperation in the field of civil protection was established.\(^{28}\) As early as in 1990 two resolutions: ‘On Improving Mutual Aid Between member states in the Event of a Natural or Man-made Disaster’\(^{29}\) and ‘On Community Cooperation on Civil Protection’\(^{30}\) agreed to examine how member states could better predict and prevent cross-boundary risks and exercise mutual aid in the event of a disasters. The cooperative efforts came to be developed further in

\(^{28}\) Pursiainen, Hedin and Hellenberg, 2005: 19.


a resolution presented in 2001\textsuperscript{31} where cooperation was proposed to also consider development in the field of crisis management. The same resolution also suggested an establishment of a regional EuroBaltic programme for civil protection cooperation in the Baltic and Barents region. In 2001, the EU Council established a Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. The mechanism embraces an all hazards approach and set the aim on improving coordination in each of the phases of crisis management - prevention, preparedness and response.\textsuperscript{32}

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), adopted in 2009, included cooperation in the field of civil protection as one priority area. In 2012 the European Commission presented an updated Communication\textsuperscript{33} specifying three overall objectives: to Save the Sea, Connect the Region, and Increase Prosperity. In 2013 a reviewed Action Plan was launched wherein civil protection and crisis management came to be addressed under two ‘priority areas’: Priority Area Secure (PA Secure) and Priority Area Safe (PA Safe).\textsuperscript{34} PA Secure aims to address all sorts of threats, regardless whether their origin is natural disaster, man-made disaster or intentional, or organised action of human beings, through the means of prevention, preparedness, and response. To this end, PA Secure promotes a broad approach to reduce trans-boundary vulnerabilities and to build common capacities for societal security in the region.\textsuperscript{35} Proposed activities are primarily aimed at establishing transboundary institutional mechanisms, emphasising closer cooperation and better understanding of macro-regional and transnational risks in the Baltic Sea region.

\subsection*{2.1.3 Capacities}

**Prevention: measures and activities**

The main objective emphasised in the PA Secure is to strengthen preventive capacities by improving risk assessment capabilities and mutual information sharing. In order to facilitate such development, the aim is to enable and foster transboundary institutional mechanisms in the form of macro-regional cooperation approaches and common frameworks. To this end the target is set to increase social prevention activities expediting risk awareness among the public in the region. The aim is to raise transnational risk awareness through different transnational networks already in existence.\textsuperscript{36} Additionally, the plan is to launch a regional prevention programme by 2018 aimed at heightening transboundary risk awareness and enhancing transboundary cooperation.\textsuperscript{37}

Moreover, PA Secure promotes a joint organisation of activities that encourage knowledge transfer and information sharing through formal and informal channels as well as a development of joint procedures and standards harmonising data and knowledge sharing systems, as a precondition for adequate transboundary risk assessment. On a large scale, a macro-regional prevention approach towards all hazards and emergencies is proposed, whereby cooperation

\textsuperscript{31} The Council of the European Union, 2001a.
\textsuperscript{32} The Council of the European Union, 2001b.
\textsuperscript{33} European Commission, 2012.
\textsuperscript{34} European Commission, 2013.
\textsuperscript{35} European Commission, 2017: 125.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 129.
methodologies should include communication systems and tools, containing early warning systems, use of technology, disaster scenarios, etc.\textsuperscript{38}

Likewise, BaltPrevResilience,\textsuperscript{39} a project created as a response to the multiple everyday accidents that occur in the Baltic Sea Region, aimed to prevent such accidents and reduce their impacts by improving the prerequisites for collection and analysis of impact and response data. The project ran from 2014 to 2016 and was coordinated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The project focused mainly on the functional aspects of improving the prerequisites for collection and analysis of impact and response data at local level. It introduced a process to establish a common understanding of statistics, evaluation of experiences and sharing of evidence-based knowledge and best practices as decision support at local, national and EU.\textsuperscript{40}

In regard to risk prevention, mechanisms such as the identification of best practices and gaps, raising risk awareness, comparability assessments, and cost-benefit examinations have been addressed in order to be harmonised and inter-operationalised.

**Preparedness capacity: measures and activities**

In order to improve preparedness capabilities in the Baltic Sea region, the PA Secure Action Plan emphasises \textit{planning towards a coordinated response on a regional level in the event of cross-border hazards or emergencies.}\textsuperscript{41} The overall aim is to enable and foster institutionalised macro-regional cooperation in the field of civil protection. A goal therein is to develop a joint macro-regional preparedness approach including methodologies for enhanced cooperation between different local, regional and national agencies with a role in emergency operations relating to major hazards and emergencies. The cooperation methodologies are proposed to include activities preparing for the response phase of crisis management; for example, regarding: information management systems, communications systems, contingency planning, and disaster scenarios.\textsuperscript{42} To this end, a target is set aiming for full participation of all Baltic Sea region countries in a ‘demand-driven forum’ for evaluating macro-regional risks and launching relevant Baltic Sea region wide projects by 2020.\textsuperscript{43} The Baltic leadership programmes in Civil Protection is a good example of an institutionalised project that work through the means of participants in the Baltic Leadership Programme.

The leadership programme’s main aim is to improve management skills and strategic thinking by engaging experts who hold key strategic leadership positions at the local, regional and national levels aim to foster preparedness for unexpected events. To this end they engage in hands-on scenario-based exercises in the form of crisis simulations wherein the participants are confronted with a critical situation escalating into a potential large-scale crisis in the whole Baltic Sea Region. The main focus is not on heightening the level of awareness and certainty in order to facilitate preventive measures; but rather, to foster readiness to respond to any unexpected and potentially disastrous event during the response phase. In the programme the

\textsuperscript{38} European Commission, 2017: 128.

\textsuperscript{39} Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), 2016: 1.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} European Commission, 2017: 126.

\textsuperscript{42} European Commission, 2017: 128.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
participants have the opportunity to share experiences and best practices among peers and increase the institutional knowledge and strengthen the ties between the agencies playing a central role in the crisis management in the BSR. There is hope that the programme will develop into a network of key civil protection actors in the Baltic Sea region sharing cross-cultural perspectives and contribute in creating successful transnational partnership. These opportunities for cooperation, even if not fully recognised as concerted efforts to prepare coordinated preventive or response measures, can over-time develop into institutionalised management capacities useful for the management of state’s preventive measures or coordination of responses.

Response capacities: measures and activities

Regarding response capacities, the EUSBSR has no autonomous response coordination mechanisms; rather, it relies mainly on bilateral agreements and on the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism. As mentioned above, in October 2001 a Council Decision was adopted establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (the CCP Mechanism) ‘to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Community and the member states in civil protection assistance intervention in the event of major emergencies, or the imminent threat thereof, which may require urgent response action.’ After considerable success in the subsequent years, the Mechanism was revised in 2014. It is one of the most important instruments for international rescue work, including in the Baltic Sea. The Civil Protection Mechanism is designed to improve and expedite cooperation between European countries and to facilitate rescue service coordination in preventing natural and man-made disasters, preparedness and assistance. The Mechanism is based on resources provided by the member states, which were reinforced in connection with the 2014 reform by setting up a voluntary pool of rescue capacities pre-committed by the member states and other standardised response modules. Such modules are highly specialised and autonomous rescue units that are on stand-by for rapid deployment. Alongside other Nordic countries, Finland contributes to the development of the EU’s shared rescue capacity, especially with regard to expertise in cold conditions. The use of resources within and outside the EU is coordinated from a 24/7 Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) in Brussels.

Recovery capacity: measures and activities

As of the time of writing, no significant recovery capacities can be linked directly to the EUSBSR per se. There are no established procedures for lesson learning, for example, nor are funds set-aside to help with post-disaster reconstruction projects.

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44 European Commission, 2000b.
Preliminary Findings for the EUSBSR

- The EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region aims to further Baltic Sea cooperation in civil protection -- albeit within the EU’s broader agenda. The EU hopes Baltic Sea cooperation will prove a model for other ‘macro-regions’ in Europe.

- The EUSBSR rests upon existing EU capacities in: prevention (EU risk assessment methodologies), preparedness (Baltic-EU cooperation in scenario exercises and training), and response capacity (EU Civil Protection Mechanism).

- The EU’s considerable administrative capacity and expert networks make the EUSBSR a force for regional cooperation, upon which other Baltic Sea institutions rely (see below).

- Capacities related to EUSBSR are concentrated primarily in *preparedness*, with *prevention* a close second -- but response and recovery lagging behind.
2.2 Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)

2.2.1 Fast Facts

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<td><strong>Purpose:</strong></td>
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2.2.2 Background

The Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was created in 1992 as a response to the geopolitical changes that took place in the region after the end of the Cold War. The main aim was then to ease the transition into the new international landscape through regional cooperation. To this end, the CBSS aimed to complement existing institutions connected to the region, such as the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). Today, the CBSS continues to be a platform for regional cooperation but with the principal aim of synergising efforts and enhancing coordination between the multitude of organisations and frameworks in the region in order to direct common efforts with common goals, and specifically with the EU and its strategy for the region.

