Transatlantic turbulence and European security*

Effects of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda and Brexit

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Introduction

The people in one of the European Union’s most powerful member states, the United Kingdom, have chosen to leave the EU and the President of the EU’s most powerful partner, the United States of America, has yet to show any sympathy for European integration. What does this dual shock of transatlantic turbulence – Brexit and President Donald Trump’s foreign policy – mean for European security?

A few years ago, it was suggested that Europe’s political situation could best be characterized as “crisis upon decline”. Crisis in the form of several structural problems that lacked effective common solutions – migration management, debt levels within the Eurozone, and mounting Russian aggressiveness are telling examples – and decline in the sense of other actors and other regions catching up or even overtaking the privileged positions of western states in the world system. The state of “crisis upon decline” was suggested to have a negative impact on Europe’s geopolitical influence.

Since then, however, Europe’s geopolitics have suffered increasing uncertainty. Political turbulence in the UK and US has rocked the pillars of European security i.e. European integration and the transatlantic link as well as their institutional manifestations – The EU and NATO. The choice of the British to leave the European Union was seen as a dramatic challenge to the European project, especially at a time when the EU was already weakened following years of shoddy crisis management and mounting popular resistance towards European integration. The election of Donald Trump – whose campaign hinted at a more transactional and less sympathetic view on European states and their integration – was considered a threat within the EU bureaucracy. While some of his nominees – such as national security advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of Defense James Mattis – have tried to calm the Europeans, his first visit to Europe in May 2017 convinced them instead that caution was indeed warranted. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel summed up her impressions after a week of EU, NATO and G7 meetings, her message was that cooperation should be sought with the US and the UK but Europeans needed to take care of their own interests – it had become clear that others would not.

The challenges posed by Brexit and the Trump administration are of course different – and the European Union members differ, to some extent, on their reading of these events. To start with, Brexit is not necessarily protectionist; it takes place within a functioning political system where the mainstream parties dominate over fringe parties. This is in bleak contrast to President Trump’s ‘Jacksonian’ protectionism and his “America First” policy, and all the challenges they create for the checks and balances of the American political system and the way his movement has taken a firm grip on the hitherto established and predictable Republican party.
But the events of Brexit and Trump’s rise also have similarities and are to some extent interrelated: Trump signalled support for Brexit and his position vis-à-vis the UK on areas such as trade might affect the political calculations of other EU members hesitant to proceed with further European integration. Also, the effects of the UK leaving the EU are tied to the choices of the Trump administration on the US global role and the extent to which the American president will challenge the Europeans on areas such as security, trade and climate change policy. The rise of Donald Trump as well as Brexit is also ushering in an era of reinvention as elements of the political system thought to be broken – the political machinery in Washington and Brussels respectively – are to be fixed or abandoned. Interestingly, this happens as the European integration project is in a phase of reinvention in itself, partly as a response to the ‘crisis upon decline’ mentioned above. This European process of reinvention is much affected both by the Trump administrations unwillingness to show global leadership and opportunities that are thought to be opened once the “awkward partner” – the UK – leaves the club. Considering these interrelated effects of current transatlantic turbulence, this collection of essays takes a broad view and aims to analyse European security within several domains while considering events on both sides of the Atlantic.

The collection is structured as follows:

In the two introductory essays, the main interests of the involved actors and the overall effects of their actions on European security are analysed. Daniel Hamilton explains the domestic roots of Donald Trump’s power and their implications for his foreign policy outlook. He places Trump within a Jacksonian tradition and discusses what this means for European partners within the EU and NATO. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling take a broad perspective on Brexit, outlining the various ways in which the choice and preferences of the UK might impact on European security and the various institutions involved.

In the following section, specific security domains are scrutinized in shorter insight pieces and possible effects of both Trump and Brexit are discussed. Björn Fägersten investigates intelligence and counter terrorism and its future considering current trends, while Christian Mölling and Claudia Major take a look at future scenarios of European defence while. Dan Hamilton then looks at the area of societal security and resilience in Europe and its nearby locales. Finally, Sarah Backman then analyses the cybersecurity challenges facing Europe today and the way the current transatlantic turbulence affects cooperation.

In a final essay, Björn Fägersten considers implications for the future of EU-UK security relations, for the prized goal of European autonomy and the prospect for regional security cooperation in Northern Europe.

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Endnotes

1 The author would like to thank Brandon Mok for excellent research assistance and editing in preparation of this report.
4 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-trumps-trip-merkel-says-europe-cant-rely-on-us-anymore/2017/05/28/4c6b92cc-43c1-11e7-8de1- cec59a9bf4b1_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.e2a9f621b9b2
Contents

Essays
Trump's Jacksonian Foreign Policy and its Implications for European Security ................. 6
Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one..........................16

Insights
Intelligence: Safeguarding future cooperation.................................................................28
Defence and crisis management: Scenarios and future development .............................36
Resilience: Shared, and Forward.......................................................................................42
Cybersecurity: The effects of Trump presidency and Brexit..........................................48

Implications
Transatlantic turbulence – Implications for European security ........................................52
Trump's Jacksonian Foreign Policy and its Implications for European Security

Daniel S. Hamilton

The Domestic Roots of Trump's Foreign Policy

To understand what is likely to drive Trump, it is important to understand the domestic context in which he operates. Efforts to categorize him as isolationist or internationalist, hawk or dove, realist or idealist do little to help one understand Trump's domestic political base, which serves as the starting point to understand his foreign and security policies. After all, it's the politics, stupid.

Over the course of American history, four great political traditions have shaped the way Americans have tended to debate how their country should relate to the rest of the world.\(^5\) Two of these traditions – the Jacksonians and the Jeffersonians – look largely inward, whereas the other two – Wilsonians and Hamiltonians – gaze outward.

Trump owes his election to a surge of Jacksonian anger. Understanding these traditions, particularly Jacksonianism, is key to understanding Trump.

Wilsonianism is the tradition most known to non-Americans. It is rooted in the belief that the United States is a nation set apart by its values and principles, and that America best advances the cause of peace by spreading democratic values and institutions elsewhere in the world – including by force, if necessary. During the post-Cold War period, Wilsonians embraced the opportunity to work with allies and new democracies to enlarge the democratic space within Europe where war simply doesn't happen. They favored the enlargement of the European Union and of NATO. Wilsonians believe that multilateral organizations, codes of international conduct and initiatives such as arms control can extend such bedrock American
values as respect for human rights and the rule of law.
The Hamiltonian tradition is named after Alexander Hamilton, the America’s first Secretary of the Treasury. Hamiltonians believe that the United States has a profound interest in maintaining a relatively open, international trading and financial order. Hamiltonians are great-power internationalists who readily speak of the ‘national interest’ and ‘the balance of power’, and would fit most readily in the ‘realist’ category. Hamiltonians view open international commerce, framed by a predictable world order based on international law, as a potential cause of peace. These beliefs have led Hamiltonians to champion US efforts to ensure freedom of the seas, freedom of the skies, an open door for American goods, and an international legal and financial order that permits the broadest possible global trade.

The domestic alliance between Hamiltonians and Wilsonians – both of which look outward to the world – has been a powerful force in U.S. foreign policy, but it has not always carried the day. Two other traditions have also been influential, each of which are much more focused on the state of America at home than its position in the world.

One of these traditions is named after Thomas Jefferson, America’s third President and the principal author of the Declaration of Independence. Rather than acting on the crusading impulse of the Wilsonians to promote democratic revolutions abroad or on the Hamiltonian interest in constructing an ambitious global order, Jeffersonians believe that America is best suited to be an exemplar for others by fulfilling the democratic promise of its revolution at home. They argue that breathless talk of spreading liberty, democracy, freedom of speech, civil rights and civil society abroad ignores the daily reality that such principles are honored in the breach by racial segregation or discrimination against Americans and others at home. They insist that the American model will only be seen as relevant for other people when others can see that America’s model works for its own people.

Jeffersonians are not knee-jerk isolationists. They do not oppose peaceful commercial relations or mutually beneficial interactions with other nations. But they are preoccupied with the gap between America’s aspirations and its achievements. They believe liberty can be subverted as easily from within as from without. They fear excessive concentration of economic, military or potential power domestically as well as internationally. And they are worried that overstretch abroad can absorb needed resources for domestic challenges. They embrace America’s system of checks and balances, constitutional restrictions on excessive power and the role of the Congress in foreign policy. This translates into support for a limited foreign policy that defines US international interests narrowly. Barack Obama is at heart a Jeffersonian, and he presided over a coalition of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians.

Perhaps the least understood and most baffling of the four American traditions for Europeans – and the one where Donald Trump is most at home – is Jacksonianism, named for Andrew Jackson, the country’s seventh President, who in the 1820s upended the established political order by instituting universal white male suffrage, remade the party system and introduced mass electoral politics. Jacksonianism is more an amorphous expression of antiestablishment populist culture than an intellectual or political movement. Jacksonians are sovereigntists
who assert that the prime goal of U.S. domestic and foreign policy must be the physical security and economic prosperity of the American people. They are instinctively democratic and populist, and skeptical of domestic or foreign “do-gooding” (welfare at home, foreign aid abroad), which causes them to distrust federal authority, support a strong military, the death penalty, federal support for the middle class, and value highly the Bill of Rights – particularly the Second Amendment to the Constitution, which enshrines the right to bear arms as the ‘citadel of liberty’.

Jacksonians believe that Americans must remain vigilant and well-armed in a dangerous world. They are ready and willing to do whatever it takes to defend the United States. Jacksonians do not like limited wars for limited goals. Although they value allies and believe that the United States must honor its word, they do not believe in institutional constraints on America’s freedom to act, unilaterally if necessary, in self-defense. They share the Jeffersonian preference for selective or limited engagement with the outside world, but they are also least tolerant of Jeffersonian efforts to restrict or limit American power. They do not support free trade and are wary of the loss of economic autonomy implied by trade liberalization and economic interdependence. They are least likely to support Wilsonian initiatives for a better world, have the least regard for international law and practice, and are the least willing to support Hamiltonian strategies of balanced engagement.

The original "American First" movement formed in 1940 to keep the United States out of yet another European war; their influence was significant until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The modern expression of the Jacksonian tradition, the Tea Party movement, came to life about the same time as Barack Obama took office in January 2009. It encompasses an inchoate assemblage of individuals and groups that range from center right to the far fringes of American political life, but united under such slogans as "America first."

Jacksonians view European allies as potential value-added partners when it comes to confronting a hostile Russia or curbing Middle East security threats, but bristle whenever they perceive Europeans free-riding on American defense expenditures or acting to bolster the liberal order, help America’s enemies via trade or other means, constrain American sovereignty or freedom of action, or extend European ways to American shores.

**Trump’s Jacksonian Instincts**

If Hillary Clinton had become the first female president of the United States, she would have preferred to preside over a coalition of Wilsonians and Hamiltonians, much like her husband did – but the pull of the Jeffersonian tradition, as personified by both Barack Obama and Bernie Sanders, was very strong. In the end, she could not bring those three disparate strands together, and lost enough Jeffersonian voters to make the difference for Trump.

Donald Trump mainly succeeded, however, by tapping Jacksonian anger with his call to “build a wall” to keep out Mexican migrants, blasting free trade deals as "sellouts” to China and other countries, questioning the need for alliances such as NATO, and scolding European, Japanese and Korean allies as “free-riders” living off of the largesse of the American taxpayer. Trump’s victory...
has given voice and power to this American political tradition in ways that have mystified foreign observers. But the Jacksonian tradition has always reflected a significant minority opinion across the American political landscape. In Trump, Jacksonianism is experiencing an historical revival.

A Jacksonian foreign policy puts America first. It is unilateral at heart. It favors hard power over soft power. It seeks to shed burdens, not to share them. Jacksonians are not interested in the promotion of democracy or multilateral processes. Trump wants to slash U.S. support for the United Nations, gut U.S. development assistance, and abandon U.S. commitments under the Paris Climate Change accord. He is wary of the permanent bureaucracy in Washington, and is purposefully acting slowly to fill key administration positions. He will not support plurilateral trade deals, could start a trade war with China, and may challenge the WTO. He will boost U.S. military spending considerably. He wants to restructure and downsize the State Department. One casualty is likely to be the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, which means that such operations will fall almost exclusively to the Pentagon.

Instincts vs. Interests

Understanding the domestic roots of Trump's foreign policy also means understanding that domestic factors may also constrain some of Trump's more radical instincts.

First, other key officials in his administration, notably his national security adviser H.R. McMaster and his Defense Secretary, James Mattis, have a more conventional appreciation of U.S. interests and values, and how they must be protected and advanced in a world of diffuse power and intensified global competition. They have been able to temper the President's instincts with regard to NATO, Russia, China and the Middle East.

Second, the President is confronted by members of Congress – both Democrats and Republicans - who are fiercely committed to NATO, far tougher on Russia, far more supportive of Ukraine, and far less willing to gut key elements of U.S. foreign policy, such as the State Department or development assistance. President Trump has also run up against the power of the judiciary, which has blocked the most egregious aspects of his efforts to impose travel bans on foreign visitors.

Third, Trump must face the "Blob in the Swamp" -- the gaggle of Republican and Democratic former officials, media commentators, opinion writers and think tankers who largely oppose the main lines of his evolving foreign policy. President Obama's former speechwriter Ben Rhodes referred to this Washington establishment derisively as "the Blob," and President Trump was elected on a platform to "drain the swamp" of entrenched Washington interests. But the Blob in the Swamp has a hold on the media, the public, and elite opinion, and has been successful in casting a spotlight on some of Trump's more questionable activities, such as the nature of his campaign's ties to Russia, or possible conflicts of interest related to his business operations.

