

Deepening NB8-Ukraine Defence-Industrial Cooperation: A Strategic Win-Win for European Security

15 April 2026

Klara Lindström, Vladyslav Panov & Stanislav Boiko



Sahaidachnyi
Security Center

Executive summary

Deepening military-industrial cooperation between Ukraine and the countries of the Nordic-Baltic (NB8) region is an operational imperative and in all the parties' mutual strategic interest. Ukraine, which is engaged in a high-intensity attritional war against an adversary with superior mass, has an insatiable demand for conventional systems and high-tech weaponry. Leveraging Ukraine's expertise and capabilities is the most effective way for the NB8 countries to rapidly close capability gaps and align defence systems with the realities of post-2025 warfare.

Instead of replacing defence-industrial cooperation in larger multilateral formats, NB8-Ukrainian cooperation is a strategic complement in a region that is particularly exposed to the Russian military threat. The NB8-Ukraine defence industry track can move fast and deliver operational results. Once established and proven, it can serve as a scalable model and driving force for broader coordination within NATO and the European Union.

To unlock the full potential of NB8-Ukraine cooperation, both sides must move beyond transactional co-production towards structured joint capability development. Combat readiness – not hardware delivery – must be the governing metric. NB8 countries should establish a dedicated coordination mechanism focused on priority tracks in areas such as integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), deep strike and unmanned systems. They should also enhance the state-facilitated business presence inside Ukraine, collectively advance Ukraine's integration into the EU drone wall initiative and scale-up Ukrainian component production to reduce dependency on China across critical supply chains.

Ukraine, in turn, should make partner presence on its territory the default industrial model, propose executable deep-strike co-development programmes, prioritise cost-effective IAMD solutions and publish a white paper on defining joint capability development areas. In parallel, it should fast-track European governance and quality assurance standards to make joint ventures scalable and interoperable.

Acronyms and abbreviations

5G — Fifth Generation (mobile network)

AI — Artificial Intelligence

C2 — Command and Control

C-UAS — Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems

EIFO — Export and Investment Fund of Denmark

ESCs — Electronic Speed Controllers

EU — European Union

EW — Electronic Warfare

GPS — Global Positioning System

IAMD — Integrated Air and Missile Defence

ISR — Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

KPIs — Key Performance Indicators

KSAT — Kongsberg Satellite Services

LSS — Low-Slow-Small

MOD — Ministry of Defence

MRO — Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul

MUM-T — Manned-Unmanned Teaming

NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NB8 — Nordic-Baltic Eight

QA — Quality Assurance

R&D — Research and Development

SAR — Synthetic Aperture Radar

UAS — Unmanned Aerial Systems

UAV — Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UGV — Unmanned Ground Vehicle

USF — Unmanned Systems Forces

USV — Unmanned Surface Vehicle

Strategic rationale for NB8-Ukrainian military industrial cooperation

The military-industrial cooperation between Ukraine and the Nordic-Baltic countries (NB8)¹ needs to move beyond sporadic interaction to systemic joint development and production. This pressing, immediate and strategic necessity is driven by technological paradigm shifts in modern warfare and the urgent military threats to the NB8 region.

First, today's technological and operational changes on the battlefield, powered by unmanned and autonomous systems, are not merely qualitative but structural. The combat modus operandi has been transformed. This calls for a complete redesign of capability development frameworks.

The NB8 countries face a compound challenge in adapting to these rapid structural shifts. First, there are legacy capability gaps resulting from military underfunding and overreliance on the United States. Capabilities such as long-range precision strike and missile defence are nominally present but insufficient to effectively mirror or counter Russia's corresponding offensive and defensive systems.

In addition, new capability gaps have emerged linked to the rapidly changing character of warfare. These relate primarily to unmanned or robotic operations – both combat and support – across three domains (air, land and sea), a new level of complexity in the electromagnetic spectrum, and the integration of intelligent technologies into all circuits of command and control (C2) and the kill-web (kill-chain).

These new gaps are especially critical: the next generation of autonomous combat technologies offers an advantage over traditional mechanised capabilities comparable to the dominance of armoured vehicles over cavalry and infantry formations in the 1900s. Defence industrial investment in the NB8 region will lack relevance to today's and tomorrow's wars unless it accounts for these structural and technological shifts.