The highest decision-making body of the CBSS, the Council, consist of the eleven Foreign Ministers of the eleven CBSS member states and the High Representatives of the European Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) serves for matters related to the work of the Council between Ministerial Sessions, such as monitoring, facilitating and coordinating the work of CBSS. The CSO officials are high-ranking representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the eleven CBSS member states as well as of the European Commission.⁴⁶

Since its establishment the CBSS has been attentive to civil protection concerns: nuclear and radiological safety in the region was discussed as early as at the first ministerial meeting, subsequently leading to the establishment of the CBSS Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (EGNRS). Maritime security has also been emphasised since the early years of the CBSS, and perhaps unsurprisingly so, considering the region’s geographical positioning around the Baltic Sea. The CBSS’s most important contribution to the field of civil protection is nevertheless the establishment of the Civil Protection Network. The Network consists of the Directors-General of the member states’ civil protection authorities who meet annually to discuss shared concerns and issues relating to civil protection. Through the Network other civil protection professionals

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and experts also meet in order to initiate, organise, and manage joint projects.\textsuperscript{47} Subsequently, the field of civil security has expanded and now includes issues ranging from natural disasters such as flooding, forest fires, and extreme weather conditions, to manmade crisis and disasters such as radiation leaks, human trafficking, and terrorism.\textsuperscript{48}

The CBSS sees its purpose as providing a ‘forum for all multilateral intergovernmental cooperation and dialogue in the Baltic Sea Region’.\textsuperscript{49} In order to achieve this purpose, the CBSS aim to function as coordinator of the multitude of regional actors in the region in three long-term areas: Regional Identity, Sustainable and Prosperous Region and Safe & Secure Region. Civil protection is addressed in the priority area of \textit{Safe and Secure Region} with the objective set to ‘ensure that people of the Region are protected from and resilient to violence, accidents and emergencies through preparedness, and safeguarded against harm caused by criminal exploitation and human trafficking’.\textsuperscript{50} The Safe and Secure Region theme aims to enhance cooperation between civil protection organisations and law enforcement agencies in order for them to jointly address challenges posed by natural and man-made disasters.\textsuperscript{51} To this end, the CBSS primarily focus on enhancing civil protection by facilitating regional cooperation and coordination to manage crisis, disasters, hazards, and emergencies.\textsuperscript{52}

What civil protection entails, and which concrete measures are to be applied for it to be achieved are in turn guided by a number of \textit{frameworks and strategies}. Conceptually, these can be seen as internally or externally driven, as well as generic or issue-specific in nature. This variety can be explained by the various methods the CBSS uses and the forms of relations it has with its stakeholders. The issue specific frameworks and strategies can be both internal and external to the CBSS. The internally driven frameworks and strategies of expert groups and task forces developed by the CBSS most often reflect specific civil security issues, such as the Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (EGNRS),\textsuperscript{53} the Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings (TF-THB), and the Baltic Sea Task-Force on Organized Crime (TF-OC). The CBSS also works through strategic partners and adheres to their frameworks and strategies. Depending on the partner, these external frameworks and strategies can be issue specific or general. The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (HELCOM) exemplifies an externally driven issue specific approach. The main general external strategies guiding the CBSS’s work for civil protection are the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction\textsuperscript{54} and the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). In addition, Russia provides their complementary North West Russia Strategy.\textsuperscript{55}

Within all the areas of cooperation, the Council both promotes synergies around specific

\textsuperscript{47} CBSS n.d., d.
\textsuperscript{48} CBSS, n.d., b.
\textsuperscript{49} CBSS, 2016a.
\textsuperscript{50} CBSS, 2014.
\textsuperscript{51} CBSS, 2016b.
\textsuperscript{52} The CBSS strategy in BSR is mainly based on the EUSBSR; Russia provides a complementary strategy; and the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the BSR guides other projects, hence different projects are driven by different objectives. For more information, see CBSS, n.d., c. The main aim is nevertheless to synergise these efforts.
\textsuperscript{53} CBSS, Expert Group on Nuclear Radiation Safety, 2012.
\textsuperscript{54} CBSS, 2017a.
\textsuperscript{55} CBSS, n.d., a; CBSS, n.d., c.
strategies and translates them into project-based actions on the ground. The Civil Protection Network, for example, brings together national rescue and crisis management authorities to exchange views and coordinate joint measures in line with the objectives of the UN Sendai Framework.  

The CBSS and the EUSBSR: Intertwined

The EUSBSR (discussed previously) has increasingly come to constitute the common platform and guide for Baltic Sea cooperation, generally, and the CBSS was one of the first major actors in the region to implement the EUSBSR Action Plan of 2015. This readiness to implement the EUSBSR should be seen in the context of CBSS’s early involvement in the preparation of the Strategy. This interchange can also be observed in the many, overlapping objectives of both the Council and the Strategy, especially in regards enhancing synergies of common efforts in the region. Most notable is the successive integration of CBSS into the governance architecture of the EUSBSR, where the CBSS Secretariat currently co-coordinates one entire policy area (PA Secure) and two horizontal actions (HA Action Neighbours and Horizontal Action Climate). The PA Secure and the HA Actions, based on the EUSBSR, has set the framework for initiated projects. A number of projects has been started through the framework of PA Secure and coordinated by the CBSS: HAZARD, for example, is a project aimed at bringing rescue agencies, relevant authorities, logistic operators of the BSR together in order to better risk analysis and assessment and improve communication and operational capabilities in emergencies between the actors. Yet another example is the Baltic Leadership Programme in Civil Protection, initiated through PA Secure and co-coordinated by the Swedish Institute (SI), the Swedish Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the CBSS. The programme aims to strengthen regional cooperation by creating a network of key civil protection actors and equipping them with necessary tools and knowledge to manage cross-border cooperation and strengthening the ties between agencies central to crisis management.

While the existence of several frameworks and strategies can raise concerns to the effectiveness of a scattered approach, the CBSS’s main aim is set to synergise efforts and approaches and to coordinate the various initiatives and organisations in the region. For instance, the 2016 Warsaw Declaration emphasised the need for cooperation in civil protection matters in order to strengthen resilience against major emergencies and disasters. This objective was further reinforced by the Joint Position on Enhancing Cooperation in Civil Protection Area, a document aimed at linking a range of efforts. To this end, the CBSS endorse common frameworks to serve as a platform for extending cooperation between national, regional and local governments.

2.2.3 Capacities

Prevention capacity: measures and activities

In an effort to enhance the preventive capacity to civil emergencies in the Baltic Sea Region, the CBSS promotes a common security culture and common threat perception that allows for greater risk assessment and crisis management. They do this by facilitating information sharing

56 CBSS, 2017a.
57 CBSS, n.d., f.
58 CBSS, 2016a.
59 CBSS, 2017b.
and collective data-collection and analysis. The CBSS works in two different ways in order to create a common security culture and threat perception: (1) as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between relevant regional stakeholders, and (2) as a platform streamlining the framework of the European Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Examples of its ‘forum’ function include the Joint Position on Enhancing Cooperation in Civil Protection Area, adopted in 2017. The Joint Position encourages all expert networks dealing with civil protection, in particular the PA Secure Steering Group and the CBSS CPN, to increase cooperation in order to ‘build common attitudes towards societal security threats and a shared understanding of prevention, preparedness, and response as well as recovery processes in connection with disasters’.  

The CBSS Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) is one example in which concerned actors are moving towards a common risk analysis in the region. The BSRBCC annually hosts two threat assessment conferences (ATA1 & ATA2), and, together with the EU’s Frontex, present an Annual Threat Assessment report. The report is intended to generate a broader understanding of the current situation in the BSR, to create and share a situation picture of threats identified within the area and to draw and elaborate conclusions regarding current and anticipated situations. In a similar manner, the CBSS Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings (TF-THB) has developed an intergovernmental platform for joint macro-regional cooperation as a central information hub on counter-trafficking activities in the Baltic Sea Region. Through collaborative projects, the Task Force encourages the CBSS’s eleven member states to improve current policies to facilitate preventive measures.

Examples of the CBSS’s ‘platform’ function include the ongoing promotion of a common security culture by administrating and mainstreaming regional cooperation in accordance with the EUSBSR. To this end, the CBSS has endorsed synergies with the EUSBSR by directing common efforts towards common goals. And as coordinators of the EUSBSR’s ‘PA Secure’ scheme (see above), the CBSS aims to promote all cooperation in the field of civil protection by generating a set of ‘values constitutive for a common area of security and guiding principle which steer strategic activities’, and to apply ‘a comprehensive and coherent approach to reduce trans-boundary vulnerabilities and to build common capacities for societal security in the Baltic Sea Region’.