Finally, most Presidents have presided over a coalition of at least two of the four traditions outlined earlier. A Presidency, such as Trump's, that rests on support of only one of
those four traditions is unlikely to be sustainable over time, and Trump already faces considerable opposition from Wilsonians, Hamiltonians, and Jeffersonians alike, which is reflected in his low public approval ratings. This reality will limit his influence at home and frustrate his ambitions abroad.

These domestic considerations suggest that the foreign and security policies pursued by the Trump administration may ultimately turn out to be more conventional than his nationalist supporters hope or his critics fear. He has conspicuously failed to follow through on some of his most radical foreign policy pledges. He has not ripped up the Iran nuclear deal. He has not moved the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. He has switched from open hostility to the EU, which he likes to call "the consortium," to cautious support. He spent most of his campaign trail castigating NATO, only to embrace it shortly after his inauguration. He has not held a bromantic summit with Vladimir Putin. The outcome of the first U.S.-China summit of the Trump years turned out to be more conventional than Trump's campaign rhetoric had suggested. Trump's decision to unleash a volley of cruise missiles on Syria in response to the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons was roundly applauded by the "Blob in the Swamp", most of whom are united in the view that America’s willingness to use military power is crucial both to its global standing and to the stability of the world order.6

In short, Trump's policies may be tempered – but Trump himself will remain temperamental. Even as he has opened the door to a more traditional American engagement with the world, he has demonstrated a highly improvisational and situational approach that could inject a risky unpredictability into relations with friends and foes alike. Trump's about-face on the Assad regime demonstrates his volatile nature. “I like to think of myself as a very flexible person,” he has said. “I don’t like to say where I’m going and what I’m doing.”7 For these reasons, a clear "Trump Doctrine" is unlikely to emerge anytime soon.

**Implications for European Security**

This tension between temperance and temperament is likely to characterize U.S. foreign and security policy during the next four years. It suggests a continued U.S. commitment to NATO, including a forward U.S. military presence in Europe, but with greater pressure on European allies to step up their own efforts. It suggests greater burdens for America's European allies and partners, and raises the possibility that improvised responses to unanticipated events could roil relations in unpredictable ways.

While Jacksonians approach Europe from a very different perspective than Wilsonians, Hamiltonians or Jeffersonians, they share enough similarities to shape a core consensus about U.S. interests with regard to Europe.

First, there is widespread consensus that the United States has an enduring interest in a Europe that is hospitable to freedom and open to American goods, investments, and ideas. Jacksonians are far less willing than others to invest significant energy or resources to advance this interest, but they recognize that America's democracy is likely to be more secure in a world in which other democracies also flourish.
Second, there is widespread consensus that the United States has an interest in a Europe that is free of the kind of strife that drains inordinate resources from the United States and the rest of the world. Jacksonians would be the first to cheer if Europeans proved capable of resolving European conflicts on their own. Unfortunately, this has not proven to be the case, as demonstrated by the Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Georgian conflicts, the Balkan wars of the 1990s, and in America's military presence, its peacekeeping forces, and its efforts at reconciliation and reassurance that—at European invitation—continue today. All four traditions perceive Moscow's defiance of Europe's prevailing security order as challenging U.S. interests in a Europe at peace, even if they are at odds over what the United States should do about it.

Third, there is common agreement that the United States has a keen interest in a confident, capable, outward-looking Europe with which it can work to address a range of challenges that no nation can tackle effectively alone. While Jacksonians are reluctant to invest American energy or resources in global do-gooding, they are not averse to seeing other countries solve problems so that the American cavalry is not forced to come to their assistance in the end.

The Agenda for NATO and Partners

These core interests will continue to guide U.S. policies, although the Trump administration comes to the issues differently from previous administrations. The most important frame will be the Trump administration's approach to NATO. Trump, Mattis and Tillerson have emphasized two basic priorities in this regard. First, the administration wants each NATO ally to produce by the end of 2017 a concrete plan demonstrating how and when it will spend 2% of GDP on defense, with 20% allocated to the modernization of equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner capability shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control; air to air refueling; and air and missile defense. This will be the main take-away from the Summit, which is largely intended as a "get-to-know-you" event. Allied failure to agree to produce such plans by the end of the year, however, is likely to cause a serious rift with the administration and could prompt unpredictable reactions from the President.

Second, the administration wants to prioritize the fight against terrorism in its efforts. NATO has been engaged on this front, notably in Afghanistan, but will need to sharpen its terrorist-fighting message. It can do so by reinforcing the Warsaw Summit decision to continue with Operation Resolute Support, including pledges already extended for financial assistance through 2020. The Pentagon has already requested greater U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan for training and ultimately as a rapid response force. NATO can also put the anti-terrorist tag on its Warsaw Summit decision to boost cyber defenses and to put the concept of national resilience at the center of defense efforts. A third Warsaw Summit decision, on defense capacity building, can also be framed as an anti-terrorism initiative, with its emphasis on defense reform, training local forces, and defense education in countries like Iraq and Jordan. Beyond these areas, the U.S. is likely to underscore the need for the Alliance to develop a clearer southern strategy, with new tools to
implement it and a better understanding of how NATO can fit within the broad array of coalitions and groupings that are currently active fighting terrorism in Africa and the Middle East.

This raises difficult issues with NATO ally Turkey. Relations between Washington and Ankara are strained by many issues, including U.S. support for Kurdish groups fighting ISIS when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is fighting his own war with Kurdish separatists in Turkey.

Other important NATO issues are below the Presidential radar screen, which means that continuity, rather than change, is likely to be the watchword. The administration has reinforced its commitment to the European Reassurance Initiative of $3.4 billion annually, which has funded renewed U.S. forward presence in Europe, and to NATO’s Warsaw Summit initiatives, particularly forward deployment of NATO multinational battalions to the Baltic states and Poland. Two U.S. Brigade Combat teams are permanently deployed in Europe (in Germany and Italy). A third heavy U.S. Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is being forward deployed to NATO’s east on a heel-to-toe rotational basis. Equipment for a fourth U.S. BCT is also being forward deployed to Europe to facilitate reinforcement. Military exercises are near continual. The Ukrainian and Georgian militaries are receiving additional U.S. training. Continued congressional support for ERI will enable EUCOM to continue its contribution to NATO’s Air Policing mission, provide for additional anti-submarine warfare capabilities complementing maritime domain awareness assets in Iceland, and support rotational Marine units operating from Norway and the Black Sea region.

It is likely that the administration will continue U.S. efforts to implement other Warsaw Summit decisions, such as improving NATO’s situational awareness and decision making in crisis and advancing NATO-EU partnership. The U.S. believes the next priority for the Alliance is to enhance the readiness and sustainability of national Follow-on-Forces to deal with contingencies in the east, and to strengthen the command structure needed to manage such forces. These Follow-on-Forces, if deployed, would most likely face an Anti-access Area-denial (A2/AD) environment in which Russian combat aircraft, air defenses, submarines, anti-ship cruise missiles, special forces, space and cyber assets would make it difficult for NATO’s reinforcing units to arrive and operate.

The major uncertainty remains the administration’s approach to Russia. U.S.-Russian ties are arguably the worst since before the Gorbachev era. U.S. and Russian leaders share limited amount of interests and very different world views of what drives the international system. Despite Trump’s reluctance to criticize Russia and his hints that he might recognize Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and review Ukraine-related sanctions as ways to pursue warmer ties with Putin, administration spokesmen have stuck to more traditional approaches. Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Mattis, and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley have all called Russia’s claims on Crimea "illegitimate," stated that the U.S. will continue to hold Russia accountable to its Minsk commitments, and that U.S. sanctions against Russia will remain in place until Moscow reverses the actions it has taken there. They have also criticized
Russian activities in Syria and in Afghanistan, and Mattis has called out the Putin regime for "mucking around" in other people's elections – a particularly notable claim coming at a time when federal and congressional investigators are probing alleged Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections.

Trump's view of Putin has also evolved, and he believes that in the current atmosphere – with so much media scrutiny and ongoing probes into Trump-Russia ties and election meddling – it won't be possible to "make a deal," as the President himself has framed it. The best that may be expected is agreement to reduce the risk of inadvertent incidents that could lead to major conflict; to manage differences in ways that do not allow them to erupt; and to contain other potential disruptions from third issue areas.

As the administration's approach to Russia continues to evolve, it is likely to be influenced by a U.S. decision whether to supply lethal defense aid to Ukraine, for which there is strong support in the Congress, and debate over Russia's violation of the INF Treaty.

The U.S. has declared that Russia has deployed a land-based cruise missile that violates the spirit and intent of the INF Treaty. Prospects for Russia returning to compliance are not good. The U.S. is likely to respond strongly by accelerating the modernization of U.S. strategic delivery systems, including a new ballistic missile submarine, a new intercontinental ballistic missile, a new strategic bomber (the B-21), and a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile (the Long-Range Stand-off system, or LRSO) which will provide the U.S. with the ability to penetrate Russia's sophisticated air defenses. The U.S. is also likely to push ahead with plans to improve its air- and sea-launched conventional strike capabilities, including a conventional version of the LRSO. Finally, it is also likely to consider ways to make available to more allies and partners its Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM); the extended-range variant of the missile, JASSM-ER; and Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).

**Conclusion**

Americans and Europeans have become accustomed to consulting and often acting together to address unpredictable countries and crises in many parts of the world. Today, America and Europe themselves have become unpredictable partners. Disruptive change is not unique to the United States; Europe faces a conflation of crises – migration, terrorism, Russian aggression, Brexit, low and uneven growth, high youth unemployment and significant debt challenges in many countries, the cancer of "illiberal democracy" – that have unsettled European polities, economies, and security policies. On both sides of the Atlantic, the traditional political divisions between right and left have given way to divides between those seeking to open societies and reap benefits generated by greater international engagement, and those who want to shield and protect their societies from such forces, which they believe are disruptive and even subversive. The potential for sudden and unanticipated challenges will remain high for the foreseeable future, and will test the resilience of this transatlantic partnership.

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5 These traditions have been captured well by scholars such as Walter Russell Mead in his book *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, or David Hackett Fisher in his book *Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America*.


Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one

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Executive summary

In the realm of security and defense, Brexit is likely to reduce the Europeans’ political capacity to act.† However, their overall military capacity to act (that is, the European set of armed forces) is unlikely to suffer much.

Europeans have always managed their defense via various channels: nationally, in the EU, through NATO, and in smaller formats (such as bilateral relationships). Brexit will change the way these formats function and how they interact. There is the negative potential outcome that there will be greater political and military fragmentation in European defence. The divide between the EU as a security player and NATO as a defence actor might become stronger, which risks weakening the Europeans’ political capacity to act on the international scene, to impact upon international policies, and to shape regional order. To sum up, there is a risk that Brexit might create a more fragmented and inward-looking EU with less political unity and credibility. This potentially reduces their capacity to shape political developments. However, the military

† This analysis builds upon interviews with high level civil servants and think tankers from Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, conducted in March and April 2017.
capacity of the European states that is, their military power, is likely to suffer less. Given the limited role of the EU in the area, also Brexit is unlikely to change much. Overall, the question of how to organise the future relationship between a post-Brexit UK and EU member states will be crucial for efficient cooperation in European security and defence matters, be it bilaterally, in the EU or in NATO.

While Brexit is likely to negatively affect almost all EU policy areas (for example, in the form of more cumbersome regulations, economic repercussions, etc), security, and especially, defence are not likely to suffer much. First, because security and defence have never been one of the core competencies of the EU, it will be easier to disentangle the UK from the EU in this very area. EU structures in security and defence are less legally complicated and organizational ties are not so close between Brussels and other European capitals. Instead, defence and security have often been organized through alternative channels, many bi- and multilateral settings besides NATO. The only exception may be the defence industrial part, as this is a complicated part of the internal market, as well as of the intergovernmental Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) regime.

For the EU’s CSDP, negative impacts may include a theoretical loss of capabilities, a real loss of political power while a positive impact would be a gain in more effective institutional governance. While the UK has, on paper, contributed quite a lot of military capabilities, it has not brought these into play in the CSDP context. Instead, London has developed into a real stumbling block, even for capability development within the EU. Instead, the worrying effects are on the more general political level. On the one hand, the EU loses a player with a strong global mind-set, diplomatic and strategic skills and the willingness to shape international order. On the other hand, the changing balance of power within the EU also means that other countries will become more important and that alliances might shift. A new foreign policy may be focus more on Europe’s south and southern neighbourhood. Yet, a more diverse EU in foreign policy could also simply mean less EU in foreign policy. Eventually, Brexit will adsorb administrative energy and bind political power in domestic struggles and in ensuring political unity and compromise among the remaining 27.

The potential positive side effects of Brexit in the area of institutional governance will only be able to compensate for the other two developments if the ongoing incremental improvement of CSDP procedures and cooperation incentives can materialize in real projects that lead to real capabilities and power. So far, most of the current ideas are not convincing in this regard. However, the EU might initiate – via new research funds (European Defence Fund), review mechanisms (Coordinated Annual Review of Defence – CARD) and closer cooperation – better intra-EU governance and defence cooperation. As a result, Europe’s overall defence capabilities – that is, its single set of forces – would benefit. The states could use such an improved single set of forces in the EU as well as in NATO or other formats.

The remaining EU27 are willing to handle Brexit in defence pragmatically. This may change if the overall climate turns sour. Moreover, many are willing to use the Brexit as a positive catalyst to re-energize CSDP. However, this does not apply to all.
NATO might benefit from a greater UK commitment, because it is the last remaining format in which the UK can shape collective answers to common security problems, implement its “Global Britain” aspirations, and play a role as an international security actor. However, this also depends upon the UK’s capacity to maintain its defence budget. Again, one should not expect tectonic shifts. NATO itself has to manage the interests of 29 members. In addition, smaller formats, such as bilateral and minilateral cooperation, can benefit. This particularly applies to the Franco-British Lancaster House treaties. Among the currently existing multilateral formats, only few have moved beyond the level of rhetoric.