At the same time, the immediate military threat to the NB8 region provides a strategic rationale for deepened NB8-Ukrainian defence industrial cooperation. Since 2022, the threat of full-scale or hybrid Russian aggression against NATO states has ceased to be hypothetical. The Baltic region in particular is on the frontier of potential hostilities. Russia has already demonstrated its ability and resolve to perform antagonistic hybrid and unconventional acts in the NB8 region, such as the sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines, deliberate GPS jamming and spoofing of civilian systems, repeated airspace violations by drones and aircraft, acts of arson and vandalism orchestrated through proxies or recruited agents, and intensified cyberattacks on critical infrastructure across the region.

Russia has fully mobilised its military machine, which has involved scaling-up production of the weaponry that has proved most effective for frontline and deep strikes. It is also expanding its force structure: to operate the new unmanned systems alone, personnel numbers are projected to [increase](#) from 80,000 to 165,500 in 2026. The threat is amplified by Russia's early adaptation to the new realities of warfare. Russia has actively seized on – and is preparing to extract maximum asymmetric advantage from – capabilities based on unmanned and robotic systems, as well as electronic warfare (EW). These are scalable and resilient, and based on inexpensive, modular, dual-use hardware and software, increasingly augmented by powerful AI tools trained using combat datasets.

¹ Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden.

Intellectualisation: The case for joint capability development

The traditional model of simply manufacturing or procuring individual platforms is becoming obsolete. Military hardware is now about complex technological systems and, increasingly, systems-of-systems. While semi-autonomous frontline capabilities operate at the edge, they are still synchronised with a central digital architecture; warfare is becoming intellectualised.

For example, a strike Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or a multipurpose Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) requires a suite of compatible reconnaissance drones, specific sensor arrays and tailored electromagnetic spectrum management systems and protocols. Software and combat AI agents have already surpassed hardware in overall importance in a growing number of military systems. This requires dedicated infrastructure not merely for standard maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), but for continuous software adaptation and integration into a broader capability framework.

Intellectualised warfare therefore calls for a transformation from traditional models of defence-industrial cooperation to joint capability development. The modern battlefield is so complex that the mere acquisition of a drone, robotic system or artillery platform will be ineffective without inclusion of the broader enabling infrastructure. This requires close cooperation throughout the entire production process, from innovation and development to testing and evaluation.

One way to facilitate such joint capability development would be to establish more joint ventures between Ukrainian and NB8 partners. Admittedly, some countries and producers will continue to prioritise sovereign capability development over joint ventures. Even within sovereign frameworks, however, local presence in Ukraine will be crucial. To remain competitive, manufacturers will need to establish subsidiaries or research and development (R&D) operations in Ukraine. Direct access to the battlefield provides an essential continuous feedback loop for mastering and adapting products to the rapidly shifting demands of modern warfare. It is impossible to develop combat-effective technology and maintain relevance without a direct link to real-world combat applications.

The case for the NB8 region

The NB8 region is especially relevant for enhanced defence-industrial integration with Ukraine. Countries on the north-eastern NATO flank have a shared perception of the immediate threat from Russia and are most actively learning directly from the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, the NB8 countries have demonstrated unparalleled resolve, consistency, and depth of support for Ukraine. These factors create a high-trust environment where defence-industrial cooperation can move fast and deliver operational results. Once established and proven, this can serve as a scalable model and driving force for broader coordination within NATO and the EU.

In addition, there are concrete synergies and complementarities between the NB8 countries and Ukraine that speak in favour of enhanced defence industrial cooperation. For example, Denmark and Norway maintain high-level industrial capabilities in sensors, missile technologies and maritime systems, while Ukraine demonstrates a capacity for rapid integration, combat adaptation and rapid scaling of next-generation military technology under wartime conditions. This pairing creates a basis for cooperation on unmanned systems, modular naval assets, interceptor munitions and other systems where subsystem excellence and production scalability must be combined.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania contribute strengths in unmanned systems, robotics, laser technologies and secure communications. When linked with Ukraine's large-scale deployment experience and continuous feedback loops from the battlefield, these capabilities support iterative development paths for systems such as UGVs and autonomous ground platforms, counter-UAS solutions and networked tactical communications. The emphasis is on short adaptation cycles rather than long-term platform development.