As previously mentioned, the promotion of a common security culture is partly aimed at improved trust-building, which in turn is intended to improve information sharing and joint data-collection. This can be seen in the CBSS’s role as coordinators of the PA Secure, wherein they encourage the development of a ‘joint macro-regional prevention and preparedness approach towards major hazards and emergencies’ by mutual assistance through, inter alia, communication systems and tools, including early warning systems. More specifically, in regards to detection and prevention of serious crimes and border security, PA Secure stresses

60 Ibid.
61 CBSS, 2017c: 97; European Commission, 2016: 20; also see the 2016 Latvia ATA1 Meeting BSRBCC, 2016; The 1st ATA Seminar where for example ‘The current situation (threats and trends) on irregular migration in 2017 (focusing on the Baltic Sea Region) including presentations from Frontex and member states’ was discussed, see BSRBCC, 2017a; The 2nd ATA Seminar where ‘The main objective with the report is to give guidelines to member states on how to combat cross-border crime and irregular border crossing in the region’ was presented, see BSRBCC, 2017b – both pointing to activities for a common security culture and common threat perception.
the importance of ‘meeting challenges linked to exchange of information and data between law enforcement agencies’ by developing capacity for ‘joint risk analysis and operational cooperation’. This proposed operation has been implemented by the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC), who on the basis of cooperative risk assessment facilitated knowledge transfer and sharing of information reports regionally on assessed threats.\(^\text{63}\) This rational of fostering a common security culture in order to enhance certainty through risk assessment capacities responds to the rational of preventive crisis and risk management where the problematisation of not-knowing becomes a vital unknown in itself that needs to be confronted in order to reduce uncertainty and possibly forestall a potential risk from becoming a threat. It is thus in the CBSS’s function as a forum for guiding regional cooperation and as platform for specific cooperative endeavors, where its preventive capacity can be found.

**Preparedness capacity: measures and activities**

The CBSS’s most developed civil security cooperation effort centres on *preparation* and roughly two distinct features of preparedness management capacities can be distinguished: (1) as an overall promoter and facilitator of preparedness through cooperation and coordination, and (2) by implementing preparedness tools and instruments in its expert groups, task forces and projects. Like the preventive measures, preparedness measures are foremost framed by the imperative of creating a *common security culture*, this in order to enable a concerted effort to prepare a coordinated regional response applicable in the event of a crisis or disaster. A common security culture in order to foster cooperation is thus a pivotal capacity in order to coordinate responses, with planning for and implementing measures such as: information management systems, communication networks, identifying resources, including expertise and equipment, and facilitating practice coordination and civil protection training.

To this end, the CBSS primarily functions as both a promoter and a facilitator of a joint approach to preparedness by encouraging cooperation and coordination and by providing support for joint meetings and operational activities. As a promoter of preparedness, the Directors-General (DGs) for the Civil Protection in the Baltic Sea Region adopted the Joint Position on Enhancing Cooperation in Civil Protection Area in 2017. The Joint Position specifically encouraged cooperation in building a common societal security culture, and a shared understanding of preparedness procedures in connection with disasters and the DGs agreed upon investigating how cooperation can be increased regarding disaster loss databases as well as on establishing most efficient institutional settings for disaster risk management.\(^\text{64}\) The DGs noted the importance of strengthening cross-sectorial cooperation in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (Explosive) (CBRN(E)) preparedness.\(^\text{65}\) The most influential structure in the CBSS promoting and facilitating preparedness is by far the CBSS Civil Protection Network (CPN), as mentioned above, which convenes annually at the level of Directors General to *inter alia* coordinate joint measures to emergency preparedness issues in BSR in the field of civil protection. The CPN’s preparedness capacity lies in its focus on building readiness for effective response to threats of cross-border nature and on spreading best practice in preparedness to common emergencies. As such, it has set the obligation to increase Baltic Sea Region security and resilience to create a common security culture.\(^\text{66}\) The CPN

\(^{63}\) CBSS, 2017c: 97; also see previous mention of Annual Threat Assessment report.

\(^{64}\) CBSS, n.d., d.

\(^{65}\) CBSS, 2017b: 36.

\(^{66}\) CBSS, 2017a.
hosted a seminar in 2016 on civil protection capacities for international response where issues such as assets for international response in the BSR, partnerships in developing assets for international response, pool of experts, best practice on cooperation with experts was discussed, all facilitating a forum and engagement in preparedness. The workshop resulted in the emergence of two new initiatives: The first initiative has been aimed at setting up a calendar of exercises, meetings, seminars and workshops organised in the BSR in the national and international formats. The calendar will be a part of the PA Secure webpage. The second initiative is to develop an interactive map of the research institutions dealing with civil security issues in the BSR. Both initiatives were endorsed by the CPN DGs and were seen as positive steps towards making international cooperation in the civil security area more operational and better fitting to the needs of agencies.

The second preparedness feature of the CBSS relates to the cooperation and coordination of the implementation and use of preparedness measures, tools and instruments in the CBSS issue-specific organisations, expert groups, task forces and other projects. It should however be noted that the CBSS only functions as a forum and platform for bilateral and multilateral cooperation and coordination and does not itself hold any preparedness tools or instruments. In the Joint Position the Directors General especially noted the importance of strengthening cooperation preparedness in the field of CBRN(E). The CBSS Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (EGNRS), in turn, implements these measures through the means of data-collection, risk assessment and response recommendations, and as such incorporate preparedness capacity. In a similar manner, the Task Force on Organized Crime (TF-OC) aim to cooperate closely with member state law enforcement agencies to not only prevent, but also by being prepared to fight organised crime. These measures include improved and increased exchange of information, joint concrete and operative measures and actions, joint training, and judicial cooperation. The Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC), in turn, provide a range of preparedness tools, measures, and actions. They primarily focus on practical forms of cooperation, simplifying communication routines between parties, and on the exchange of information on security at sea ports, marinas and sea areas. They have for example done so by developing the data system COASTNET. They also focus on counteracting terrorism and to this end organise sea exercises and operations, exchange experiences, and evaluate existing standards of security controls. The CBSS also organise the Annual Threat Assessment Seminar, discussing issues such as joint operations, exchange of reports on the situation in the Baltic Sea region, ad-hoc operations and similar. All these measures closely relate to developing, bettering and facilitating the implementation of preparedness capacity.

The BSRBCC also annually organise joint operations in the form of a large scale international operational-tactical training session, such as RONIS in 2016, Baltic Tracking and Baltic Dart in 2017. The main task of the joint operation RONIS was to test theoretical and practical knowledge of the vessels crew and brought together the State Border Guard, as well as the Estonian, Lithuanian, Finnish and Polish cooperation authorities. According to the BSRBCC this exercise resulted in ‘opportunity to develop cooperation between the vessels, to exchange information between cooperation authorities, as well as do develop common procedures for

67 CBSS, n.d., d.
69 CBSS, n.d., e.
70 BSRBCC, 2016.
71 CBSS, 2017c: 97.
vessel inspections at sea, to work in a Joint Inspection Group’. The BSRBCC’s activities also include annual seminars such as the SAR Seminar who took place in 2017, simulating scenarios and search and rescue operations in the maritime domain and exchanging experiences from other operations.

**Response capacity: measures and activities**

Response measures are concerned with the immediate reaction to an emergency or catastrophe and includes measures such as critical decision-making and the implementation of the same in the form of plans and procedures, for examples in regard to international assistance. The CBSS is an organisation promoting visions, ideas, and enhanced cooperation and coordination on a bilateral and multilateral level, and as such lacks in the response capacity category. Even though the CBSS promotes a range of legal agreements, contingency planning processes, emergency decision protocols, and other initiatives which are intended to improve response coordination (see preparedness discussion above), these are often devised via other institutional frameworks and are difficult to ascribe to the CBSS per se. The CBSS does, however, exhibit some response capacities useful for the coordination of member states’ response, mainly in terms of information management systems and communication networks. The BSRBCC, for example, functions as a regional tool for daily inter-agency interaction, and coordinates member states’ Police, Border Guards, Coast Guards and Customs Authorities to act together in the event of a crisis or disaster. Whereas most tasks on their agenda relates to developing practical forms of cooperation to highlight preparedness capacity, they have also: (a) developed and implemented the data transmission system COASTNET to simplify communication routines between all parties; and they (b) regularly conduct sea exercises and operations and extract lessons-learned and best-practices from cooperation; (c) evaluate existing standards; and (d) mobilise assets such as vessels in the service of improved crisis response -- all useful capacities for the coordination of member states’ response activities. However, beyond the BSRBCC, the CBSS lacks response capacity and there is currently little operational cooperation through the CBSS. Noting this lack in operative cooperation in regard to CBRN(E), the member states’ Directors-General in civil protection acknowledged in the Joint Position in Enhancing Cooperation in civil protection area that: ‘The operational cross-sectoral cooperation in the response and recovery phases remains a challenge that needs an appropriate reply in terms of joint training and exercises and sharing best practice. These efforts should also include cooperation between civil protection and law enforcement agencies in the transnational context, focusing on best practices’.