The remaining EU 27 states share at least two things regarding Brexit: they regret that the UK is leaving the Union, and they are all willing to find pragmatic solutions to organise the future cooperation of the UK with the EU as early and as close as possible. At the same time, only a few states (mainly the bigger ones) have started seriously preparing for the Brexit in defence.

The EU’s power will suffer more in terms of defence than in overall military power as a result of Brexit. This is because military power still results from national sources which are only loosely pooled in international organisations. Brexit could affect the role of the organisations more than the portfolio of the individual states. The division of labour could turn the EU into a defence facilitator and a security actor, whereas NATO will remain the operational defence actor.

**Brexit’s overall effect on European Security and Defence**

Brexit deeply affects the way Europeans organize their cooperation in almost all areas of politics. Brexit questions the very logic and hitherto accepted truths and myths of European integration: that it is irreversible, attractive to everybody, and only develops in one direction – deeper in each area that it governs and further in expanding the number of areas that it comprises. Brexit questions these ideas, which were valid for decades, and therefore has forced all European Union members to reconsider the EU’s role with regard to themselves and to Europe as a whole. Overall, there is a high probability that Brexit will negatively affect the UK and EU citizens alike, be it via economic repercussions, cumbersome work and travel regulations or the complication of military cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Yet, there is one area where the negotiations might be less fraught, and where the repercussions might be less dramatic or might show their effect only later – the area of security and defence. This is due to the particular nature of security and defence cooperation in Europe. Firstly, security and defence cooperation in the EU is less integrated than other areas (trade, agriculture etc.), which means that the UK and EU have fewer legal obligations and structures to disentangle.

Second, European countries have always managed their security and defence via various channels: nationally, in the EU, through NATO and in smaller multilateral formats. Thus, unlike other areas (such as the single market), countries have alternatives to EU cooperation when it comes to security and defence. This also means that limiting the potential effect of Brexit in security and defence to the EU’s CSDP would actually miss the point. To assess Brexit’s
effect on security and defence in Europe one has to look not only at the EU, but also at NATO and minilateral formats, too.

From a methodological point of view, assessing Brexit’s impact on security and defence raises various challenges. One major issue is to distinguish Brexit’s repercussions from those of other events, mainly the security policy of President Trump’s administration. Up to a certain degree, it is difficult to assess whether recent pro-European initiatives to deepen cooperation (such as in CSDP via a Headquarters or Permanent Structured Cooperation) that some member states call for are a response to Trump or Brexit or (most likely) to both.

Another challenge is the uncertain political environments of key European players. The future course of Brexit depends largely on the results of the elections in France (the new president Macron needs a parliamentary majority to implement his program: legislative elections will take place in June 2017) and in Germany (September 2017). The UK and EU members alike perceive Germany as a key shaper of the Brexit agenda. If the rather pro-European president Macron gets a stable government, Germany and France are likely to fiercely defend the European acquis and give the UK a hard time, as already visible in the Council conclusion of late April 2017.

Yet another challenge is the unpredictable economic development during and after the Brexit process. Economic problems will certainly affect the resources the UK can spend on defence, and hence its international commitments. Thus, any assessment on Brexit’s impact upon European security and defence is a snapshot, which might need to be reconsidered in the light of current and future developments.

Looking more into detail, Brexit is likely to affect the EU, NATO, and other format in the following way:

**Brexit’s effect on EU’s CSDP: a theoretical loss of capabilities, a practical loss of political power and a gain in institutional governance**

Contrary to the amount of discussion within the EU about the effects of Brexit on security and defence, most EU states assume that the negative consequences of Brexit in this area will *a priori* be limited for two reasons:

Because cooperation in security and defence is less important, developed and integrated than in other EU areas, such as the single market, trade or agriculture. The latter are supranationally organized, which means that the states have delegated their decision-making authority to EU institutions. CSDP, however, is intergovernmentally organised. This means that states did not delegate their decision-making authority to a supranational EU institution. There is no Commissioner on defense deciding in the name of all Europeans what to do. EU members still decide on a case-by-case basis, for example, whether to launch an operation, and they pay largely for it with national funds, instead of EU funds. Hence, disentangling the UK from the CSDP will be easier, simply because there are fewer legal obligations and common structures to leave. This also means that debates might be less contentious poisoned. This is at least the hope that countries like France and Germany maintain.
All states also agree that CSDP is not the major framework for their defense and security issues. No EU country heavily depends on the EU for its security or defence. CSDP concentrates on military and civilian crisis management and security, such as training security forces in Mali. Defence in a narrow sense – meaning the protection of populations, territorial integrity and of the functioning of the state - remains largely NATO’s task. Therefore, Brexit will only have very limited effects for most countries’ security plans.

**Likely repercussion on capabilities, political power and institutional governance**

The Brexit will affect CSDP in terms of capabilities, governance and policies. In military terms, Brexit means a serious capability crunch which risks damaging the EU’s credibility. A limitation in the EU’s military capabilities also limits the Union’s military aspirations, and thus affects its broader ambitions. The UK is a military power – one of only five EU states to have an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) able to command an operation, and it possesses high-end capabilities not many Europeans have, such as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance). On paper, the EU is losing the UK’s considerable military capabilities – which amount to about 20% of Europe’s overall capabilities and 25% key enablers – because of Brexit.

The EU-Europeans are worried about how to make up for the capability gaps the UK will leave. The smaller and medium sized countries (Hungary, Poland) seem to be particularly worried about the shortfalls in practical operational capabilities, intelligence and counter terrorism, and the effect on Europe’s overall strategic autonomy.

The bigger ones (Germany, France) seem to be less worried. Without the UK, it becomes ever more illusory for the EU states to meet the EU level of ambition (LoA) they agreed upon, that is, what the EU aims to be able to carry out in terms of operations. The LoA was already ambitious, but it the member states decided to increase the LOA even further with the new EU Global Strategy of 2016, despite knowing already about Brexit and the loss of military might it would yield. Theoretically, the EU should thus lower those LoA, as it can no longer count on the UK’s capabilities. Yet, it is unlikely the Union is going to accept it, as it would look like a step backwards. Yet, this is to some extent a theoretical debate: the UK has always been reluctant to put its defence power at the EU’s disposal. It actually blocked CSDP on different occasions, such as by vetoing an EU Headquarters and an increase of the EDA’s budget. In the last years, it did not launch meaningful initiatives, nor did it consider the CSDP a core channel for its security and defence policy. Although it contributed personnel and equipment (such as to Northwood HQ for the EU Operation Atalanta), these contributions were disproportionately small compared to what the UK could have done with its military capabilities at hand.

The real and negative impact may be the one on the EU’s weight in general foreign policy and its strategic culture. The existing balance of power within the EU’s CSDP might also change. With Brexit, the EU loses the UK’s voice, which had an important weight on the international scene. After Brexit, the EU and UK can of course support each other in areas of common interest in foreign policy. However, it will take time to develop a new partnership that
the outside world will perceive as a powerful EU-UK alliance. So far, the Brexit negotiations signal to the outside world that a contentious divorce is ahead, not a new powerful EU-UK couple.

Also difficult to assess will be the loss of strategic outlook for the EU due to Brexit. The UK brought a particular strategic culture to the EU, characterised by a global outlook and a readiness to intervene. It is difficult to measure the loss of such strategic thinking following Brexit. Yet, it is likely that it will not only affect the internal debates on what the EU should do, and how, but also the view that the outside world has of the EU. In fact, a reduced strategic outlook without the UK’s strategic culture might inhibit the CSDP but also the wider foreign policy power of the EU. External actors might perceive the EU as being less ambitious, more inward-looking, and less willing and capable to act on the global stage. Here, France in particular is torn between two positions: worried to lose a strategic ally, which is close to its strategic culture (closer than Germany, who is however, Paris’ most important European partner); and relieved to lose a country that traditionally resisted progress in EU cooperation.

While Brexit is unlikely to change the politics of CSDP, it might affect the balance of power within the CSDP and the foreign policy framework: new alliances will appear. With the UK leaving, other countries like Italy could play a more important role than before. This could also mean that southern perspectives in security and defence gain in importance; that is, the EU could become even more southern looking. Whereas central and Eastern European members, like Poland, tend to worry more about territorial defence in the East, southern Europeans are more concerned about the instability and terrorism at Europe’s southern border. At the same time, individual states can maintain a considerable blocking power. Thus, a more diverse EU in CSDP may simply lead to less CSDP in Europe. For the time being, especially for the smaller countries who have been traditional partners of the UK, like Poland and Hungary, Brexit means a major loss. Yet, they seem to regret rather the loss of a political partner than the loss of the UK’s capabilities in the CSDP framework. Other countries in the south and southeast see Brexit less as a problem: they are more concerned with their own security problems: migration and economic struggle – two things on which the UK did not show much solidarity.

Finally, there is a risk that Brexit might create a more fragmented and inward-looking EU. Not only will the implementation of Brexit occupy the EU and the UK for some time and might affect mutual trust. Both face domestic issues as well. The UK needs to deliver on Brexit promises while keeping the Union together (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland). The EU has to avoid further centrifugal tendencies and define its future integration model, as the debates about differentiated integration show. It is likely to suffer from the political fallout from Brexit, that is, a lack of unity and doubts about the EU project as such. Yet, political agreement is the precondition for EU collective action. A Europe that is occupied with itself risks paying less attention to external threats and has less weight on the international stage. This is worrying in view of existing challenges and the uncertainty about the US commitment to European defence, which has questioned the viability of NATO and the EU.
Institutionally, the EU may improve its governance once the UK has left. While fundamental change is unlikely, stepwise modifications are already under way. EU states have already improved CSDP governance, such as by setting up a Military Planning and Conduct Capability for non-executive operations, a precursor for an HQ, in March 2017. Particularly interesting is the development of additional instruments, at the EU level, to support member states in better spending on and coordinating their defence activities. The Preparatory Action, launching €90 million for CSDP-related research, will start mid-2017 and will run until 2020. It could pave the way for a European Defence (Research) Budget under the EU Multiannual Financial Framework. Together with Coordinated Annual review of Defence -CARD, the Defence Fund (EDF) and possibly Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), if wisely implemented, these instruments could nudge the Europeans into more meaningful and efficient cooperation. France and Germany in particular see here an opportunity for CSDP to make a qualitative step forward.

However, the benefits of such new governance structures will only materialise if the states will use these institutions to effectively pursue security. For the time being, the institutional reorganization is more a theoretical exercise than a practical necessity: in the past, the member states prevented CSDP from becoming a real political actor, while still, furthering the procedures. Hence, even if the procedures were to improve, as long as EU member states remain reluctant to use the EU for their security political interests, things will not change much.

Brexit as an opportunity for CSDP

Although most countries (France, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Poland) regret Brexit because the EU loses a decisive player in the areas of security and defence, they claim that the EU should make the best of this unfortunate situation by developing CSDP further. With different levels of enthusiasm, EU member states agree that Brexit might be the badly needed opportunity to eventually improve the security and defence cooperation within the EU. After all, the UK had profiled itself as fiercely critical voice to closer EU defence cooperation and vetoed several developments.

France, Germany and Italy in particular openly admit that such a “new dynamic” approach amounts to “making the best out of a bad situation”: if the UK leaves, at least try to find some benefit at the EU level. They have found it by claiming that CSDP, without the UK’s opposition to it, might finally prosper. This explains the strong Franco-German commitment since June 2016 in launching bilateral proposals to improve CSDP, and also the Italian non-paper.

There have indeed been several initiatives, since the Brexit vote, to take CSDP to the next level. At the September 2016 Bratislava summit, states agreed to strengthen EU cooperation on external security and defence. At the December 2016 European Council meeting they focused on three priorities: implementing the EU Global Strategy in security and defence; the Commission’s European Defence Action Plan; and a follow-up of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, signed at the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit. In parallel, EU states exchanged non-papers on how to take the CSDP to the next level. Most states then rallied behind
the Franco-German ideas, which called to make better use of the treaties, such as by implementing Permanent Structured Cooperation, setting up a European Medical Command and starting a CSDP research programme. However, one needs to be cautious when identifying / qualifying these initiatives as new: most of those ideas date back to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty but the states were reluctant to implement them.

The hope that Brexit might allow to finally develop CSDP into a credible security and defence player might be over-optimistic and ignores at least three things. First, the UK is not the only country sceptical of the usefulness of the CSDP. Others have been comfortable hiding behind the UK and must now speak up.

Second, current proposals mainly target institutions and governance procedures. Although they may improve CSDP’s practical work, such as an HQ in the area of planning, they do not address the political problem of a lacking support from the states. CSDP’s main problem is that Europeans have a proven alternative for defence – NATO. Hence, there is little pressure to set up and agree on a defence policy within the EU. CSDP’s limited success is not only due to the British block on structural development. It results from a lack of trust of the Europeans in the capacity of the EU to deliver on defence. Moreover the EU has been ambiguous about the role of defence: The 2016 EUGS plays with the word by using it throughout the whole text, yet, the deeds are still missing.

Third, France and Germany are decisive in taking the EU forward. It remains to be seen how the elections in both countries and the new governments will take up this responsibility.

**Brexit and NATO – potential beneficiary**

The UK leaves the EU, but not Europe; security problems in and around the continent will hence still affect Britain. However, if after Brexit the UK can no longer shape collective answers to these challenges inside the EU, it is likely to turn to other formats. All states expect NATO to benefit from the Brexit, although they differ in their expectation on how big this benefit will be. Smaller states expect bigger benefits, hoping that the UK will refocus their capabilities on the Alliance (Hungary), France and Germany do not expect major change. Thus, NATO can benefit, as it will be the only defence forum in Europe in which the UK can still play a role, and which would allow London to underpin its “Global Britain” ambitions called for by Prime Minister Theresa May.