Fig. 1 Venues for NB8-Ukrainian defence-industrial cooperation

Domain	Bilateral cooperation proposals ¹
	Denmark
Maritime drone warfare	Denmark possesses robust engineering capabilities in maritime technology, navigation and sensor systems, which directly complement Ukraine's combat experience of deploying maritime drones. Potential cooperation extends beyond the joint manufacture of hulls or engines; the primary focus lies in control systems, navigation, secure communications and payload integration.
Small unmanned aerial systems (Sky-Watch, Nordic Wing)	Danish tactical-level UAVs (with a range of up to 50 km) have already demonstrated their relevance in the Ukrainian theatre. The aims are the joint adaptation of these platforms to withstand active EW, the replacement of standard communication channels, and the integration of Ukrainian navigation systems and combat modules. For Denmark, this offers accelerated combat hardening of its products; for Ukraine, it provides access to serial production and a stable component base.
Comms and EW	Denmark maintains strong engineering expertise in compact EW solutions that could be adapted for integration with unmanned platforms. Collaboration centres on translating Ukrainian frontline experience of countermeasures into scalable systems that meet industrial and interoperability standards. Denmark would expand its EW portfolio with combat-tested concepts, while Ukraine would accelerate the transition from prototype to deployment-ready production.

1 There is no direct industrial dimension to the cooperation between Iceland and Ukraine. Military-industrial cooperation is possible indirectly via funding, training and participation in multilateral programmes.

2 These have been identified and discussed with experts from the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Command and Ukrainian representatives from the Drone Coalition, as well as with defence-industrial experts and stakeholders in the NB8 region.

Radar systems	Danish lightweight radar technologies correspond with Ukrainian experience of detecting small targets under heavy electronic interference. Interaction is focused on adapting UAV-mounted radars for navigation and target acquisition in degraded conditions. Denmark would refine sensor performance through operational feedback; Ukraine would improve its situational awareness.
Modular coastal combat vessels	Denmark's modular naval design concepts align with Ukraine's experience in robotised maritime operations (combat, reconnaissance, support). Engagement prioritises mission-module experimentation for reconnaissance, strike and drone deployment roles rather than full platform construction. Denmark is validating modularity in operational contexts while Ukraine increases flexibility within a resource-constrained fleet.
Interceptor drones for Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS)	Denmark's need to protect ports and critical infrastructure against small UAVs is increasing. The Ukrainian side has workable technical solutions and practical experience in hard-kill UAV interception, which can be converted into industrial scaling.
Estonia	
Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGV)	Estonia is an established European leader in the UGV sector (notably Milrem Robotics). While Ukraine has a number of highly effective products of its own, combat intensity means that it faces a chronic deficit in such platforms, while also possessing an abundance of combat scenarios and data for AI-agents. Cooperation with Ukrainian manufacturers (e.g., Darkstar) could focus on production localisation, hardening systems for high intensity combat and refining autonomy algorithms based on frontline feedback.
Tactical connectivity for unmanned systems	Estonian tactical communication solutions are viable candidates for integration into unified robotic command networks. Ukraine is currently more operationally advanced with regard to NATO standards in this domain due to constant battle-testing. This offers a testing ground for next-generation mesh networking.
UAS development (Thread Systems)	Estonian UAV design experience corresponds with Ukrainian requirements for survivability in contested electromagnetic environments. Joint efforts could centre on incremental airframe optimisation, propulsion efficiency and adaptation to persistent jamming. Estonia could shorten development cycles while Ukraine improves its battlefield endurance in active jamming environments.
Optronics and sensor fusion	Estonia has strong capabilities in optical technologies applicable to both civilian and military use. Specific Ukrainian requirements drive demand for night vision, thermal imaging, and multi-spectral sensors calibrated for engagement ranges of modern combat.
Finland	
Resilient Combat Communications (Nokia)	This represents one of the most high-potential vectors. The need goes beyond encryption to ensure network resilience and spectrum dominance within active EW zones. Ukraine provides a stress-test environment; Finland provides the digital architecture.
Fibre-optic production	Finland possesses advanced fibre-optic manufacturing capabilities essential to first-person view and tethered unmanned systems. However, there is a critical bottleneck in the scale and quality of fibre-optic supply. Joint efforts are needed to address supply bottlenecks by improving production speed, quality and consistency. Both Finland and Ukraine could reduce dependency on external suppliers and increase logistical resilience.