**Recover capacity: measures and activities**

If there is comparatively less capacity in the area of response cooperation, there is even less in the area of recovery cooperation. There are no measures to facilitate or evaluate previous crisis management efforts, which in turn subsequently amount to a lack also in the recovery phase of transboundary crisis management.

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72 BSRBCC, 2017c.
73 Ibid.
74 CBSS, 2018.
75 Ibid.
76 CBSS, 2017b.
The CBSS functions mainly as a forum for dialogue and cooperation between relevant regional stakeholders, not least in terms of its own ‘Safe and Secure Region’ initiative.

The CBSS’s forum-like function also allows it to facilitate other civil protection initiatives, most notably the EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. The CBSS is the main driver of implementation of the EUSBSR (taking the EU lead on the PA Secure initiative). The CBSS also uses the Sendai Framework to guide much of its work.

The CBSS’s ‘own agenda’ is less clear, and less prevalent in its operations than other organisations’ initiatives. This raises the question of overlap: the CBSS becomes yet another actor in Baltic Sea cooperation. The problem has been tackled through the creation of the Joint Position on Enhancing Cooperation in Civil Protection to improve link between initiatives.

The CBSS does engage in prevention and preparation measures, however, in a unique way: by attempting to create a common security culture. Through this, the CBSS hopes to build trust and enable a coordinated regional response in the event of a crisis or disaster.

Response and recovery capacities are at best low.

An advantage of CBSS is the participation of Russia. After an absence following the annexation of Crimea, it is now engaging again and offers hope for a broader Baltic Sea platform.
2.3 Nordic cooperation (Haga Declaration)

2.3.1 Fast Facts

The Haga Declaration

Established: **2009**, at a Nordic Ministerial Meeting on Civil Protection and Emergency Preparedness; further strengthened by a Nordic Declaration of Solidarity signed in 2011 (associated with Haga II).

Purpose: The purpose of the Declaration is to ensure a legal foundation for cross boundary cooperation in the event of an emergency or disaster, with the symbolic call for a ‘a robust North without borders.’

Members: Denmark, Finland, Island, Norway and Sweden.

2.3.2 Background

Nordic cooperation on civil protection cooperation has been ongoing for some time, but was largely ad hoc: annual meetings of the ministers responsible for rescue services and preparedness, a permanent working group of public officials that meets before ministerial meetings, meetings of the departmental heads of ministries, meetings of Nordic rescue commissioners, a pan-Nordic high-level preparedness course, as well as cooperation in the spheres of fire prevention, statistics, local information and research. This changed during a Nordic Ministerial Meeting on Civil Protection and Emergency Preparedness in 2009, when the Haga Declaration was adopted. The Declaration provided a framework agreement for civil protection, to take place in a more structured way. The purpose and aim of the Haga Declaration was to emphasise the need for a joint Nordic crisis management structure and to generate the political will to implement such cooperation. The Declaration has contributed to a growing effort by Nordic members to reinforce public safety, and now encompasses cooperation on contingency planning as well as general mutual assistance in the event of accident, disaster or crisis. In 2011, the Haga Declaration was followed by Haga II, and Nordic cooperation in the area of civil protection was further strengthened by the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity. Now, a range of new and older cooperation frameworks and agreements in the area of health care provision, rescue services, fire prevention, as well as statistic and research, the Nordic countries cooperative civil protection mechanisms have come be strengthened as part of a broader framework.

The Haga Declaration emphasizes and encourages already established Nordic efforts. One such effort is the framework agreement for Nordic cooperation regarding rescue services (Nordred). The Nordred agreement is a framework for cross-border cooperation between rescue services,

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77 Nordred, 2009.
78 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), n.d., a: 69.
79 Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, 2011.
established first in 1998 between Denmark and Norway, and later joined by Sweden and Finland in 1992, and lastly by Iceland in 2001. One of the conclusions of the Haga Declaration was to develop Nordred, then a cooperation concerning fire and rescue services, into a wider civil protection agreement. The Nordred agreement is thus not confined to national level but is also applicable for regional and local governments to enter into regional or local agreements for cross-border cooperation over rescue services. For example, local and regional cross-border rescue service agreements stemming from the Nordred arrangements are used on a daily basis so that the geographically closest rescue unit can respond in border regions. The primary aim of the agreement is to ensure joint assistance in the event of an accident or immanent accident in the Nordic countries, in order to prevent or limit personal injury and damage to property or the environment. The framework was driven by the need to respond to transboundary disasters, such as nuclear events, and by the logic of pooling scarce assets in remote border areas. The Nordred agreement ensures that there is a legal foundation for cross boundary cooperation in order to facilitate the joint assistance.

Another example of Nordic cooperation is the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement (Nordhel). The Nordhel agreement was established in 2002 and concerns contingency preparedness for natural disasters; events of accidental character especially in regard to radioactive emission, biological substances or chemical substances; as well as events of intentional character, such as acts of terror. The purpose of the agreement is twofold: (1) to ensure effective assistance in the event of a Nordic country suffering from an emergency or disaster, and (2) to enhance preparedness capacity by promoting cooperation between the different countries’ healthcare authorities in order to better be able to ensure effective assistance.

The Nordic countries’ civil protection cooperation includes issue-specific cooperation frameworks such as: the Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection with Radiation Accidents, the Atlas-project that frames the cooperative work and exercises between anti-terrorist forces of the Nordic countries, and the Nordic geographical information in crisis management network group (Nordisk KrisGis) with the aim of promoting the use of geographical information system (GIS) in civil protection and crisis management in the Nordic countries. In this report, attention has primarily been given to the Haga agreements.

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80 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), n.d., a: 33.
81 Nordred, 2009.
82 Pelastustoimi, n.d.
84 See art. 1, section 1: The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), n.d., a.
85 The agreement only applies ‘when a Nordic country suffers an emergency or disaster and assistance is not covered by other Nordic multilateral and bilateral agreements, such as the agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden of 20 January 1989 concerning cooperation across territorial boundaries to prevent or limit damage to people, property or the environment in the event of accidents (the “Nordic Rescue Services Agreement”).’ Nordhel, The Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement, n.d., a.
86 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), 2014: 31.
87 Ibid. 32.
88 Ibid. 32.
Declaration as a strategic document, and the Nordred and Nordhels agreements as more general operative crisis management structures in the field of civil protection.

2.3.3 Capacities

**Prevention capacity: measures and activities**

As mentioned in the analytical framework of this report, prevention measures are aimed at minimising the possibility of known or uncertain disastrous events from occurring at an early stage. Indications of prevention capacity includes methods and tools that enables systematic monitoring, mapping, assessments, and recognition of threats and risks. In regard to prevention, the Haga Declaration aims to ‘prevent and limit the consequences that may flow from major accidents, natural disasters and other societal emergencies’. Nevertheless, the purpose is not to prevent the accident or disastrous event *per se*, but rather to ensure preparedness in order to avoid harm from befalling people, property, or the environment – which can be seen reflected in the lack of prevention activities ensuing the Haga Declaration. The only clear reference to developing capacity to prevent an accident or a disastrous event in the Haga Declaration is in regard to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness, where the objective includes developing preventive capacity through the framework of Nordic cooperation in order to detect and prevent events involving CBRN materials. To this end, a unit, the CBRN Haga-group, has been employed to develop capacity to detect and prevent CBRN-related incidents. Whereas this group actively has been developing preparedness and response capacities (see separate sections), there are no indications of any institutionalised framework or activities in regard to cooperation to facilitate preventive measures.

**Preparedness capacity: measures and activities**

To better ensure effective assistance, the Nordhels agreement aims to enhance preparedness capacity by promoting cooperation between the Nordic countries’ healthcare authorities. To this end, the agreement encourages the Nordic countries to ‘provide opportunities for the exchange of experience, cooperation and competence building’ through collective cooperation, and ‘as far as possible remove obstacles in national legislation, regulations and other rules of law’. To facilitate these measures, Nordhels holds the annual Nordic Public Health Preparedness Conference (Nordiska hälsoberedskapkonferenser). The conference functions as a forum for the Nordic authorities involved with health preparedness to discuss joint approaches to common issues, exchange experiences and information about incidents and disasters, as well as to create networks among those working with health preparedness in the different countries. Issues that have been discussed range from risk assessment and response methods, to recommendation on planning for a situation with pandemic influenza and lessons

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89 Annex one: Text of ‘Haga I’ Declaration (Unofficial Translation). Can be found in Bailes and Sandö, 2014: 54-56.
90 Ibid.
91 Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), n.d., b; Annex one: Text of ‘Haga I’ Declaration (Unofficial Translation). Can be found in Bailes and Sandö, 2014: 54-56.
92 Nordhels, 2013.
93 Høybråten, n.d.
94 Nordhels, 2013.
learned after the Islandic volcanic eruptions. The preparation goal is to ensure good lines of communication between the countries should an incident or disaster occur.