Several countries, like France and Germany fear a political UK overinvestment in NATO; which might lead to commitments that not all allies share, such as those to Syria and Iraq, or just hectic activism with many initiatives. They are also worried that the EU-NATO relations might suffer. Although they see them on a good track since the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration at the NATO summit in Warsaw, they fear that implementation, such as regarding the cooperation on cyber issues and resilience, might suffer if the climate in the EU would be negatively affected due to unpleasant Brexit negotiations. Such a strained atmosphere could generally affect NATO’s political cohesion, which remains the crucial precondition for political agreement and
military action. They are also worried that the issue of finding a way to associate the UK with the EU might open other dossiers: how to associate a non-EU but NATO member to the EU re-opens the Turkish question, which Cyprus and Greece are likely to block.

Other countries, particularly smaller and medium sized like Hungary and Poland, welcome a stronger commitment of the UK within NATO but fear that the London has other interests: a “global Britain” might be less interested in territorial defence in Eastern Europe, and more in global affairs outside the continent. Even more, if the UK engages in global security with more solid commitments outside the Alliance, there will be less capacities available for NATO.

The UK has already voiced its intent to strengthen its commitment in the Alliance, yet without specifying what this means. It stresses its unique position as a nuclear power, a close US ally, a member of the Quad and a country ready to use military force. So far, London has increased its personnel in NATO and aims to take a political lead. It also refers to its contributions to NATO’s deterrence and defence measures, such as the role as lead nation within NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Yet, London made these decisions prior to Brexit; they can thus hardly serve as a token of a new commitment.

Besides, a stronger military role cannot be taken for granted: If the Brexit process affects the economy, the UK’s ability to achieve its LoA and maintain its capabilities – as set out in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review – will suffer. Even if the UK sticks to the 2% of GDP spending goal for defence, there will be less money if the overall GDP shrinks. If the pound loses value, procurement abroad will be more expensive, planned capabilities could become unaffordable, or the timing and numbers of procurement could change. Finally, if the UK’s unity were to be questioned from the inside, such as through another Scottish independence referendum (as requested by Scotland in March 2017), budget priorities might shift. Therefore, it is not certain that the UK can implement its greater NATO commitment into facts.

There are other limits due to NATO’s special nature as an alliance of 28 states. In fact, NATO has experienced even more than the EU how difficult it is to find agreement. A strained atmosphere due to difficult Brexit negotiations will not help. In the Alliance, it is typically the US that forces the allies into an agreement – which is something that all allies recognise (without always appreciating it). In addition, decision-making has become so cumbersome at 28 that the Quad (US, UK, France, Germany) tends to prepare decisions that the other allies then mostly accept. Brexit does not change this pattern. The change might actually come from the US. Certainly, despite Trump’s critical stance on the Alliance, US commitment on the ground has not changed. But the lack of US interest in NATO, and in exerting leadership within NATO, is affecting political unity in the Alliance. It might make it more difficult to get all allies to agree on decisions, to tame internal disputes, such as about Turkey’s role, or the south-east divide.

Nevertheless, there is a certain chance that NATO could benefit from a potentially stronger UK commitment. The Alliance could gain in importance as a platform for debates, policy, and capability development.
among Europeans. In an ironic twist, although it weakens the EU, Brexit could thus strengthen the European pillar in NATO.

**Brexit effect on bi- and multilateral formats**

The second potential beneficiary is the bi- and multilateral defence cooperation frameworks outside the EU and NATO. This applies in particular to the Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties, launched in 2010, which set up large-scale cooperation in various areas reaching from the nuclear realm, capabilities, up to industrial issues. Both states confirmed their wishes to deepen this link, such as by launching specialised Centres of Excellence for missile technology in 2016. Moreover, both countries share an ambitious and outward-looking strategic culture and rely on each other for issues such as the fight against the so-called Islamic State. According to France, Lancaster House will of course continue and deepen, as set out. Yet, there does not seem to be a stronger push due to Brexit – instead, there has been a “carry on” approach.

Also the UK and Germany aim to intensify their cooperation, such as in cyber security and maritime patrol. Yet, Germany makes it very clear that this should in no way affect EU commitments.

In terms of multilateral formats, the UK aims to revive its cooperation in the Northern Group, which comprises northern European countries, including Germany. So far, it mainly exists only in rhetoric. London also aims to further the Joint Expeditionary Force, which consists of Denmark, the Baltics, the Netherlands, and Norway.

These frameworks have even more appeal because they can serve as a link for the UK into the EU, and possibly as a way to channel some UK interests into EU debates. Cooperation in small groups seems easier, yet the question is whether these groups risk undermining the EU and NATO in the long term, or act as a facilitator for decision shaping and taking in bigger format like NATO (where decision-making is cumbersome), and transmission belt for various ideas.

**A surprisingly united European approach**

Interestingly, the European countries under study here mostly agreed in their analysis on what Brexit might mean for the EU and NATO, what the consequences might be, and how one should react. There is no outright disagreement on anything, but there remain subtle differences in their understandings and willingness to implement changes. The main differences lie in the priority that EU countries give to Brexit, their level of commitment to CSDP and the expectations they have regarding the UK’s future role in NATO.

A second noticeable difference lies in the stage of preparation: While the bigger countries like Germany and France have already made up their mind about the defence and security implications, others either did not have the capacity, or felt that it would have been the wrong timing, especially in view of the French elections. Southern Europe, for example, does not give Brexit much of a priority. This might also be because for most EU-countries, the crucial issue within Brexit is not security and defence but trade and the future conditions of their citizens in the UK. Poland, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands underlined the importance to
find a solution to their citizens living in the UK.

All countries under study here agree in that they regret the UK’s decision to leave, and recognise that CSDP loses (in capabilities, strategic culture), but maintain that the EU should try to make the best of it. However, not all share the idea that this would best be done by launching new initiatives within CSDP. All suppose that the UK might need to make up for the loss of policy shaping capacity in the EU by a stronger commitment in NATO, yet they differ in their assessment on how much difference this will eventually make in the Alliance, and how this will affect the EU-NATO relationship. While some expect the UK to play a more prominent role in NATO (Poland, Hungary), other expect not much of a change because the NATO structures hardly allow for it (France).

In view of the future relationship, most countries agree that it is in the interest of both partners (EU and UK), to quickly find a pragmatic solution. According to countries like Hungary, France, Germany, and Poland, the UK should not be able to veto any EU development, but should be associated with the EU as early as possible in order to get London to participate in EU security action (from which London would also benefit). Most countries insist on the pragmatic aspects of the future relationship, because they recognize that a formalisation might open the thorny issue on how to deal with those states who are NATO members, but not EU members (like Turkey).

One difference lies in the assessment about how much will change, within the EU, once the UK has left. Here, Italy seems more concerned about the repercussions on the defence industrial realm than the other states. It fears that its defence industry, elements of which are closely linked to UK industries, might suffer. Likewise, Italy expects that the political balance of power might shift in two directions: First, Italy might get a stronger voice in CSDP (and the EU as such) than before, possibly forming a new “big three format” with France and Germany, thereby filling the place the UK is emptying. Second, CSDP might turn even more than now to the South, given that credible northern voices in the EU are lacking, for the countries in the north of Europe whether left CSDP (UK, Denmark), or are cautious (Sweden).

Thus, for the time being, the preparation, definition of preferences and setting is differently developed. However, there seems to be agreement among many smaller EU countries that they expect Germany and France to take the lead in the Brexit negotiations and the EU’s future development.

**Outlook: the EU as a defence facilitator**

Overall, because of Brexit, it is not so much Europe’s military capacity that will suffer, but rather – as a result of political disunity - its political capacity to shape regional order. The main challenge for the Europeans, both in the EU and NATO, is to avoid a poisoned atmosphere of revenge, and to assure political unity – which is the ultimate pre-condition for action, be it imposing sanctions on Russia or stabilizing the neighbourhood in the South or East. In addition, the Europeans should seek to avoid a likely increase in bilateral and multilateral formats that will affect the functioning of EU and NATO. While negotiations among 27 or 28 governments are far more cumbersome – the
power of a consensus of 27 States is by far stronger than any bilateral consensus.

In fact, it is very likely that Brexit will lead to a further differentiation of tasks between NATO and the EU. This is what most countries hinted at when underlining the importance of NATO for defence, and of the EU for crisis management. Rather than creating a defence capacity inside the EU, the future development steps of CSDP are likely to increase crisis management capabilities and capability cooperation, whereas NATO will stick to its (operational) defence tasks.

Moreover, and here comes a novelty – if not a defence actor, the EU might develop into a defence facilitator – which would be a tremendous step. If the EU – via new research funding (European Defence Fund) with financial incentives for cooperation, coordinated planning (such as CARD), closer cooperation (PESCO) and the opening of defence markets – were able to support capability development, Europe’s overall defence would benefit. It is up to the states to decide where they would use such an improved single set of forces, in the EU or in NATO (and the UN, for that matter).

The main challenges for the UK-EU relationship will be to define the UK’s role and to re-think European defence. First, for the CSDP, the existing third-party agreement (from which more than 40 non-EU states benefit) offers a starting point for future UK contributions. It allows non-members to join EU operations but gives them next to no role in their design. It might be worth considering offering the UK a special status to involve them in planning processes earlier in order to provide incentives for UK contributions. A regular EU-UK dialogue would allow for common ground on operations, industrial and capability cooperation to develop, which would be of mutual interest. NATO would also benefit from a functioning EU-UK relationship, as it would ease the implementation of the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration.

Second, the next step is to conceptually re-think European defence. Most Europeans tend to link the solutions to their security problems to institutions – mainly the EU and NATO. However, both have limitations. NATO remains a military alliance. Crucial tools that deal with non-military threats remain with the EU or the states. The CSDP offers a contribution to security, but key instruments lie with the Commission and the states. It is hence misleading to ask which institution will organise European defence. The key questions are how Europeans can ensure effective defence and how they will identify the needed capabilities to protect populations, states, and borders. The importance of institutions lies in the bundling of forces and ideas, and fostering agreements where necessary. The states’ role is to ensure the coordination between the various formats, and to offer political leadership.

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Intelligence cooperation is not only a field of cooperation in its own right, but also a necessary contribution to areas of joint action such as crisis management, counter-terrorism and strategic planning. Both the US and the UK are strong intelligence actors and have been influential in shaping European intelligence cooperation. How does the current transatlantic turbulence of President Trump’s foreign policy and Brexit effect on this cooperation and its future development?

Importance of intelligence for European security

Access to correct and sometimes exclusive information is considered a force multiplier for any security actor. Information power helps create more targeted policy and efficient operations. For a collective actor made up of autonomous members, commonly shared information lays the ground for joint action. The push towards ‘strategic autonomy’ in EU doctrine, in this sense, depends on production of and/or access to autonomous European intelligence. Apart from the need for common intelligence in Brussels, EU member states are in need of shared intelligence in order to fulfil their national security responsibilities. Organised crime, terrorists and foreign agents of influence are transboundary actors and can only be stopped with transboundary intelligence work. Current events thus suggest a strong and growing need for tighter European intelligence cooperation. And if history offers any pointers, similar needs for intelligence have in the past translated into deeper cooperation. The abandonment of internal bor-
ders in the EU prompted German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to push for what later became the Europol agency. The perceived threat of Islamic terrorism – and the need to be able to produce an independent picture of this threat – called for tighter security service cooperation in the Counter-Terrorism Group format following the 9/11 attacks. And increasing levels of foreign policy ambition on behalf of the EU motivated the build-up of what is today the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (IntCen). Hence, intelligence is already important for the EU, and all the factors that earlier have strengthened cooperation – the level of threat, internal policy development and the relation to other intelligence players – remain valid today, which suggests further deepening of cooperation. But how can and will this play out in an era of transatlantic turbulence? As will be discussed below, because both the US and the UK have been instrumental in shaping European intelligence cooperation, current political processes in both countries will most likely affect the development of future cooperation.

The role of UK and US in development of European intelligence cooperation

In the areas of foreign and security intelligence – the work of international-oriented intelligence agencies and domestic security services respectively – the US has played an important role as an instigator of intra-European cooperation. The anxiety over the relative intelligence dominance of the US over Europe that was showcased in the First Gulf War and the Balkan Wars catalysed early moves towards intra-European intelligence cooperation. Following the terror attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the US put considerable pressure on Europe to deliver in the field of counter-terrorism, which accelerated intelligence cooperation among European security services – both as a way to be a more relevant partner to the US and as way to produce a more independent assessment of the terrorist threat. Hence, the idea that Europe is only able to exercise a common as well as somewhat autonomous foreign and security policy only if it has access to its own threat analysis and intelligence has been an important driver for cooperation. Instances where US intelligence activities have been seen as running counter to European interests – painfully illustrated by NSAs tapping Angela Merkel’s phone – have further highlighted this perceived need for more potent European intelligence capacities.

The UK has also played a key role in the development of European intelligence, although from the inside of the EU. When the first High Representative of EU foreign policy – Javier Solana – informally queried the member states for intelligence analysis in order to make progress on his new post, it was the UK that took the lead in the development and management of intelligence sharing. In the area of criminal intelligence – shared within Europol – the UK has over the years become a main contributor. The agency is also currently managed by a British person. According to a recent estimate, around 40% of data traffic through Europol comes from the UK or concerns the country and the UK police carry out 250,000 searches of Europol databases each year.9 The UK has also been vital in shaping the overall approach in the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs field by pushing for the method of intelligence-led policing.10
In sum, both the US and the UK have been central in shaping the development of European intelligence cooperation. Considering the range of current security problems in and around Europe such cooperation will be essential for the Europeans when developing their security policy. How can the transatlantic turbulence of Brexit and the Trump presidency impact such cooperation and what can be done to mediate the effects of these geopolitical developments?