Armoured vehicles	While full-scale joint development is currently unlikely, there is scope for the modernisation of specific subsystems, such as communications suites, active protection systems and electronics.
Space-based ISR	Finland operates space-based sensing assets that are already contributing to European security architectures. Beyond the existing track with ICEYE (in 2026, the Ukrainian MOD and ICEYE signed a new agreement that expands the Ukrainian military's access to high-resolution satellite imagery), extended cooperation appears feasible but constrained by political and financial factors. The immediate focus should be on data analysis and interpretation rather than launch capabilities.
Latvia	
Kamikaze drones (Origin Robotics)	This is one of the most practical venues. Ukraine can contribute the combat logic and tactical requirements while Latvia ensures manufacturing discipline and integration into European supply chains. Latvia can integrate systems into regulated supply chains while Ukraine accelerates field deployment.
C-UAS	Latvia is actively seeking practical solutions for detecting and intercepting hostile UAVs in urban and infrastructure-heavy environments. Cooperation involves adapting Ukrainian operational concepts into mobile detection and interception systems. Latvia would gain a deployable counter-UAS capability while Ukraine industrialises tested solutions.
Joint production of Ukrainian unmanned systems and spectrum management infrastructure	There is potential to establish scalable joint production facilities to reduce dependency on external supply chains.
5G-enabled battle-field networks	Latvia's work on military 5G applications is aligned with Ukraine's experience of operating under contested communications conditions. Collaboration is developing deployable microcell networks suitable for frontline use. Latvia will advance its military telecom integration while Ukraine improves real-time connectivity across units.
Lithuania	
Kamikaze drones	Similar to Latvia, but with a stronger emphasis on state-backed support for defence start-ups and agile procurement.
C-UAS systems	Lithuania is interested in deployable counter-UAS solutions for protection of critical infrastructure. Cooperation could refine Ukrainian combat-tested systems into serially producible formats. Lithuania would gain ready capabilities while Ukraine benefits from industrial standardisation.
Joint production of Ukrainian unmanned systems and spectrum management infrastructure	Lithuania offers an EU-based platform for joint manufacturing of Ukrainian combat systems. Localisation of production could expand existing industrial capacity on both sides.

Advanced thermal sights and laser devices	Lithuania's leadership in laser and optical technologies – supported by companies such as Ekspla, Light Conversion, Brolis Semiconductors and Yukon Advanced Optics Worldwide – is aligned with Ukraine's operational requirements in laser communications, and expertise in precision targeting and air-defence integration. Cooperation would combine Lithuanian laser emitters, infrared modules and precision optics with Ukrainian combat-calibrated control systems for tactical battlefield communications, UAV data links, counter-UAS applications and guidance systems within air-defence and robotic platforms.
Norway	
Communications for deep- and middle-strike	Norway has specific competence in long-range, secure communications, which is a critical enabler for deep- and middle-strike UAV operations. Ukraine is a key validation environment for these technologies under combat conditions.
Joint UAS production	Here, the emphasis is on the development of high-value, technologically advanced unmanned platforms rather than mass production. These systems are defined by their extended operational range, increased endurance and higher levels of autonomy, making them suitable for complex missions.
Uncrewed maritime systems	A promising sector for future growth, initial cooperation could focus on sensor packages, payloads and auxiliary modules that can be integrated into existing platforms, before moving to full system integration.
Space and surveillance systems	Norway's space-industrial base includes satellite manufacturing, SAR sensing and ground-segment infrastructure through Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace, Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT) and ICEYE Norway. Following the launch of Ukraine's satellite programme in 2026, cooperation could focus on joint production of satellite payload components, ground systems, SAR data-processing modules and surveillance analytics software.
Sweden	
Aircraft (JAS Gripen)	Cooperation could extend beyond procuring the aircraft to the broader ecosystem: tactical data links, interoperability, and use of the concept of manned unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with UAVs.
Procurement of Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems	Sweden sees Ukraine as a source of mature, combat-proven solutions. This represents a significant export opportunity for Ukrainian manufacturers to supply the Swedish Armed Forces with small UAS for various combat missions.
Electronic warfare	A promising and virtually untapped market niche for cooperation lies in the segment of tactical-level EW. This would involve joint development of integrated counter-drone systems and active protection modules designed for mechanised platforms and armoured vehicles.
Radars and sensors	Swedish sensor technology is highly adaptable to Ukrainian requirements, particularly regarding the detection of low-slow-small (LSS) targets and low-flying threats in cluttered environments.
Missiles and precision weapons	A focus on the joint production of high-precision missile components would combine the smart guidance systems of Nammo and Saab with Ukraine's experience of building missile bodies and using strong composite materials. Ukraine would contribute its capabilities in developing cruise and anti-ship missiles, along with its proven ability to rapidly adapt western weapons to work with different launch platforms.