In regard to the Nordred agreement, there are structures facilitating preparedness activities and measures. The ‘6th paragraph’ of the agreement, for instance, obliges states to provide information on the organisation of their respective rescue services and responsible authorities, legislation measures, and other changes of importance to the agreement. In addition, the agreement encourages the Nordic countries to enhance collective cooperation in the area of rescue services. To this end, the responsible authorities must maintain contact in order to ensure practical implementation of the agreement. For the same purpose, countries are encouraged to hold meetings when deemed necessary. In addition, a contact group consisting of responsible representatives of state authorities meet regularly to exchange information. The contact group also holds seminars every three years in order to continue educating and equipping crisis management actors.

In a Nordic report from 2011 coordinated by the MSB, a disappointing conclusion was that no specific Nordic exercises were carried out. The report nevertheless noted that there was work in progress for coordination of exercise-calendars between the Nordic countries at a national level. Subsequently, through the framework of Nordred, a range of preparedness activities and measure were arranged. For instance, in 2014 a passenger-plane crash scenario, involving impassable border-terrain, was carried out to test the emergency management plans of the Norwegian and Swedish rescue services, as well as their ability to effectively coordinate rescue service across borders. The exercise involved 155 participants from Norway and Sweden. In 2017, as part of a cross-border crisis management project, a major exercise was carried out in order to assess the capability and vulnerability of cross-border communication of the two security and rescue services’ radio communication systems Rakel (Sweden) and Nödnett (Norway). They also tested the ability to achieve a successful emergency population warning through the two radio communication systems. As a result of these exercises, national directives for how to best coordinate communication in Rakel and Nödnett was presented.

However, even though the Nordred agreement facilitate some preparedness activities and an increased level of preparedness activities can be observed, the preparedness capacity is constrained by the agreements aim of only ensuring joint assistance in the event of an accident or imminent accident. This means that the agreement (1) only encompass incidents that are accidental by nature, and as such exclude intentional disastrous events, and (2) it does not account for unknown or unperceived events, which constrain the preparedness capacity planning and the development of plans, procedures, and capabilities that provide an effective response to an emergency or disaster of an unlikely, unforeseen, or surprising nature.

95 Nordhels, 2014.
96 Nordred, n.d., b.
97 Nordred, n.d., d.
98 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), n.d., a.
100 Ibid. 13
Response capacity: measures and activities

Nordic cooperation response capacity is well developed through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Nordhel agreement, for example, presents concrete structures for increasing the capacity of the Nordic countries health and medical authorities to better assist a Nordic country to deal with emergencies and disasters. Special attention has been given to disastrous incidents involving radioactive emissions, biological substances and chemical substances. These efforts have been formalised in the shape of a concrete contingency preparedness handbook, the Nordic health preparedness handbook (Nordiska hälsoberedskaphanboken),\(^\text{102}\) that guide responsible practitioners and authorities to best be prepared to act, and what to do in the event of a crisis or disaster.\(^\text{103}\) Additionally, the Nordic countries has formalised catalogues of available material resources that can be put to use if needed. The catalogue includes material such as ambulances, ambulance helicopters, patient transportation at sea, decontamination plants, and other issue specific materials and resources such as stockpiling of medical products.\(^\text{104}\)

The Nordred agreement also showcase a quite formalised cooperation structure. The agreement includes concrete directives and is accompanied by a range of operational routines serving as a guide for the Nordic countries rescue services in the event of a crisis or disaster. There are emergency plans and operational routines covering everything from international help-seeking procedures, checklists for how to assist a Nordic country in need of aid, to other forms of framework agreements setting the parameters for questions on accountability.\(^\text{105}\)

Notably, the Haga Declaration provides a structured framework for Nordic civil protection activities, and thus does not engage in response coordination efforts per se. However, it can be said here that the Nordic countries’ response capacity, primarily assisting each other in the event of an emergency or crisis, is well developed, institutionalised and tested. But however formalised, these arrangements are not supranational in any way, since Nordic Cooperation per se lacks any legal basis or institutionalised secretariat. It consists of a series of bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

Recovery capacity: measures and activities

The Haga Declaration highlights the importance of ‘cross-border cooperation to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and draw lessons from actual events. Cooperation also draws upon a common learning process and the possibility to streamline developments among the countries following such incidents.’\(^\text{106}\) Hence, the Haga cooperation aims to ‘guide and strengthen society’s preparedness for resisting and responding to serious accidents and crises’ and

\(^{102}\) Nordhel, n.d., b.
\(^{103}\) Nordhel, n.d., a.
\(^{104}\) Nordhel, n.d., a.
\(^{105}\) Nordred, n.d., b.
acknowledges that ‘an important aspect of this is to continually review, define and prioritise specific areas for cooperation.’

The Nordred framework for cooperation, in turn, provides a detailed account of operative, economical and juridical procedures after the event of an accident or disaster. However, they do not explicitly address the aftermath of a crisis in terms of evaluating, assessing, learning, and make changes based on the crisis. There seems to be no concrete evaluation mechanics and accountability procedures for use after the aftermath of a crisis.

In similarity to the Nordred framework, there are no requirements of assessing a crisis management performance in the Nordhels framework for agreement. However, the group responsible for Nordic cooperation on health based on the Nordhels, the ‘Svalbard Group’, have on several occasions presented reports on how to assess crisis management performance. After Hurricane Gudrun in 2005, strategic cooperation was reviewed and assessed -- and recommendations and lessons learned were extracted from the result. And after the Icelandic volcanic eruption in 2010, the Svalbard Group established a working group to study the actions taken and to describe how the cooperation and crisis management measures functioned during the crisis. In June 2011, the report ‘Strategic Cooperation during emergencies affecting the Nordic Countries – Lessons learned from the volcanic eruption 2010’ was presented. The report concluded that Nordic coordination worked rapidly and efficiently at the strategic level, i.e. between the Nordic health authorities. Exchange of information between the regional health bodies worked equally well, as did requests for reallocation and loan of equipment between regions. This they argued was partly due to ‘an arena with people from different Nordic authorities who know each other well before and shared the same problem/challenge was quickly established. Exchange of information added great value to national assessments. Resource issues and requests for assistance in each country were quickly answered positively.’ They did however note some issues that needed to be addressed, such as updating list of contact points, issues with the format for and frequency of information sharing, clarification of border crossing challenges, to mention a few.

As such, the Nordhels arrangement seems to have an operative procedure encompassing the recovery phase of crisis management, where evaluating, assessing, extracting lessons learned, and recommend changes on the basis of the results.

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107 Ibid.

108 The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare, the Unit for Crisis Preparedness (Socialstyrelsen), 2005.


110 For more information read the report ‘Stormen Gudrun i Sverige i januari 2005’, The National Board of Health and Welfare, the Unit for Crisis Preparedness (Socialstyrelsen), 2005.
Preliminary Findings for Nordic/Haga cooperation

- The Haga Declaration is mainly a political-symbolic gesture intended to give impetus to, and to better structure, existing Nordic civil protection cooperation.

- Nordic cooperation has traditionally been quite effective regarding response, including operational cooperation such as cross-border rescue and air transport. There are numerous examples of successful cooperation.

- Prevention and preparation work is less robust, a fact mentioned in the Haga Declaration and the target of additional work as shown in the Nordred and Nordhels cooperation programmes (which expanded cooperation to include health issues).

- However, beyond some information sharing, our analysis suggests that prevention lags behind preparedness in most Nordic cooperation initiatives.

- We find most Nordic cooperation focused fairly narrowly, and on operational grounds (e.g. cross-border rescue) rather than on a broader range of threats and perhaps even ‘black swans’.

- Before Haga, and to extent still today, Nordic cooperation is less formal and institutionalised than other forms of Baltic Sea cooperation. Nevertheless, cooperation is fairly strong, begging the question of whether institutions or cultural trust is most important for forging effective cooperation.
2.4 NATO

2.4.1 Fast facts

NATO

Established: 1949; the intergovernmental military alliance was signed between 12 North American and European countries, including Denmark, Iceland and Norway.

Purpose: Matters concerning civil protection fall under the framework of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). The CEP’s mission is to ensure civil support for the military and for crisis response operations and ensure support for national authorities in civil emergencies and in the protection of civilian populations.

Members: NATO has 29 member countries including Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Germany in the Baltic Sea Region. Additionally, Finland and Sweden have close relationship with NATO through their membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

2.4.2 Background

Civil emergencies of larger dimension have increasingly come to be seen as not only a threat to the security and stability of the crisis afflicted country but to the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole. NATO thus identifies the need for a cooperative format addressing the occurrence of disaster situations that extends beyond the capacity and national territory of one member country. And even though civil emergency planning is considered to be ‘first and foremost a national responsibility’, and each country in the Alliance is considered responsible for handling emergencies and civil protection at the national level, NATO has increasingly come to address transboundary threats such as hybrid warfare, as well as natural disasters such as floods, fires and earthquakes. While the idea originally was to deal with mainly natural and technological disasters, crisis management in the field of civil protection and the response to terrorist attacks have also developed into major objectives. Thus, including disastrous events and crisis, NATO’s aim is to also under times of peace contribute to the ‘protection of citizens from all potential hazards’. Importantly, NATO’s role in civil protection, as they themselves formulate it: ‘goes beyond military operations to include issues such as the protection of populations against natural, technological or humanitarian disaster operations’. Civil protection is now seen as one of NATO’s ‘fundamental security tasks’.

Policy background (civil protection)

After the Cold War, NATO began to widen its scope of activities in the direction of civil security and disaster management. In 1953, the first disaster assistance scheme was implemented following devastating flooding in Northern Europe, and in 1958 NATO

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111 NATO, 2010a.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
established detailed procedures for the coordination of assistance between NATO’s members in case of disasters. These procedures remained in place and provided the basis for civil emergency planning work within NATO in subsequent years. The procedures were comprehensively reviewed in 1995 when they became applicable to partner countries in addition to NATO member countries.\(^{115}\)

In 1992, NATO hosted an international workshop on the ‘Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief’,\(^{116}\) which came to provide the foundation for subsequent Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) cooperation activities with the future Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, established in 1994, and later on with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries, established in 1997.\(^{117}\) The 1999 Washington Summit reflected the transnational nature of crisis and crisis management and noted ‘crisis management and partnership’ as ‘essential to enhancing security and stability’ in order to ensure ‘the peace and stability’ of not only member countries but ‘of the wider Euro-Atlantic area’.\(^{118}\) Subsequent documents have maintained and refined the inclusion of transboundary crisis management. For instance, at the Lisbon Summit 2010, a strategic concept was adopted which ‘commits the Alliance to prevent crisis, manage conflicts, and stabilise post-conflict situations’, ensuing firmer CEP management and measures.\(^{119}\)

Matters concerning civil protection fall under the framework of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). The CEPs mission is four-fold: 1) civil support for military; 2) civil support for crisis response operations; 3) support for national authorities in civil emergencies; and 4) the protection of civilian populations. In addition, it has increasingly come to focus on enhancing civil preparedness.\(^{120}\) The CEP covers civilian and military strategy, planning, and activity. Thus, for NATO, effective civil-military cooperation is crucial, and NATO’s toolbox accords crisis management with both military and non-military means. In regard to civil security, two categorical divisions of crisis management are discernible: the most prominent aspect is the operational activities at the national and NATO-levels to ‘protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attacks, and other major incidents or natural disasters’. Another aspect is concerned with the planning of activities to ‘ensure that civil resources can be put to systematic and effective use in support of Alliance strategy’. This mainly concerns civil support to the military but does also include direct civilian support to crisis response operations.\(^{121}\)

One must distinguish between NATO’s ‘crisis management’ operations and civil emergency planning. The latter was originally designed to assist NATO members in the event of an attack at home, whereas the former concerns international missions abroad. In the post-Cold War complex security era, however, these aspects are blurring. For instance, in order to encompass an all hazard transboundary crisis management and enhancing resilience, NATO has different mechanisms in place. As part of an overall NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS),

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

\(^{116}\) NATO, 2001: 6,13.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.

\(^{118}\) NATO, 1999.

\(^{119}\) NATO, 2010b.

\(^{120}\) NATO, 2018a.

\(^{121}\) Ibid.
NATO’s Operational Planning System (NOPS) and NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) to mention a few, are designed to complement and support NATO’s crisis management role and response capability. The NCMP provides a common procedural structure for crisis response measures and breaks down a crisis in six subsequent phases: 1) indication and warning; 2) assessment; 3) development response options; 4) planning; 5) execution; and lastly 6) transition. This six-phase procedural structure, against which both military and non-military crisis response planning processes are to be designed, aim to cover the full spectrum of crisis, from identification, to its management, to its resolution.

2.4.3 Capacities

Prevention capacity: measures and activities

While NATO’s military focus has been on its ability to coordinate rapid response, NATO’s role in civil protection has been one of coordination to ensure disaster relief and administration of rapid assistance in the event of a disaster or crisis. At the same time, changes in the security environment since 11 September 2001 led NATO to revise its crisis approach to increase cooperation on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members and non-member countries.

Since NATO depends on its acquisition of information and intelligence from national civilian intelligence services, the main objective has been to promote information-sharing among member countries. The main driver in the development of information and intelligence-sharing in order to raise awareness, to develop early warning systems and to improve risk assessment capabilities, has been counterterrorism. Already in the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO members called for increased intelligence sharing. However, no major changes took place until the 2010 Lisbon summit when a reform of NATO’s intelligence structure to improve intelligence-sharing within NATO was identified as fundamental ‘to better predict when crisis might occur’. To this end, NATO has undergone an intelligence structure reform promoting increased interaction with members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), including Partner countries. In addition, NATO has started to develop systems and methods for information gathering, risk assessment and information disseminating. At present, NATO intelligence consists of multiple intelligence components in a network of actors and structures. The two main providers of intelligence support to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and subsequently the EADRCC acting on civil protection matters are the joint civilian and military Intelligence Unit (IU) and the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS). The IU provides the NAC with intelligence-based analysis on already identified regional and transnational risks and threats, such as, terrorism, instability and proliferation. The NIWS, in turn, placed under the Military INT is designed to be a much more inclusive warning system, one covering not only threats to NATO, but also a wide variety of non-military risks, including uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area. The NIWS thus ‘provides warning of any

123 NATO, 2017a.
124 NATO, 2002.
125 NATO, 2010b.
126 Fägersten, 2010.
127 NATO, 2018b.
developing instability, crisis, threats, risks, or concerns that could impact on security interests of the Alliance and monitors de-escalation of a crisis’. Furthermore, the Situation Centre (SITCEN) provides current intelligence from open source intelligence. The SITCEN was initiated in order to provide ‘situational awareness … [and is] responsible for receiving, exchanging and disseminating political, economic and military intelligence and information’.

Nevertheless, states and their national services are reluctant to share sensitive, classified information, and clearly bolstering intelligence cooperation within NATO presents a major problem. Again, as recently as the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the necessity of strengthening information-sharing within NATO was stressed. The Alliance underlined that improved cooperation and information-sharing would enhance ‘shared awareness of contingent terrorist threat’ and general resilience. To that end, Heads of State and Government agreed to establish a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD), tasked with coordinating intelligence provided by member countries and internal bodies (IU, NIWS, SITCEN) in order to deliver strategic all-source intelligence assessments and early warnings. Additional task includes promote information-sharing between member countries.

However, NATO intelligence-sharing efforts are aimed primarily at external security problems rather than internal crisis management. The CEP aims to ‘protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attacks, and other major incidents or natural disasters’, but as we shall see, most efforts in this regard fall outside of the prevention category.

**Preparedness capacity: measures and activities**

NATO’s preparedness activities are mainly dedicated to diminishing vulnerability of societies’ ‘capacity to resist any form of armed attack’. They do this by facilitating cooperation and by coordinating operative responses. NATO facilitates cooperation firstly by providing forums for exchange between member countries and Partners and secondly by strengthening and encouraging cooperation between varies bodies such as the Euro-Atlantic Council (EAPC), civil and military representatives from branches of national, regional and local government, international organisations, and NGOs. The main aim of these efforts is to encourage information and data exchange among national agencies as well as international organisations as this is believed to improve interoperability and to harmonise NATO’s nations’ standards into collective decisions for allied actions. Thus, they encourage member countries and Partners to exchange data and information, partly by encouraging practitioners to take part in seminars, courses, training, exercises and team visits, focusing on practical cooperation in the field of emergency preparedness and crisis management.

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130 NATO, 2015.
132 NATO, 2016.
133 NATO, 2017b.
134 NATO, 2016.
136 Ibid.
137 The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), 2009.
The second way in which NATO aims to enhance readiness is by conducting pre-disaster planning and post-disaster analysis in order to better prepare for coordinated operative responses applicable in the event of a crisis or disaster. Member countries and Partners are encouraged to exchange data through the directive of Civil Emergency Planning to help in forecasting crisis or disasters.\textsuperscript{138} Within NATO, the Civil Protection Committee (CPS), guided by the directorate of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), analyses post-disasters and conducts pre-disaster planning. CPC also arranges seminars and conferences in order to guide the development of national disaster and crisis plans.\textsuperscript{139} Moreover, in order to be ready in the event of an unforeseen crisis, NATO collects and monitors information on where civilian resources and equipment exist, and NATO officials keep databases on civilian experts who can be called upon.\textsuperscript{140}

NATO efforts to foster readiness by facilitating cooperation and by coordinating operative responses are in essence aimed at enhancing the resilience of Member countries and Partners’ capacity to resist any form of ‘armed attack’.\textsuperscript{141} At the 2016 Summit in Warsaw, Allied leaders committed to continue enhancing NATO’s resilience and to further developing individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. As stated in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué: ‘NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness. We will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means.’\textsuperscript{142} While these activities clearly can be argued to bring added-value in the form of civil protection, the main consideration is not afforded to the protection of civilians but to ensure preparedness of the civilian society and population to assist the military and make civil resources accessible to be used by the military.\textsuperscript{143} As is clearly stated: ‘civil preparedness is a central piece of the Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence’.\textsuperscript{144}

**Response capacity: measures and activities**

NATO’s Crisis Management System (CMS) provides a structured array of pre-identified political, military and civilian measures to be implemented by states and NATO in response to various crisis scenarios. Within this system, specific Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements define the roles of the CEP Committee, EADRCC and the use of civil experts.

Response capabilities lies predominantly in efforts dedicated to enhancing the ability of member countries and Partners to assist one another. NATO provides forums for consultation with partners in order to exchange intelligence data and information; achieve interoperability;

\textsuperscript{138} NATO, 2001: 51-52.
\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141} NATO anchor the principle of resilience to Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty, that reads as follows: ‘In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ See NATO, 1949. Also see NATO, 2010a.
\textsuperscript{142} NATO, 2016.
\textsuperscript{143} NATO, 2017c.
\textsuperscript{144} NATO, 2016.
and harmonise NATO nations’ standards and guidelines into collective decisions for allied actions. As part of an overall crisis response system, the NCRS provides member countries and Partners a framework of pre-identified political, military and civilian directives, NATO’s Crisis Response Measures (NCRM), to improve the readiness of member countries and Partners to respond to a set of crisis situations. The NCRM aim to foster applicable measures primarily by coordinating possible responses to emerging or actual crisis. Functions include facilitating required preparedness; pre-identify response measures and options; initial timely response; and coordination of other organised response measures.

In responding to requests in cases of emergency, a non-standing Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), a ‘multi-national mix of national civil and military elements (qualified personnel of rescue, medical and other units; equipment and materials; assets and transport)’, will be activated with a voluntary contribution by Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) is a framework for NATO’s adaptation in response to growing challenges and threats emanating from the south. The RAP was implemented in order for the Alliance to be ready to respond to these security challenges. Begun at the 2014 Wales Summit, this is the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War. At Warsaw Summit in 2016, Allied leaders called for its implementation. The RAP is directed towards the security challenges from the east and south and includes ‘assurance measures’ for NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Assurance measures comprise activities which are complemented by exercises focused on collective defence and crisis management. Even though the RAP is primarily a military mechanism facilitating readiness to reassure NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe towards potential aggression from Russia, there are mechanisms put in place aimed at reinforcing civil protection and crisis management. In order to facilitate readiness, the RAP presented a series of adaption measures including tripling the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The VJTF, or ‘spearhead force’, of around 20,000 (of which about 5,000 are ground troops) is able to deploy wherever needed within two to three days. The VJTF and NRF forces are based in their home countries, but able to deploy from there to wherever they are needed for exercises or crisis response. The VJTF participated in its first deployment exercise in Poland in June 2015 and is regularly tested during exercises. Moreover, eight NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) has been set up in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia. The NFIUs are multinational headquarters facilitating a rapid deployment of the VJTF and Allied follow-on forces. Their task is to improve cooperation and coordination between NATO and national forces, as well as to prepare and support exercises and any deployments needed, including at home.

**Recovery capacity: measures and activities**

The Civil Protection Committee (CPC) functions as the focal point for pre-disaster planning and post-disaster analysis for all NATO and Partner countries. The CPC functions under the aegis of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) which is the top NATO advisory body for civil protection issues. The SCEPC regularly brings together the heads of the national civil emergency planning organisations of the member countries and partners to discuss and review issues in civil emergency planning. The CPC also holds conferences and seminars with the aim of discussing the ‘development of national plans, as well as exchanging information on lessons learned from operational disaster experiences’. To this effort, NATO
encourages Member and Partner countries to exchange data to assist in not only forecasting but also in reporting the potential effects of disasters that have occurred.  

Recovery capacity can also be found in the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordinate Centre (EADRCC), NATO’s principal civil emergency response mechanism. The EADRCC also conduct post-disaster analysis. The Centre functions as a ‘clearing-house system’, coordinating requests and offers of assistance in the event of a natural or man-made disaster in the Euro-Atlantic area. Importantly, the EADRCC not only guides response crisis management efforts, but also analyses past NATO-coordinated disaster response operations and exercises -- and holds seminars to discuss learnt lessons. The EADRCC also arrange large-scale field exercises annually and harness the experience and learned lessons for future operations.  

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**Preliminary Findings for NATO**

- NATO cooperation in civil protection, embodied in its Civil Emergency Planning apparatus, is a long-standing part of the alliance.
- NATO includes most Baltic Sea states as members, and includes Sweden and Finland as active ‘Partnership for Peace’ countries.
- NATO prevention capacities are quite limited in the area of civil protection, since most information-sharing and horizon scanning concerns external threats. There is much more preparation capacity, however, and response capacity is high, considering the operational capabilities of NATO members.
- A major question mark looms, however, when considering how and whether NATO capabilities would be deployed to help non-NATO members (and considering the current political climate, even smaller NATO members).
- There are also political limitations regarding the extent to which Sweden and Finland can engage fully with NATO regarding civil protection cooperation.

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146 NATO, 2017c.
Part 3: Reflections and Recommendations

3.1 Case Reflections

The case studies above reveal an extraordinarily rich and diverse set of cooperative arrangements covering the Baltic Sea. We now summarise the results of each, and add reflections relevant to the research questions set out in the introduction.

**EUSBSR:** The EU’s Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region includes civil protection as a priority area, and a 2013 review of the strategy – which resulted in an Action Plan – generated two ‘priority areas’: Priority Area Secure (PA Secure) and Priority Area Safe (PA Safe).\(^1\) PA Secure is the most relevant for this report, as it is aimed to address all sorts of threats, regardless whether their origin is natural disaster, man-made disaster or intentional. Moreover, it emphasises the importance of addressing threats through the means of prevention, preparedness, and response. In many respects, the EUSBSR is a transposition of EU objectives in the Baltic context, with hopes that Baltic cooperation to meet those objectives will serve as inspiration for others. The EUSBSR enjoys the status of being the product of a deliberative process devised by EU members, and receives the administrative backing of the EU’s institutional apparatus. The strategy is also relatively clear, with clear steps indicated. It is this reason that the EUSBSR has been taken up by the CBSS as something of its own ‘guiding document’. The CBSS has taken on the task of implementing the EUSBSR’s civil protection priorities. In many respects, this suits the EU well, and the EU and CBSS have a mutually beneficial relationship (not least owing to the fact that the CBSS brings in non-EU members to engage in EU priorities).

THE EUSBSR is supported by the EU’s broader capacities related to prevention, preparation, response and recovery, even if the Strategy itself emphasises the first two (see Table 1, above). In an actual crisis in the Baltic Sea Region, it is highly likely that the EUSBSR, and more specifically the EU’s general civil protection capacities, would be put into effect.

**CBSS:** The Council for Baltic Sea States is perhaps the broadest platform for civil protection cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. It has a wide membership and fairly open agenda. Activities and measures conducted by the Council Secretariat, under the Safe & Secure Region initiative, include well-developed regional and cross-sectoral cooperation structures. The issuespecific strategies promote measures directly linked to the issue at hand. For example, the Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety (EGNRS) and the Baltic Sea Region Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) facilitate cooperation and coordination of regional efforts and promotes concrete issue specific measures of heightening data-collection, risk assessment, and response recommendations in order to minimise accidents and border disruptions. Likewise, in the field of law enforcement, cross-border crime-related networks of police, border guard, prosecutors and tax administration high levels of cooperation, but also implementation of joint measures and operative actions are established. These different structures and networks have defined the level, degree and nature of cooperation and activities quite differently, starting from their own concrete needs. Some of the CBSS related civil security networks meet only annually at the highest level to exchange views, whereas others have established 24/7 communication channels and take joint operational actions on the ground.

\(^1\) European Commission, 2013.
The CBSS assists with crisis management capacity-building primarily in the areas of prevention and preparation, with less operational assistance in response (see Table 1). In an actual crisis, the CBSS is less likely to be directly involved, although the networks it facilitates would no doubt assist in a specific response effort.

**Nordic/Haga Cooperation:** When the Haga Declaration was adopted in 2009, it encapsulated – but lent political support to – existing Nordic cooperation on civil protection cooperation that was ongoing for some time. That cooperation as largely ad hoc: annual meetings of the ministers responsible for rescue services and preparedness, a permanent working group of public officials that meets before ministerial meetings, meetings of the departmental heads of ministries, meetings of Nordic rescue commissioners, a pan-Nordic high-level preparedness course, as well as cooperation in the spheres of fire prevention, statistics, local information and research. The Declaration provided a framework agreement for civil protection, to take place in a more structured way. The purpose and aim of the Haga Declaration is to emphasise the need for a joint Nordic crisis management structure and to generate the political will to implement such cooperation. The Declaration has contributed to a growing effort by Nordic members to reinforce public safety, and now encompasses cooperation on contingency planning as well as general mutual assistance in the event of accident, disaster or crisis. Norderød and Nordhels are two examples of fairly well-functioning initiatives, which were boosted by the Haga Declaration and contributed to enhanced civil protection activities in the Nordic region.

Nordic/Haga cooperation excels in the preparedness and response phases of crisis management, since it includes joint exercises and highly operational agreements for cross-border response in specific areas. We found very little prevention or formalised recovery capacities, however (See Table 1). In an actual crisis, Nordic/Haga cooperation is likely to feature highly, when relevant, considering its established and well-practiced nature.

**NATO:** Matters concerning civil protection fall under the framework of NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP). The CEP’s mission is four-fold: 1) civil support for military; 2) civil support for crisis response operations; 3) support for national authorities in civil emergencies; and 4) the protection of civilian populations. In addition, it has increasingly come to focus on enhancing civil preparedness.\(^{148}\) The CEP comprises civilian and military strategy, planning, and activity. Thus, for NATO, effective civil-military cooperation is crucial, and NATO’s toolbox accords crisis management with both military and non-military means. Regarding capacities, NATO encourages enhanced information-sharing and harmonisation among its member countries, but very little related to prevention of domestic crises and disasters. NATO’s main objective is for its member and partner countries (e.g. Sweden) to be best prepared to cope with the consequences of crisis, disaster or conflict. At the same time, NATO tries to foster readiness by facilitating cooperation and by coordinating operative responses aimed at enhancing the resilience of member countries and Partners’ capacity to resist any form of ‘armed attack’. While these activities clearly can be argued to bring added-value in the form of civil protection, the main consideration is not afforded to the protection if civilians but to ensure preparedness of the civilian society and population to assist the military and make civil resources accessible to be used by the military.

In short, NATO excels in the preparedness and response phases of crisis management but lags behind in prevention and recovery. In a Baltic Sea crisis situation, NATO is likely to play some

\(^{148}\) NATO, 2018a.
sort of response role – probably concerning the movement of military-capabilities or in transport.

3.2 Findings and Recommendations

Research uncovered an extraordinarily rich and diverse set of cooperative arrangements covering the Baltic Sea. To a great extent, such diversity is to be welcome: it allows local specificities to inform policymaking and provides multiple outlets depending on national needs. It also provides flexibility. The participation of Russia in the CBSS, which is a central player in the implementation of the EU’s Baltic Sea Region strategy, enables communication and interaction on technical questions that might not always be possible in the EU or NATO proper. Nordic cooperation (framed by the Haga Declaration) is mainly informal and ad hoc, whereas the EUSBSR is highly institutionalised and associated with EU formalities.

That said, institutional diversity in Baltic Sea region has drawbacks. The exact roles of each organisation are not always clearly defined or delineated from one another. The CBSS has many roles and pursues many initiatives – but mainly initiatives from other organisations like the EU or the Sendai Framework. The question of ‘value added’ raises its head here. While the EU and CBSS implicitly allow Russia to engage, the exact opposite is the case with NATO. Highly varying institutional arrangements – including the EUSBSR’s relatively strict processes, the Haga Declaration’s mainly symbolic characters, and NATO’s operationally robust arrangements – clash with the goal of coherence since membership varies amongst organisations. And last but not least: each organisation varies in the proportion of crisis management capacities it can lend to members.

Specifically, we uncover answers to our three main questions in this report.

Where are the capacities? We find most capacities in the preparedness category, meaning that all Baltic Sea organisations support member countries’ efforts to plan, practice and better organise their collective response to crises. The coordination of exercise-based training, common courses for crisis management-related personnel, and some degree of advanced positioning of resources. However, we find prevention, response and recovery activities more fragmented. Surprisingly few Baltic Sea organisations help members to prevent crises from arising in the first place; for instance, by conducting collaborative risk assessments, horizon scanning, or internal threat information sharing (the EUSBSR is a partial exception). Response coordination is also limited, mainly because response, by definition, is a national responsibility (Nordic cooperation is an exception here, where long-standing cooperation on cross-border rescue exist). And finally, only two organisations display assistance with recovery: rebuilding material and political damage, and attempting to systematically learn lessons (NATO, and to a lesser extent, the EUSBSR).

What are the cooperation patterns? An important question for effective cooperation is the nature of cooperation. Baltic Sea cooperation is heterogeneous, not only in terms of membership but also institutional design. Membership ranges from the fairly closed Nordic cooperation structures to the rather wide-open CBSS, which includes Iceland and even draws Russia into cooperation. Institutionally, the organisations are diverse. While all relations are voluntary and, at best, linked to political agreements, the EUSBSR is underpinning by some binding EU rules and regulations. NATO has a relatively strong political framework for cooperation. The CBSS is perhaps the least obligatory, in that it has few of its own policy
frameworks rooted in international law (although it works to pursue EU and UN Sendai obligations, perhaps as a result of its own voluntary nature). In terms of general versus specific tasks, the CBSS takes a general approach to efforts on creating a ‘Safe and Secure Region’, working across organisations to get things done. Nordic/Haga cooperation is perhaps the most specific, with clear objectives and sector-oriented agreements.

**What is the cooperation strategy?** Each organisation takes a slightly different approach to furthering effective cooperation. The EUSBSR is mainly a rules-bound strategy, setting out guidelines (through collective discussion) which then are expected to be implemented (with a considerable degree of oversight). NATO has few compliance mechanisms but is politically robust in its set-up and expectations: membership has its clear obligations, as newspaper headlines remind us. On the other side of the equation, Nordic/Haga cooperation is more trust-based. Over time, cooperation has emerged through clear identification of need – and facilitated by civil protection community building. The CBSS, which has few rules of its own, is clearly inspired by this approach. A main task is to generate a ‘common security culture’ over time, as a way to facilitate effective cooperation.

With this in mind, we now formulate a modest set of recommendations for increased ‘value-added’ in Baltic Sea cooperation:

- Evidence shows that trust-building strategies work well to facilitate effective cooperation. We encourage **common exercises, increased exchange, and intensive communication** as a way to breed familiarity and healthy reliance upon one another – from a bottom-up perspective. These interaction strategies need not be aimed towards the building of common protocols or standard-operating-procedures, which may not suit the diversity of members in Baltic Sea cooperation. Incremental, bottom-up practices

- Evidence also shows that sector-specific initiatives bear the most fruit. Rather than launch broad framework initiatives, **concrete steps towards well-specific goals** might be the best way forward. Nordic/Haga cooperation shows success in rescue service coordination, for instance, NATO takes specific steps in discrete areas such as air transport during disasters, and the CBSS is engaged specifically on nuclear safety question. However, an ‘all hazards’ approach, and the potential for ‘transboundary’ crises with unclear solutions, warrant against specialising too narrowly in a particular kind of response. A combination of specific capacity-building with more generic oversight would be useful here.

- Our research suggests institutional complexity in the Baltic Sea Region, and we see a need for some degree of rationalisation. We find the ‘broad platform’ approach of the CBSS – while occasionally confusing – a possible **umbrella approach to link various initiatives** and bring all actors together. This already takes place regarding the CBSS and the EU but should include Nordic/Haga cooperation and possibly observer status for NATO. Currently, the latter two organisations work fairly independently. More connections could be made with the EU’s Emergency Response and Coordination Centre, through enhanced networks between the Centre and Baltic crisis managers.
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Appendix 1. Detailed overview of the distribution of crisis management capacities in Baltic Sea Region organisations, strategies, and projects.

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<th>Participating countries</th>
<th>Strategy; Project; Flagship</th>
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<th>Crisis management capacity</th>
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