Trump, trust and transatlantic intelligence cooperation

A central element in any exchange of secrets is trust. Trust can be conceptualised as the willingness to let your guard down even when this entails a risk – a trusting relationship is one where Actor A trusts Actor B to manage her interests and expects Actor B to “do the right thing”. The most obvious risk to transatlantic intelligence cooperation is the breach of trust among partners. On the most overarching level, such lack of trust can be the cause of general political divergence. Trump has shown little interest in the rules-based, egalitarian international system facilitated by multilateral institutions – known as the liberal world order. If Trump’s lack of goodwill towards this system is also a symptom of America’s increasing disdain for it, then allies will, over time, cease to trust the US to “do the right thing”. The recent Canadian decision to spend more on defence in order to compensate for faltering US global leadership is an indication of such logic.

One is President Trump’s carelessness with secret information, and his disdain for US and allied intelligence services. During a May 10 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak, the President Trump disclosed intelligence about the Islamic State which the US had received from Israel. The incident provoked the Israelis to adjust their intelligence sharing protocol, which might impact the level of cooperation between the partners. Earlier in 2017, the Trump administration had given voice to the idea that the British signals intelligence agency GCHQ – the Government Communications Headquarters – had spied on President-elect Trump on behalf of the then President Obama. This provoked a rare public reaction where British intelligence stated that these accusations were “utterly ridiculous and should be ignored”. To this one must add President Trump’s own conflicts with various US intelligence agencies over their management of the lingering issue of Russian involvement in the US election. The net effect of this is that US intelligence allies – in Europe and elsewhere – cannot assume that their secrets are safe with the US President and that their US partner agencies may not have enough influence to discipline President Trump on intelligence modus operandi such as the third party rule. The relationship between the Trump administration and Russia currently under scrutiny aggravates this risk, especially for US allies that have intelligence activities directed towards Russia.

From a European perspective, this lack of trust is most likely to have an effect on high level bilateral intelligence sharing. Firstly, because of the sensitive nature of the intelligence that is shared in these formats, high level bilateral intelligence sharing is more
dependent on a trusting relationship. Secondly, bilateral intelligence sharing relations are managed closer to the respective administrations and so are more exposed to political decisions and moods. This is in contrast to multilateral sharing, such as within NATO or between the US and the EU via Europol, which is less sensitive and takes place in far more institutionalized settings with several layers of bureaucracy adding distance to politically-elected parts of national administrations. In sum, eroded levels of trust as well as policy divergences on issues such as Russia and the Middle East risk raising the threshold for what intelligence is shared in the transatlantic relation with sensitive bilateral relations being more at risk than data shared through multilateral venues.

A knock-on effect of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda is the prospect for tighter intra-European cooperation that it might trigger. This could happen in a direct and an indirect fashion. As a direct effect, European nations could choose to increase intelligence sharing in order to compensate for a more strained transatlantic intelligence-sharing climate. This seems unlikely as intelligence relations between European countries and the US have not yet degenerated substantially, and Europeans would be hard pressed to compensate for the intelligence the US offers. In an indirect way it is more likely to see an effect. As has happened before in times of transatlantic divergence, the Europeans are likely to respond to President Trump’s foreign policy by stepping up their own foreign and security policy cooperation. This trend is accelerated by the British choice to leave, which means both that a brake on integration has been lifted and that the remaining EU member will want to show that the integration project still has momentum. The recent push towards Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the development of a planning facility for military training missions, and the establishment of a new defence fund for research and acquisition are a few examples of this development with further steps having been promised. While there are several other causes to this, there is no doubt a “Trump”-factor driving development at the moment. 

Internal policy development within the EU has been one of the main drivers of previous efforts to strengthen European intelligence cooperation and there is no reason to assume that this should not be the case also this time. Indeed, the confluence of current trends – budget needs, increasing threat levels, internal EU strategy development, the need and possibility to showcase momentum in the face of Brexit, as well as worries over American commitments to European security – make security policy development with increased intelligence requirements very likely.

**Brexit and the future of Anglo-European intelligence cooperation**

Security cooperation in general, and intelligence cooperation in particular, have been suggested as one of the UK’s strongest hands in the Brexit-negotiations. It was also explicitly mentioned in Theresa May’s notification of Brexit to the European Council where she hinted that ‘a failure to reach agreement would mean our cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism would be weakened’ which in some quarters was interpreted as blackmail. Whatever her intentions, this interpretation is not unreasonable, considering the involvement of the UK in several EU venues for intelligence cooperation and the way this cooperation could
be affected by Brexit. The UK is one of the top three contributors to Europol where intelligence is shared among national police forces and joint analysis is conducted.\textsuperscript{19} The UK has been a driving actor in establishing a pragmatic intelligence exchange in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy which takes place within the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EUINTCEN). It also participates in the security service cooperation CTG (the Counter Terrorism Group – which functions outside of the EU but feeds analysis into the Union and supports its decision) and policy-making. Compared to other areas affected by Brexit that might be more of a zero sum game – such as budget contributions and financing of joint projects – intelligence cooperation in the forums above are more akin to a positive-sum game.\textsuperscript{20} Europol Director Rob Wainwright argues that cybercrime, people smuggling, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking are areas where the UK would struggle to maintain the current operational efficacy if it left the agency.\textsuperscript{21} Even with a partner arrangement with Europol similar to those established by US and even Denmark, the UK would lose the capacity to do direct searches in Europol’s databases, which would severely hamper the speed of police work. Likewise, the EU27 would lose out in several areas if cut off from UK intelligence and analytical expertise. The same can be said about intelligence work within the EU INTCEN. This is obviously an area where the EU27 benefits from the UK’s global intelligence presence and resources. However, it is also a way for the UK to gain access to niche analytical competences of partner countries, as well as an effective means to influence European policy making.\textsuperscript{22} This discussion only relates to the multilateral bodies for cooperation that would suffer from Brexit. In a darker scenario, where Brexit leaves the UK and continental Europe on different and diverging geopolitical tracks the consequences would be worse and would also impinge on bilateral intelligence cooperation. If, as an example, the UK would side with the US administration on policy in the Middle East and actively try to work against common European positions, that would obstruct intelligence cooperation top down, according to the same logic discussed above in the US case. Another effect that goes beyond the functioning of current cooperation arrangements is that a more independent UK cut loose from EU supervision might develop an even more relaxed view on the work and mandates of its intelligence agencies. A recent ECJ preliminary ruling on the legality of the GCHQ’s bulk interception of phone call records and online messages illustrates the role hitherto played by the EU.\textsuperscript{23}

The fact that a “hard Brexit” in the intelligence field would be a clear negative for everybody involved and that thoughts of protecting its reputation means that the UK is unlikely to use security as a bargaining chip means that pragmatism, instead of emotional desires to inflict repercussions on either side, will hopefully drive future developments in this field. The different fields of intelligence cooperation explained above come with different challenges when it comes to post-Brexit cooperation.

In the case of Europol, the main hurdles are likely the role of the European Court of Justice and budget contributions.\textsuperscript{24} While budget contributions to future cooperative ventures can be managed in a variety of ways and thus are easier to manage, the role of the ECJ is difficult to work around. The ECJ has an oversight role over data protection rules – for example, it invalidated the
EU-US Safe Harbour agreement due to concerns over the quality of US measures to protect the personal data of Europeans. It is also the mechanism of arbitration between partners, for example when using the European arrest warrant. Here, the EU27 and the UK will either have to find alternative legal ways to safeguard data routines and compliance or the UK will have to accept a limited role for the ECJ. Whatever path is chosen, agreement is made easier by the fact other sectors as well – such as future trade with the EU27 – will demand high levels of data protection rules in the UK. It should also be mentioned that the UK already has chosen to opt-in twice in Europol so it clearly sees benefits of current cooperation. As long as these budgetary and legal aspects will find a solution, the EU27 would be well-advised to incorporate managers and analysts from the UK and to find a bespoke arrangement allowing them direct access to each other’s databases in order to maintain current levels of interaction.

In the case of intelligence in support of foreign and security policy, a similar solution is to allow the UK to keep staff within the IntCen, who could then feed intelligence into the system and take part of the joint analytical products is possible. This arrangement might be easier since the IntCen have a history of both informality (it was originally a private office of EU High Representative) and hierarchy (not all member states was invited to participate at the start). The risk here is that the push for tighter intelligence cooperation will over time result in a more formal “agency-like” function in which it will be more difficult to design a bespoke UK presence. In light of this, further development of intra-European strategic intelligence cooperation should rather be designed in a PESCO-like cooperation among devoted member states that wish to take cooperation to a new level, rather than a heavily institutionalized federal structure that might not deliver obvious cooperative gains. That would allow for British cooperation not only at the current level of integration but also participation in its future development.

Finally, the counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation within the CTG will be largely unaffected by Brexit. Indeed, the CTG (and the more general cooperation framework of the Club de Berne) offer a beneficial framework for post-Brexit intelligence cooperation. It is decentralised (and thus less sensitive to changing political moods) and does not function under any supranational control function such as the ECJ. However, it still influences European policy and strategy making by several links into the EU system. From the UK’s perspective, this offers continuity as its membership will not be affected by Brexit while it will allows a back door through which to influence the EU on matters such as counter-terrorism. Two possible effects will be important to consider in relation to this. First, the European Commission has repeatedly tried to integrate the work of security services into the EU. Their lack of success in doing so is now a benefit of this cooperation but member states should be wary that these ambitions might resurface in times of intensified European security cooperation. Keeping the CTG out of formal EU structures makes it easier to keep the UK in these European counter-terrorism efforts. Second, the effort to establish Europol as the main actor within European counter-terrorism efforts have been obstructed by the fact that much of the intelligence need for this task is in the hands of security services, not in those of
the police agencies cooperating within Europol. Much has been done to increase cooperation between these professions with some success, although legal as well as cultural barriers still impede cooperation. The combination of the UK becoming less involved in Europol while simultaneously focusing more on the work within the CTG carries the risk of increasing fragmentation in the European counter-terrorism field. Such a development would be harmful as successful cooperation between security services and police agencies are essential for successful counter-terrorism measures. The solution here is to align the UK closely to the work of Europol to preserve also cross-sectoral cooperation among security services and police forces.

Conclusion

This analysis has shown that different forms of intelligence cooperation play an important role in European security, and that both the US and the UK have been influential in the development of intelligence cooperation. The agenda and actions of President Trump risk undermining common interests and erode the level of trust that underlies intelligence cooperation. Even though strong and common interests suggest that cooperation will be continued, the UK’s departure from the EU will threaten cooperation on a number of intelligence areas. Both President Trump’s actions and Brexit have given momentum to the strengthening of European security cooperation which will likely also spill over into stronger intra-European intelligence cooperation. In such a case, it is important that future intelligence cooperation in Europe is designed in order to allow for UK participation without risking fragmentation of such cooperation.

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15 Implying that it is up to the originator of shared information to decide on dissemination to third parties.

16 Strömvik, Maria (2005) To act as a Union. Explaining the development of the
EU’s collective foreign policy. Lund University Press.


20 Other areas of intelligence cooperation are clearly more transactional, where information is offered in a quid pro quo fashion, but such intelligence trading is mostly reserved for bilateral, not multilateral, relations.


22 Fägersten, Björn. Intelligence and decision-making within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (2015:22epa)


24 For a good overview, see Camino Mortera-Martinez 2017 "Good cop, bad cop: How to keep Britain inside Europol" CER, London


26 In 2014 and 2016, see "Statewatch analysis - The UK opt in to pre-Lisbon EU criminal law by Steve Peers, Professor of EU Law and Human Rights Law, University of Essex Introduction" for background

27 Fägersten 2015.

28 The Club de Berne is a long-standing cooperation arrangement between European security services with a broad agenda covering issues such as counter-intelligence and internal security. The CTG is a spin-off that brings together a similar clientele for joint work on Islamism terrorism.

Defence and crisis management: scenarios and future development

Claudia Major
Christian Mölling

This short paper looks into how defence and crisis management in Europe are affected by the new US administration and Brexit. It turns out to be a rather complicated equation: We have to look into the tripolar political relationship between the UK, the US and Europe/the EU. The move of one pole closer to the other affects the relative relations between all poles. At the same time, the triangular relationship related to defence and crisis management implies that the overall external environment will heavily influence the development of the need for defence and crisis management, whether the US, UK or Europe like it or not.

We use the style of scenarios to offer spotlights on the causes that might drive these developments or their results. The objective is to raise awareness and stimulate thought on these matters rather than to generate fully coherent scenarios or even strategies on how to deal with the possible futures. These developments are not exclusive to one scenario: they can also mix or overlap. They can be seen rather as modules as far as their development is not connected to the tri-polar relationship – where every move by one has consequences for the other but modules that describe external developments that could happen in all of the scenarios.

Three scenarios outline possible futures and address the added value of transatlantic cooperation for European security. The following three key uncertainties define the content of the scenarios:
• The future of transatlantic relations, (how, in which constellation will both sides of the Atlantic continue to work together)
• The future role of the EU (What role will the EU play as a political framework for security and defence related issues, especially the question of whether it can institutionalize consensus among 27 states)
• As to the UK first, whether it will tend more to the US or the EU/the continent. This may well depend on the policy and incentives both sides can offer. Second, if the UK can still hold its level of capabilities or whether the Brexit effects will shrink the UK forces.

We assume that the security environment of Europe will deteriorate. This increases the need to do more and to spend more in security and defence.

The scenarios offer the following main lessons:

1. The meaning and the importance of crisis management and territorial defence can change rather fast. The distinction may become blurred and external operations more important than territorial defence – be it under a UN or US framework.
2. The question how crisis management and territorial defence will develop is less linked to sufficient military capabilities than to political unity within Europe, the relationship with the US, and the EU-UK relationship.

3. The industrial dimension plays a serious role: not because of high volumes in defence procurements but because many European countries are dependent on US supplies and cooperation and may look to change this if political ties deteriorate. In fact, many Europeans hoped to buy US commitment when buying US products.

4. A rift in the transatlantic partnership will expose the Europeans to the same risks as the US. But Europeans may find an alternative to the US support in political, military and technological areas. New partners of Europe do not have to be partners of the US.

5. Russia can be a strong factor only if the currently existing system of security institutions is weak – and the US actively weakens the order through bilateral deals that compromise on common security in Europe.

6. We may see a fast and serious decline of UK military power – which might mean it will no longer be able to operate East of the Baltic Sea and South of the Canary Islands.

7. China and the Middle East may soon be more important than Russia as strategic actors and crisis spots respectively. This might redirect attention, and turn it from Russia and the Northern region.

A rational deal: several crises drive the US back into cooperation with the EU but sidelines the UK

On Christmas Eve 2025, the US President declares the beginning of a new era in 300
year-long transatlantic relationship: “Brothers on both sides of the Atlantic have to stand together against the increasing threats around them”. On New Year’s Eve, leaders in Europe welcome this US overture and respond jointly in the form of a unified message issued by EU Council President Angela Merkel.

In 2020, the US entered into several conflicts in the Middle East. Cooperation with its local partners, with which the US sought to build a coalition, is getting increasingly difficult. The US needs increased legitimacy in the area, and hopes to gain it by persuading more Europeans to join the coalition Washington has set up. As of 2019, the Europeans are willing to send a unified force of 50,000 soldiers as a UN force into the former Syria to implement a regional peace agreement, which Russia backs. The EU is more directly affected than the US by the spillover effects from the violence in the Middle East and needs the US as a balancer in Asia especially to increase the costs of security for China and thus to slow down their economic power. Costs for operations and deterrence contributions lie where the fall.

The EU of 2025 has become more federalized after Brexit and its move towards a multiple-speed Europe (that is a Europe in which different countries of the EU integrate at different levels and pace depending on the political situation in each country). The multiple-speed Europe has established a two-class EU, the avant-garde which is highly integrated, and the second row or outer circle of countries who were not willing or able to join the first group. In fact, nobody wants to be part of the second class, as it smacks of being a loser. This has driven many countries to increase their national efforts and support for the EU. In return, more resources are being funneled back into the countries.

The only country not reacting to these developments is the UK. It was taken by surprise because its diplomatic staff, cut by 50% due to a budget crunch after Brexit, did not see the crisis coming and was unable to react. In fact, the devastating loss of value of the pound hit the country very hard in all areas. Public spending has been hit hard, especially the defence sector, which has had many of its projects stopped or abandoned again. As a result, the UK’s relevance as a military capability provider has shrunk dramatically. Before Brexit, it had provided 20% of overall European capabilities; in 2019 it only provides about 8%. Its contribution to the European pillar in NATO is a running joke in Europe. It thus had to give up commitments to its partners in Europe and the US.

Yet, as the (other) Europeans keep investing 2% of their GDP into defense, they keep alive the defense industry in Europe, which is even able to innovate in some areas. However, innovation in new areas like cyber is only possible with US companies. Here, at least some European companies (financially supported by the European Commission) have been able to successfully sideline classic US defense companies and strike deals on innovation partnerships with Silicon Valley actors.

**EU turns into a Fortress Europe and finds new friends**

Growing transatlantic political differences and a US that has exhibited a more transactional approach to the relationship have torn apart the EU member states and the US. The EU has started organizing security on its
own, rather than with the US. This has demanded tough political compromises and financial commitments, such as paying far more than in 2017 for security and defence. However, it has eventually been effective. After high casualty terrorist attacks in Warsaw and Rome, the EU member states agreed on more effective measures by setting up a central security agency, vamping up Frontex and launching a growing external security force – a type of European armed force.

Europe sees a growing need to use crisis management operations to fight terrorist networks already in Africa, but also in the Middle East as a kind of forward defense. Here, the EU clashes with the US which still plays a dominant role in the region: while the EU uses a comprehensive approach, the US backs a military heavy counter-terrorism strategy of the Middle Eastern countries based on head counts. The EU sees its approach undermined by the negative consequences the US approach has.

France has vamped up its nuclear force, providing a minimal deterrent with nuclear sharing across Europe. Costs for that as well as for operations are covered by an EU budget for those who pay 2% of GDP on defense and 50% into this EU budget. However, it is now under pressure from a US that now describes the EU as a growing risk to US security because the Union has acquired new nuclear weapons.

Other European countries like Norway and UK want to (re-)join as the EU has demonstrated such effectiveness and as the costs for being allied with the US is increasing in terms of resources (large defence acquisitions have to be US-built), and reputation (US poodle).

The EU cannot make up for the US investments in defence via the “defence innovation initiative” – the follow up to the 3rd Offset initiative. But it ensures a serious level of industrial base and technological autonomy through a 3% investment of GDP in security and defence. A buy European act is introduced. US companies who are part of the supply chain for European systems have to re-negotiate their contracts for European governments through the EU if they want to take part in future public procurement tenders. Especially, they have to allow technology transfer for those systems for which the Europeans have paid a share of the R&D. US companies find attractive offers from European governments and the EU. But they may have to fear negative reactions from the US side.

At the same time: As the US slides into a more isolated position regarding Europe, other partners around the globe become more attractive. To gain access to technologies and systems it no longer produces internally, the EU has included security and defence into its global trade agreements. It now buys some parts of its technology and components from South Korea and India in exchange for nuclear and green technology. It prepares for a major equipment deal on attack helicopters either with China or Russia. Joint exercises between Europeans, China and Russia take place.

**A split-up Europe meets a hegemonic US**

A scandal involving the French president has helped Marine Le Pen into the Elysée Palace earlier than expected. Her declaration of national independence from the EU has triggered the complete dissolution of the EU. While the economic union still exists,
the political union is history. This pushes the European security order based on institutions to shift over into a (military) power-based “concert of nations” type of order.

The US in 2022 has about 35 bilateral security agreements with European States. These include Article 5-like protection, that is, collective defence as it was previously enshrined in the Washington Treaty which in good old times set out the core promises of the now obsolete NATO. Collective defence means that an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies. The 35 new bilateral agreements have effectively hollowed out NATO’s political meaning and turned it into a coordination agency for US-European Equipment. Moreover, the countries have agreed to buy US equipment to ensure interoperability with US and other friendly forces.

The US –“foreign military sales” instrument tripled its turnover volume. Europe pays about 2% of its GDP for this. The US offers offsets to every country. European national industries participate in the production of parts in their countries. In some cases of larger European companies, these are allowed to produce for the US market and gain support by the US also for exports – with regulations in line with US ITAR-regulations. This way US companies make the rest of the European defence industry either American or turn them into elements of a production chain with US-companies on top.

Europe’s political leverage on the use of armed forces is limited. The US asks the Europeans to conduct missions in Africa, under the command of US AFCOM. Remaining gaps in capabilities are filled by the US. Dependence has its merits: in terms of security of supply and interoperability, the US will ensure harmonized standards. Moreover, the US offers the framework for cooperation. Hence, much of the costs incurred from political fights over the right framework just disappear. However, there are also downsides. The US will hold the key to the European national militaries. The leverage for the Europeans when it comes to operations is limited.

Yet, Moscow has followed both developments, the shifting political situation in France and in Europe as a whole, with huge interest. It now sees the window of opportunity opening to gain influence in Europe. It reactivates its old ties with the US president and proposes several bilateral deals, reaching from nuclear disarmament of IC-BMs to peace agreements in the Middle East. This honeymoon questions the Article 5 commitments in Europe and their counterparts in the bilateral agreements.

The UK (would) gain from this return of a concert as its relative power in Europe would increase. But its security would depend whether it makes it dependent on the US, on the Europeans, or on Russia.

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The notion of ‘resilience’ is gaining currency in European and Euro-Atlantic security policy discussions. The European Union, NATO and their respective member states are each building the capacity to anticipate, pre-empt and resolve disruptive challenges to vital societal functions. New energy is apparent in efforts to advance more effective NATO-EU cooperation in the field of resilience. But Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President raise questions whether current patterns of cooperation will prevail or be changed in some way.

At the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, allies agreed to a set of seven baseline resilience standards and made national pledges to meet those standards; they also each made a Cyber Defense Pledge to secure their national cyber systems. EU member states have similarly approved a strategy and implementation plan to counter hybrid threats, have created a Hybrid Fusion Cell, launched contractual public-private partnerships for cybersecurity, and signed codes of conduct with platform and social media companies to prevent radicalization. Resilience also features prominently in the EU's 2016 Global Strategy document. Moreover, in a 2016 Joint Declaration NATO and the EU committed jointly to "boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response."

These are positive developments that can and must be developed further, and work is
continuing to do just that. But there are questions whether and how such cooperation may change due to Brexit and the advent of the Trump administration.

Brexit has raised questions on whether the UK will continue resilience cooperation within EU channels, even though its NATO credentials will still remain valid. The spate of terrorist attacks in the UK in spring 2017 has reinforced the determination of UK authorities to address terrorist threats, including through continued strong cooperation with EU partners. The UK is likely to remain a key actor when it comes to advancing resilience -- at home and among societies abroad. When it comes to situational awareness and intelligence cooperation, however, the UK is more likely to turn to NATO channels than EU mechanisms. When it comes to multilateral intelligence cooperation, the UK is likely to invest with priority in NATO's Warsaw Summit decisions related to intelligence cooperation, including through creation of an Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence, rather than EU channels, which will remain uncertain throughout the Brexit negotiations, which are likely to be fraught and contentious.

The same goes for the United States. Despite uncertainties related to the Trump administration's approach to Europe, the current U.S. government has been clear about its commitment to the NATO Warsaw agenda, including its resilience component. President Trump has insisted that NATO do more in the fight against terrorism -- greater NATO focus on resilience can be one important answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and in particular the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), continue to be particularly active within NATO channels, working with allies and partners on good practice related to the baseline requirements, and helping to formulate an allied agenda with regard to resilience. To the extent that allies and partners can demonstrate that they are investing resources and attention to this aspect of the Warsaw agenda, they also underscore that they are addressing terrorist threats and carrying an important share of the common defense burden -- both important issues to the Trump administration.

Allies continue to be worried, however, whether President Trump is personally committed to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. When he attended the May 2017 NATO summit, he chose not to reiterate this long-standing commitment of the United States. In this regard, the current trajectory of NATO's resilience agenda could also be worrisome, because the Warsaw commitment to the seven baseline requirements has been justified under Article 3, rather than Article 5, of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 3, the so-called "self-help" provision of the Treaty, underscores that each ally's foremost duty is to ensure it can defend itself. This is of course a sine qua non of effective mutual defense. But by linking resilience primarily to Article 3, and creating an agenda in which the seven baseline requirements -- and resilience itself -- is treated on a country-by-country basis, rather than as a shared endeavor, the Alliance may have created an "Article 3 trap" for itself at a time when the U.S. commitment to the mutual defense premise of the Alliance is under question.

For this reason alone allies should consider how to emphasize the shared nature of resilience. But substantive reasons related to the
resilience challenge itself should further underscore the need to move along these lines.

Current efforts among allies and partners to build a resilience agenda should be understood only as first steps toward a more effective and comprehensive resilience agenda. State-by-state approaches to resilience are important, but insufficient in a deeply interconnected world. Resilience must be shared, and it must be projected forward.

No nation is alone in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats and disruptive hybrid attacks. Few critical infrastructures that sustain the societal functions of an individual country are limited today to the national borders of that country. Social cohesion within a given country can be affected by flows of goods, services, money, data, energy or simply people — whether refugees or radical elements who cooperate and operate across borders.

This means that traditional notions of territorial security must be supplemented with actions to address flow security - protecting critical links that bind societies to one another. Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must also focus on protecting their connectedness. This requires greater attention to shared resilience. None of NATO's seven baseline requirements for resilience, for instance, can be met without attention to shared resilience.

NATO and EU members also share a keen interest in projecting resilience forward, since robust efforts by one country may mean little if its neighbors' systems are weak. NATO and EU member states have a vested interest in sharing approaches and projecting operational resilience procedures forward to key neighbors.

NATO allies and EU member states should identify — very publicly — their resiliency with that of others beyond the EU and NATO, and share societal resilience approaches, operational procedures and foresight analysis with partners to improve societal resilience to corruption, psychological and information warfare, and intentional or natural disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other critical infrastructures, with a strong focus not only on prevention, but also on response. Forward resilience should also enhance joint capacity to defend against threats to interconnected domestic economies and societies and resist Russian efforts to exploit weaknesses of these societies to disrupt them and put them under its influence.

Forward resilience should also consider timely response as a crucial component through better shared coordination with regard to early warning and foresight analysis, as well as 'bounce back' capacities well in advance so as to deter attacks or disruptions to our societies' weak links.

In sum, effective resilience should encompass a spectrum that embraces national, shared and forward strategies, and which itself is an integral part of broader "full spectrum" efforts at deterrence, defense and emergency management. A Resilience 2.0 agenda that not only incorporates but also goes beyond current state-by-state efforts to encompass both shared and forward resilience is likely to be welcomed by the Trump Administration as well as the British Government. It would also go far to enhance Euro-Atlantic security, and would offer new avenues of allied-partner and NATO-EU
cooperation. Such an agenda might give consideration to the following elements:

**Develop and expand the Intelligence-Sharing Agenda set at Warsaw.** Slow decision-making based on incomplete or differing intelligence assessments is beginning to be addressed by the Alliance. Improved Joint Information Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities decided at Warsaw are focusing in the first instance on the most ready forces, such as the NRF. NATO is creating a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security who will run a new Division in the International Staff. But problems related to situational awareness and rapid decision making are deep. Brexit will tilt British preferences to NATO channels over those of the EU when it comes to intelligence-sharing. Improved NATO-EU mechanisms in this regard might be the next best channel to ensure continued strong UK participation in intelligence-sharing arrangements beyond NATO. And the next step for NATO would be to create an Intelligence Committee somewhat similar to the Military Committee, consisting of national intelligence officers from each mission.

- Establish genuine multilateral intelligence training. The EU IntCen should scale up training modules not just to new EU intelligence analysts, but also to non-intelligence officers within the EU bureaucracy as well as NATO officials, to familiarize them with each other's systems, and to some extent, to analysts from security agencies in partner countries. Similarly, NATO should consider opening its training modules to relevant EU officials.

**Develop and expand the cyber defense agenda.** At Wales, cyber defenses were categorized as collective defense. It was noted that certain cyberattacks could constitute an Article 5 attack. At Warsaw: 1) cyber was classified as a separate “domain” which could have significant long term consequences for NATO’s command structure; 2) nations made a “cyber pledge” to better defend their own networks (which has been the most vulnerable element of NATO’s network); NATO is primarily responsible for defending its own network and this pledge should expand cyber protection provided by individual nations), and 3) NATO’s cyber range will be expanded to give nations practice in defending against cyber threats. For the future, NATO will need to more clearly define how it is prepared to use the offensive cyber capabilities of member stated to enhance cyber deterrence. A Cyber Coordination Center and eventually a NATO Operational Cyber Forces HQ will be needed. Both the UK and the U.S. are likely to support such efforts.

**Establish special cyber support teams** that can be deployed to partner countries to increase interoperability, improve information-sharing and coordinate responses to cyber crisis. Establish individually-tailored projects and expand existing projects in accordance with interests and capacities of partners to enhance their cyber security and defense. Prospective cooperation areas in cyber defense include increasing interoperability, sharing strategic and technical information and threat assessments, coordinating responses to cyber crisis, and engaging partners into NATO’s education, exercises and training activities.

- To support NATO allies’ resilience in the cyber security context, cyber experts should be included within
NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU). This would help assess vulnerabilities, increase preparedness and interoperability in regards with crisis response.

- Assess the levels of the existing maturity of cyber security and defense capacity in partner countries. Coordinate and synchronize mutual training and assistance projects with the EU in order to avoid overlapping. The Partnership Review and Planning Process (PARP) should include cyber defense elements as part of broader resilience efforts, and planning should to be aligned with the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP).

- Partners would benefit from the development of minimal requirements for the protection of their critical infrastructure and in regards with cyber defense.

Create Forward Resilience Advisory Support Teams. NATO has periodically used Advisory Support Teams for civilian emergency planning purposes. The resilience commitments made at the Warsaw Summit will require a revitalization and expansion of these Advisory Support Teams in such areas of emergency preparedness including assessments; intelligence sharing, support and analysis; border control; assistance to police and military in incident management including containing riots and other domestic disturbances; helping effectuate cross-border arrangements with other NATO members; providing protection for key critical infrastructures including energy; and, in the cyber arena, support to and enhancement of NATO’s Cyber Response Team. Efforts to build these teams should be accelerated. In certain countries, such Teams could be collocated with NATO Force Integration Units, and help national responses with NATO military activities including especially special operations activities.

- Pool EU and NATO resources for Forward Resilience Advisory Support Teams. They might be used to address the highest priority needs in countries where both the EU and NATO are each engaged in projecting resilience beyond their borders, for example in Ukraine and in the western Balkans.

- Host nations could be encouraged to establish working group-type secretariats to coordinate defense activities with overlapping civil authority and private sector key critical infrastructure functions to enhance national capacity to anticipate, prevent, respond and recover from disruptive scenarios and to provide a key point of contact for Forward Resilience Advisory Support Teams.

Include Finland and Sweden as full partners in these efforts. Both countries have significant traditions of total defense and societal security, and would bring significant added value and experience to these efforts. Finnish experience with territorial defense, border guards, and whole-of-government approaches to societal security, for example, or Swedish expertise with addressing asymmetrical dependencies on external resource flows, may mean that these countries could be leaders in cooperative efforts as neighbors seek to enhance their efforts in such areas.

- Forward resilience should be integrated as a high-priority element of each country's Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EOP).
- NATO should also intensify work in the 28+2 format connected to Civil Emergency Planning, which has not advanced as far as the 28+2 in the military and political arenas.


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Cybersecurity: the effects of Trump presidency and Brexit

Sarah Backman

The cybersecurity challenges facing Europe today and in the future are many and complex. The British exit from the EU (usually referred to as “Brexit”), in combination with the presidency of Donald Trump has forced European security cooperation into a phase of uncertainties and turbulence, whose outcome is still unknown. At the same time, Europe faces unprecedented digital threats.

The transboundary nature of cyber threats in combination with increasing societal dependence on cyberspace makes it hard to fully grasp their potentially disruptive impact. Cyber incidents affect individuals, businesses and nations alike, and the frequency of these incidents is increasing rapidly. Cybercrime “as a service” has become more and more common. EC3 (European Cybercrime Centre) stated in its annual threat report from 2016 that “the additional increase in volume, scope and financial damage combined with the asymmetric risk that characterizes cybercrime has reached such a level that in some EU countries cybercrime may have surpassed traditional crime in terms of reporting”. At the same time, European critical infrastructure has proved vulnerable to cyberattacks that seek financial gain, with the WannaCry ransomware attacks on hospitals and organizations during May 2017 – the most extensive attack ever of its kind – setting a fearsome example. Moreover, in late 2016, security researchers uncovered “Operation Cloud Hopper” – a cyber espionage campaign conducted by a China-based threat actor, which targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), allowing the attackers unprecedented potential access to sensitive data and intellectual property. 2016 also marked a shift in the cyberattack landscape towards campaigns designed to influence political outcomes, such as disinformation campaigns. Generally, the use of offensive
cyber power has become more and more likely a result of an increasing number of attacks for subversive purposes.

On the 8th of May 2017, the European Political Strategy Centre (European Commission) issued a Strategic Note called “Building an Effective European Cyber Shield – taking EU Cooperation to the Next Level.” It clearly states that Europe is currently insufficiently prepared to successfully meet the requirements of cybersecurity in the present cyber threat and risk landscape. It emphasizes the importance and urgency of the European Union and its Member States to make cyber capability a political priority, quickly scale up European cybersecurity cooperation and individual Member State cybersecurity capabilities, and anticipate a plan “for hitherto unimaginable scenarios in which they would be put under severe [cyber] attack”. A swift roll out of the recent NIS (Network and Information Security) Directive, aiming to improve cyber capabilities and cooperation across the EU, will be important, says the strategic note – but the EU and Member States must already consider enhancing competence sharing beyond that. Europe faces great challenges in improving the currently uneven cyber capabilities across the continent, lacking information sharing and cooperation between various stakeholders, as well as a still lacking general awareness of cyber threats and their possible implications.

In this new and darker phase of digital development, horizontal collaboration (such as between states and between private and public actors), as well as vertical collaboration between, for example, the technical and strategic levels is key. Strengthening international collaboration and information sharing has long been considered one of the most important EU measures regarding cybersecurity, which has resulted in several new EU cybersecurity collaboration initiatives such as the CSIRT network – consisting of Member State CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) and CERT-EU (Computer Emergency Response Team of the EU institutions), the Cooperation Group (consisting of representatives of Member States, European Agency of Network and Information Security (ENISA) and the European Commission) and a new public private partnership on cybersecurity (with ECSO, European Cyber Security Organization).

Considering the grave situation regarding cyber threats and the dire need for improved European cybersecurity collaboration, how will Brexit affect European cybersecurity and the EU cybersecurity initiatives?

It is clear that the UK has strong incentives to continue promoting increasing cybersecurity capabilities, cooperation and information sharing within Europe, not least due to the cross-border nature of cyber threats and the likeliness of a domino-effect should a major cyber crisis hit the continent. cybersecurity is indeed one of the areas specifically mentioned by the UK as an important area of continuous cooperation when leaving the EU. Thus, it is likely that we will see the UK still supporting EU initiatives and objectives regarding cybersecurity and cybersecurity collaboration. It is difficult at this point to foresee exactly how post-Brexit UK-EU cooperation on cybersecurity will look like. Naturally, the UK will lose some of its current influence regarding EU cybersecurity laws and policies. New agreements between the EU and the UK will also have to be negotiated. The new EU privacy-regulation GDPR (General
Data Protection Regulation) which has to be implemented into Member State law by May 2018 will most likely continue be implemented in British law, which will ease cooperation and trade.

However, information sharing and capability sharing between the UK and the EU will probably decrease as a result of UK’s diminished role in EU cybersecurity collaboration initiatives and institutions like the CSIRT-Network and the EC3 (European Cybercrime Centre). Moreover, interoperability might suffer as a result of less interaction between key cybersecurity personnel.

As a result of Brexit, the UK will likely promote European cybersecurity more through NATO, for example via CCDCOE (The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence) and will work towards increasing EU-NATO collaboration on cybersecurity matters. Signs of the British move towards promoting cooperation between the two are already visible. In March 2017, Stephen Lovegrove, the British Defence Ministry’s permanent secretary, called for greater NATO-EU cooperation on cybersecurity at the Atlantic Council. That same month Michel Fallon, British Defence Secretary urged the EU to “cooperate more closely with NATO, to avoid unnecessary duplication and to work together on new threats, including cyber.” at a meeting of EU defence ministers in Brussels. NATO, especially in case of weakened support from the US, might in return benefit greatly from the UK (being one of the most cybersecurity mature countries in Europe and, arguably, the world) stepping up its commitment to NATO cybersecurity issues and pushing NATO-EU cyber collaboration forward. The prospects for a closer collaboration had indeed been strengthened by Brexit, but likewise by new agreements on closer EU-NATO cybersecurity cooperation. For example, the NATO-EU joint declaration presented at the NATO Warsaw summit 2016, EU and NATO states its intentions to strengthen their relationship by introducing (for the first time in the EU-NATO relations) an official set of interlinked and complementary activities in cyber defence and cybersecurity. Moreover, proposals for increased information sharing have been discussed at high level staff dialogues between EU and NATO.

However, the question remains: to what extent will increased cyber information sharing within Europe be achieved? Cybersecurity information is often sensitive in nature, which creates a natural reluctance to share it. In order to enhance information sharing, trust has to be further developed. The preconditions for such trust to develop among European actors has certainly been severely weakened by Brexit and the Eurosceptic winds connected to it, regardless of closer EU-NATO cybersecurity cooperation and the UK’s motivation to continue its cybersecurity cooperation with the EU. And without continuous development of trust, cybersecurity cooperation at the European level may stall, with the result that bilateral or regional structures will instead be the settings of deep cybersecurity cooperation in Europe.

When it comes to the effects of the Trump presidency on European cybersecurity, the aspect of trust is central as well. Trump’s protectionism and Jacksonian unilateral focus, as well as his favoring of “hard power” over “soft power”, lead us to expect that he will promote the narrative of cybersecurity as a defence and individual national security
issue. This is in contrast to the EU’s narrative of cybersecurity as a shared challenge which requires extensive and rather deep international collaboration and information sharing.

President Trump has continuously discussed the importance of cybersecurity, calling it one of the US’ most critical national security concerns. Showing his commitment to enhancing US cybersecurity, Trump issued an executive order the 11th of May 2017 called “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure”, which presents cybersecurity as a national security priority and tasks the DHS to assess and report on a number of key actions in order to, among other things, secure critical infrastructures.

In line with our expectations on his focus on “hard power”, Trump has continuously emphasized the need for the US to gain increased cyber counterattack capabilities, which would include greater retaliation against (especially state-sponsored) attacks.\(^{35}\)

It remains to be seen exactly how the Trump administration will engage in international cybersecurity collaboration and develop cybersecurity policy. As part of the executive order issued in May, an international cybersecurity engagement strategy will be developed in addition to international cybersecurity priorities. This strategy will give more clarity in President Trump’s ambitions and what we can expect in the next few years regarding US-Europe cybersecurity collaboration.

However, it is clear that President Trump takes cybersecurity seriously and will try to enhance the United States cybersecurity level generally. It is also clear that he aims to enhance the US offensive cyber capabilities and that he views cyber capability as a “hard power”, with less emphasis on international collaboration. President Trump has also shown little interest in increasing or deepening security cooperation within NATO or with the EU, a stance which will probably include cybersecurity.

This may lead to a more cyber-resilient and cyber-secure United States, but it might also lead to a more hostile international cyber environment with increased tensions and risk for cyber conflict. It will definitely present a challenging international environment for Europe to develop trust, cybersecurity collaboration and common capabilities in.

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Transatlantic turbulence – implications for European security

Björn Fägersten

This report has illuminated the driving forces and logic behind two separate but interlinked events: the Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. Together, these developments have rocked the two pillars of European security: the transatlantic link and European integration. In order to gauge the breadth of possible effects, as well as possible ways to mitigate these effects, four security domains were then analysed in relation to Brexit as well as the Trump administration: defence, cyber security, Intelligence cooperation and resilience. In this final section, overarching trends and possible spin-off effects will be discussed with a specific eye on security in northern Europe. Considering that all three variables in the analysis – the priorities of the Trump administration, the meaning of Brexit and the development of European security cooperation – are constantly in motion, this should be seen as a tentative analysis highlighting areas of relevance for future strategic planning.36

Diverging geopolitical outlooks

The single most serious effect of the current transatlantic turbulence on European security is the divergence within the West concerning overall geopolitical outlook. The liberal world order – an international system based on the liberal democratic state’s internal characteristics: market economy, rule of law and individual freedom – is the guiding principle holding the West together. The reluctance of the American President to underwrite this order and his obvious ignorance of the benefits it has delivered to the US dwarfs any other concerns Europeans...
might have over his policy preferences. Indeed, the major worries that European states have raised concerning President Trump – his disdain for the European Union, his unwillingness to reassure NATO allies of US commitment to article 5 and his uncritical stance on Vladimir Putin and other authoritarian leaders – can all be seen as symptoms for his inability and/or reluctance to believe in this order. Multilateral commitments and a rule-based order, in his view, limits the gains that the US could extract out of interaction with other players in the system. His national security advisor H.R. McMaster and his national economic advisor Gary Cohn put this appreciation of a Hobbesian order in plain text a few days after Trump’s May 2017 visit to Europe:

The president embarked on his first foreign trip with a clear-eyed outlook that the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. We bring to this forum unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral strength. Rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs, we embrace it.37

The problem here is that since World War II, the West has invested in and benefitted from an alternative order where Hobbesian competition built on strength alone has been complemented by regions of peaceful interaction and absolute gains, by alliances and relationships built on shared values and by specific domains – such as the climate – which increasingly are managed by a “global community”. Writing of even the aspiration to a liberal and cooperative system based on Hobbesian principles amounts to an abdication from global leadership. This does not imply that ‘the West’ is over as a force in global politics but its role will be severely weakened as long as this divergence prevails.

This divergence between Europe and the US is of course painful for the European Union, which embodies the characteristics of the liberal world order and which has been instrumental in preserving this form of international relations in Europe, especially at a time when internal development in countries such as Poland and Hungary questions these values and principles from within. But it is potentially even worse for the UK whose exit from the European Union was premised on the liberal order: only under that system could a medium sized player like the UK hope to negotiate trade arrangements and “go global” with the backing of a functioning system of trade and arbitration. In Trump’s preferred system of transnationalism, protectionism and short-sighted competition, the UK has less to gain from cutting itself lose from the Continent. Having decided to do so, the UK might have to adjust its policy stances just to accommodate the US so as not to isolate itself further. Changing positions on Israel/Palestine, being quick to visit Washington, refusing to discuss the US election with its EU partners and avoiding to speak out against Trump on other issues can be seen as indicative of such geopolitical hedging.

In sum, the most serious risk of current transatlantic turbulence is that the EU, the UK and the US are drawn apart in their geopolitical outlooks. From the perspective of European security, such strategic divergence would make it harder to unite on issues such as Russia, the conflicts in the MENA region as well as Europe’s role in its regions security. If European states are keen to mitigate this risk, or at least alleviate its
consequences a few strategies are conservable which will be discussed below.

**Division of tasks among security institutions**

Another effect that might be viewed more as an opportunity than a risk is an increasingly clear division of tasks between the institutional platforms used to provide for European security. While Trump has failed to signal a strong commitment to NATO allies on the political level, his administration has continued – and even increased – reassurance measures in Europe in face of Russian aggression. The fact that the US has troops on the ground in the Baltic nations and continuously trains and prepares for joint action adds credibility to the US’ commitment to being presence and its resolve, despite President Trump’s own signals. The lukewarm support from President Trump also implies that European allies that worry about Russian behaviour will have to double down on their commitments to territorial defence (as well as lend symbolic support to Trump’s preferred focus area of fighting terrorism). The forward presence of the US in the European theatre is also relevant for its projection of power elsewhere in the region, which is in line with the Trump administration’s ambition to bring military strength to the competition with other nations as described in the quote above. But while territorial defence backed by the US thus seems to prevail as NATO’s prime function, other areas might have to be carried out with less US support. Considering the transactional perspective of President Trump, Libya-style operations in Europe’s neighbourhood where vital US interests are not evident will be a hard sell for European allies.

At the same time, the EU has made considerable headway the last year concerning different areas of security cooperation such as research and development, capacity development and governance. Brexit has been a factor here – both in the sense that the remaining 27 needed to show progress within a challenged Union but also since the UK had put a break on development for many years – as has President Trump. Notably however, none of the advances have in practice impinged on NATO’s role as Europe’s territorial defender. On the contrary, measures such as the new military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) increases the efficiency of the EU’s out-of-area missions and PESCO as well as the new defence fund will help Europeans to shoulder their pre-existing commitments within NATO as well as the EU. Even the rhetoric surrounding this development has been largely void of the traditional calls for a European army and rather the complementary nature of EU security measures has been stressed. This does not imply that the EU does not have a relevant role for the security of Europe, on the contrary, it shows that its methods lie in the areas of crisis management, counter-terrorism, comprehensive engagement in the neighbourhood, and resilience building at home and abroad – not deterrence and traditional defence. This division of tasks has been cemented by Brexit since the possible deterrence capacity of the EU without the UK will be reduced and UK reinvestment in NATO to showcase European engagement will strengthen the core task of territorial defence in that alliance.

**Future of European autonomy**

The political meaning of autonomy is that Europeans should be vested with some among of security policy “actorness” that is
not dependent on American support. This requires material capacities (tangible military forces and strategic enablers such as airlift and intelligence), decision-making, planning- and command structures (national or centralized) and the political will for collective European action. The idea of European autonomy has long lingered in the background as initiatives to strengthen the EU as a security actor have been discussed. It was a factor in the reinvention of the Western European Union and the Petersberg tasks in the 1990s and the later transfer of these tasks to the new Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. The 1998 St, Malo declaration of France and the UK struck a balance between ambitions of autonomy and ambitions to preserve the transatlantic security link for years to come.  

Although the US sequentially dropped its hesitation to the idea of European autonomy (as it can be seen as a way of European shouldering more of the responsibility – and costs – of their own security) progress has been slow. Recent efforts to boost autonomy have focused on specific elements (the European Commission has for example highlighted the role of a strong and competitive European armaments industry) or has qualified the application of autonomy (the 2013 European Global Strategy Report for example suggested the concept of regional strategic autonomy). The importance of autonomy was highlighted by Federica Mogherini’s European Union Global Strategy of 2016. Recent events now seem to add to the momentum towards autonomy. France, traditionally a supporter of European autonomy (but also a fierce guardian of its own sovereignty) now has a government with a strong focus on the EU and an apparent ambition to strengthen the French-German axis of policy making. The role of a stronger military Germany has traditionally worried several European partners but now seems to be a joint European interest. The UK, for long a sceptical observer in the field is now stepping down from its veto-position and might very well appreciate a more capable EU when it does not fear being forced into any future European army. And finally the US, with a President that by example reminds the Europeans why it might be a good idea to be able to act independently of the US.

Will these changes on the continent, in the UK, and in the US lead to a more autonomous EU? A likely scenario is that the level of autonomy within the EU will grow with the current momentum but that its different components (material resources, planning and decision structures and political will) will not develop in sync which decreases the output within the policy field. Brexit and President Trump’s foreign policy agenda will also lead to fragmentation of European security. Without the UK, the EU will not be the platform on which Europeans can enjoy strategic autonomy, at least in terms of demanding military tasks. However, with Trump in the White House, countries such as France and Germany will be hesitant to invest in such a manner for the European pillar of NATO to be the platform for the exercise of European autonomy. Barring these alternatives, real European strategic autonomy will in the medium term only materialize in coalitions in which big players in European security have aligned interests. The extents to which these countries will agree are then tied to the development of overall geopolitical outlooks, as discussed above. This scenario, of course, carries consequences for smaller countries.
because they will have less of a role in shaping security policy under such consequences.

**Risk and opportunity of European minilateralism**

A likely effect of Brexit is the increased focus on sub-regional, bilateral and minilateral groupings, as suggested by Christian Mölling and Claudia Major. These groupings offer clear benefits as they can push cooperation further among like-minded actors, and could affect larger multilateral groupings such as the EU and NATO. In some cases, these groupings are less geopolitically charged than larger formal alliances. For the UK, engagement in or with smaller groupings offer additional benefits: cooperation with specific partners can be sustained after Brexit; the possibility to influence EU via these formats; and a way to link the continent with the US (the latter two benefits constituting an important geopolitical task within its special relationship with the US).

Northern Europe houses several of these smaller cooperation formats with varying degrees of activity within them. The Nordic-Baltic cooperation spans several portfolios ranging from EU coordination to security policy and transatlantic affairs. The Northern Group, started by the then-Secretary of Defence of the UK, Liam Fox, aims to facilitate greater partnership between the UK and the Nordic and Baltic states, in addition to Germany and Poland. Activity has been sparse but the format has the potential to bring together NATO and EU members. Bilaterally, Sweden and Finland has gone far in its security relationship, which now resembles something close to an alliance between two non-aligned states. This cooperation has been closely followed and encouraged by the UK, and has resulted in the imminent membership of two Nordic countries in the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force.

These cooperation formats offer added value in the security realm – especially for countries that build their security on the premise of offering and receiving help in case of security challenges. In case of the UK (especially considering its exit from the EU) caution is warranted. In a positive scenario, where Brexit has not resulted in geopolitical drift between the UK and the continent, cooperation in sub-regional, bilateral and minilateral groupings will be an effective way to “keep the UK close” in matters of European security. This will be a way of compensating for the fact that the UK will no longer be part of the EU’s solidarity clauses – which is a potential security loss, especially for the EU’s non-NATO member states. In a negative scenario, the UK might take on a role of spoiler rather than constructive partner in relation to European integration. Bi- and minilateral formats then become potential mechanisms with which continental Europe might become divided (but not ruled). The Anglo-French Lancaster House cooperation offer one way to balance the German-French axis of European affairs (and the French would probably see benefits as it allows them to gate-keep British influence over Europe). Engagement with internal policy outliers such as Hungary and Poland would offer other balancing opportunities against the European core and its institutions. UK-Nordic engagement could also divert resources away from EU27-cooperation.
However, in reality, the choice is not binary and cooperation will produce effects in both directions. As a rule of thumb, members of the EU that see a value in EU cohesion should make sure that cooperation with the UK in bi- and minilateral formats complement rather than compete with aspects of EU integration.

A new Anglo-European security and solidarity pact?

Several of the essays in this report hint at possible areas of fruitful security cooperation between the EU27 and post-brexit UK. Resilience-building, counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, cyber security and crisis management are examples that have been discussed. While this is all good, a range of more or less informal arrangements without any framework or superstructure that offer direction or ensure that different measures are in sync risks delivering suboptimal results. Just as the various EU-UK trade and investment agreements will most likely be grouped in a future comprehensive free trade agreement after Brexit it would be helpful to group and develop future security cooperation within a dedicated framework too. Such a framework could include three vital functions or baskets; a political manifestation of solidarity and cooperative benefits; structures for decision making and policy planning; and finally, formats for operational cooperation and coordination. In the first basket, the UK and the EU could, at the very least, issue a guiding declaration of solidarity and shared interests. A more ambitious alternative would be to find ways for the UK and the EU to sign a solidarity clause mirroring the substance (but not the processes) of the two existing solidarity clauses of the EU. This would bring meaning and direction to more practical aspects of cooperation. In the second basket one could place an overarching deal for UK involvement in the CFSP and CSDP, including permanent deliberation and policy-shaping roles within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and expertise within the External Action Service. This could lead to a general policy alignment that in turn would increase the utility and functioning of more practical areas of cooperation. Lastly, in the final basket, one could place practical sectoral cooperation on the issues named above – for example, by regulating UK access to Europol databases, financial contributions and cyber threat sharing protocols. Taken together, an Anglo-European security and solidarity pact like this would offer the best guarantee that both partners could enjoy mutually beneficial security cooperation. A bespoke deal like this would acknowledge the UK’s importance, increase security for all European countries, and allow the UK to avoid deeper entanglement within this field while not creating unnecessary risk for contagion. Indeed, it seems farfetched that members without the UK’s specific ideational background would prefer an agreement that essentially mirrors EU membership without voting rights.

European integration and national security positions

Finally, current transatlantic turbulence puts several national security policy positions under stress. The overarching effects of Brexit and the Trump administration on the US, the UK and the EU27 have been discussed in previous essays as well as above. However, individual European countries will see their positions challenged as a consequence. Countries that depend heavily on their bilateral ties to either the US or the UK will have to hedge if the one of the more
dramatic scenarios of geopolitical drift and/or spoiler tendencies materializes. EU-NATO relations will likely be affected as indicated above. This might motivate a recalibration and adjustment of engagement and investments by member states in general but in particular by states that are only members of one of the two organisations. Finally, the topic of this report – transatlantic turbulence – is only one of several factors now driving EU security integration. Indeed, it is the confluence of current trends – economies of scale arguments prompted by austerity, the increasing levels of threats in the neighbourhood, internal strategy development in the form the European Union Global Strategy, the need to showcase union in the face of Brexit, new opportunities to develop cooperation now that a sometimes obstructive UK is leaving the union as well as a need for Europeans to take a more active role in catering for the regions security under the Trump administration – that set this area up for rapid policy development. Adding to this, there is strong support for the development of the EU’s role in the security realm. This confluence of push factors, in addition to a high level of political symbolism, and considerable public support increases the political cost for member states that seek to obstruct cooperation. EU member states hesitant towards deeper cooperation and supranational elements within the security and defence field will thus have to calculate the cost of obstruction in a post-UK EU as well as balance the value of securing their preferred level of integration in relation to the value of EU unity within security and defence.

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36 This essay has been enriched by interviews and discussions at the Defense Committee of the UK Parliament, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Centre for European Reform (CER) in May 2017.
40 See “Brexit, Security and Defence: A political problem, not a military one” in this collection.
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