Multilateral Cooperation Venues

In addition to bilateral arrangements, some military-industrial clusters are particularly conducive to multilateral NB8-Ukraine cooperation. A common enabling condition across all these areas involves credible financing and risk-sharing mechanisms. State investment insurance, export credit guarantees and concessional finance will be essential to make joint projects systemic rather than occasional. On the NB8 side, agencies such as Export Finance Norway (Eksfin) and Denmark's Export and Investment Fund (EIFO) could reduce risk for private sector firms. On the Ukrainian side, government bonds or special-purpose debt instruments could underpin concessional lending for joint production.

A number of multilateral cooperation venues are relevant to the defence planning of all the NB8 countries and closely aligned with Ukraine's strategic defence interests.

1. Integrated air and missile defence

The NB8 countries are within the immediate threat radius of Russian aerial and missile power. However, they face a quantitative and qualitative [insufficiency](#) in air defence capabilities to counter ballistic threats and combined UAV attacks, creating a strategic imbalance compared to Russian aerial offensive capabilities. In addition to joint industrial ventures, Ukraine can offer partners expertise and analytics derived from combat experience, specifically regarding doctrine, organisation and training. Wider NATO or EU frameworks, while essential at the continental scale, are limited by the complexity of consensus requirements, divergent threat perceptions and procurement bureaucracies. Enhanced IAMD cooperation in the NB8-Ukraine format would allow faster decision cycles, deeper political trust and operationally grounded cooperation.

2. Ukraine's integration into the EU's drone wall

Ukraine needs to be an integral part of the European drone defence [initiative](#); to be feasible and effective, it needs Ukrainian combat sensory data and operational expertise. Incorporating Ukraine would also ensure that European drone defence develops as a battle-ready infrastructure capable of securing the eastern flank. Given the volatility of the threat environment, Finland and the Baltic states cannot afford a protracted development cycle – the operational necessity for C-UAS in the Baltic states is immediate and urgent.

3. A joint deep strike capability programme

The NB8 countries currently face either a significant deficit in or a total absence of deep strike capabilities, particularly in ballistic weaponry. Given the disparity with the Russian arsenal, this gap represents a severe risk. A joint development programme could help to address this strategic vulnerability. The NB8 format offers high levels of operational agility to form a cost-effective deterrent specifically tailored to the north-eastern flank.

4. Developing next-generation maritime domain capabilities

As maritime nations, the NB8 countries need enhanced conventional surface and underwater warfare capabilities in the form of uncrewed and autonomous systems. A priority is the development of effective countermeasures to protect critical littoral infrastructure and offshore assets from similar adversarial threats. The integration of robotic systems into mine and counter-mine operations – a traditional edge for Scandinavian and Baltic nations – is essential.

5. Scaling robotic systems for land domain integration

A shift to unmanned and robotised operations on the ground will be required to prepare for next-generation land warfare and mitigate demographic challenges, such as the limited mobilisation resources of many NB8 countries. Ukraine possesses advanced technology and experience in this domain. Cooperation could focus on integrating technical and organisational solutions that have proved effective in Ukraine.

Conclusion and recommendations

The strategic need to urgently deepen NB8-Ukrainian military-industrial cooperation is undeniable. Whether this translates into a strategic window of opportunity, however, will depend on both sides. Success will require the alertness to grasp the true scale of the challenge alongside the flexibility and adaptability to overcome bureaucratic inertia and institutional bottlenecks. Policymakers in the NB8 countries and Ukraine are recommended to:

	NB8 countries	Ukraine
1	Start to institutionalise NB8–Ukraine industrial cooperation by establishing an NB8-Ukraine coordination mechanism, starting with a shortlist of top-priority tracks, such as IAMD, deep strike and unmanned systems.	Fast-track the adoption of EU corporate governance, industrial procedures and QA protocols across relevant defence industrial segments to make joint ventures bankable, scalable and interoperable.
2	Enhance local presence in Ukraine by facilitating business-to-business contacts, specifically by issuing letters of introduction, advising on due diligence, providing financial support for insurance, and supporting the establishment of R&D subsidiaries in Ukraine for combat-relevant iterations.	Operationalise partner presence in Ukraine as the default industrial model, to prioritise and provide incentives for joint ventures and NB8 subsidiaries located in Ukraine for maintenance and adaptation.
3	Advocate for the full integration of Ukraine into European drone defence efforts, to leverage Ukrainian combat data, operational expertise and iterative testing.	Offer implementable projects to make concrete contributions to the EU drone wall with NB8 partners.
4	Launch a joint development track on drone-/swarm-enabled deep-strike capability to address shared NB8 capability gaps and align with the new air offence architecture and economy.	Propose a compact, executable programme outline for joint development/production of deep-strike assets leveraging Ukrainian industrial and operational edge in this area.
5	Support industrial initiatives for the scaling of Ukrainian production of components (micro-turbines, flight controllers, ESCs, fibre optics) through NB8 advanced manufacturing.	Pursue concrete joint production initiatives on scaling components and materials (primarily inputs for unmanned systems and battlefield spectrum management), as well as joint production of ammunition.
6	Incentivise the expansion of joint production of ammunition beyond NATO artillery calibres to include standardised warheads for combat unmanned aerial and surface vehicles.	Streamline certification processes and provide standardised technical specifications for UAV and USV payloads.
7	Facilitate targeted investments, technology transfers and joint R&D in critical high-tech sectors such as edge computing, avionics, directed energy and satellite infrastructure, thereby combining Nordic-Baltic technological capital with Ukrainian battlefield innovation.	Prioritise deep integration in sectors where Ukraine has combat expertise but resource gaps, such as telecommunications/radars, edge computing/avionics, directed energy weapons and satellite infrastructure. Expand avenues for bilateral cooperation, such as maritime drones, UGVs, C-UAS, EW and precision missiles.

8	Orient IAMD cooperation with Ukraine towards scalable, cost-effective solutions rather than defaulting to high-end platforms ill-suited to the volume and tempo of the new threat environment.	Facilitate the IAMD cooperation track, prioritise and present existing, combat-tested and cost-effective solutions to provide economically sustainable responses to massed combined aerial attacks.
9	Move beyond co-production agreements to joint capability development, anchoring KPIs on cooperation to combat-ready capabilities (with requirements jointly defined and measured) rather than isolated military hardware/ software.	Produce a white book with specifications on areas for joint capability development, to initiate the shift from industrial integration to end-to-end capability integration.



Klara Lindström

Analyst, SCEEUS



Stanislav Boiko

Associate Senior Analyst, Sahaidachny Security Centre



Vladyslav Panov

Junior Analyst, Reform Support Office of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine

About SCEEUS

The Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) is an independent Centre, funded by the Swedish Government, established in 2021. The Centre conducts policy relevant analysis on Russia and Eastern Europe and serves as a platform and meeting place for national and international discussions and exchanges on Russia and Eastern Europe. Guest Commentaries are written based on the views of the writers and do not necessarily reflect the views of SCEEUS.

Photo: AP/ Evgeniy Maloletka

© 2026 Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies

Previous Publications

Stratagems for the Victory of Ukraine: The Concept of the Russian Federation's Terminal Defeat in a High-Tech War of Attrition

By Sahaidachnyi Security Center

The Hard Security of EU Enlargement

By Klara Lindström, SCEEUS Commentary No. 2, 2025



Sahaidachnyi
Security Center

SCEEUS STOCKHOLM CENTRE FOR
EASTERN EUROPEAN STUDIES



THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS